(Fwd) [globalobserver] Why the Taliban collapsed so quickly

["Davide Bertok" <davide.bertok@adriacom.it>]

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To:             	"The Global Observer" <globalobserver@yahoogroups.com>
From:           	"Maurizio Scalari" <scalanews@yahoo.com>
Date sent:      	Thu, 15 Nov 2001 22:56:20 +0100
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Subject:        	[globalobserver] Why the Taliban collapsed so quickly

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Why the Taliban Collapsed So Quickly
November 13, 2001
Anthony H. Cordesman

We don't have enough detail as yet to know exactly why the Taliban
collapsed as quickly as it did in the North and center -- and it is
premature to count them out around Qandahar and as a guerrilla  force.
No one should assume its over until its over, and there could still be
a long battle for Qandahar or guerilla battle in Pashtun areas.

Nevertheless, but there are a number of factors that certainly
contributed to the Taliban's collapse over the last few days and which
could lead to further collapses in the near future:

1. Alienation from the Population

The Taliban has always been a relatively narrowly based movement even
in terms of the Pashtun group which is its core. In many ways, its
extremism made it into a new "Russia," occupying hostile areas in
about 60% of the country, and meant that the Taliban was virtually an
occupying force in Uzbeck, Tajik, and Hazara areas, as well as in any
relatively modern urban center.

The problem of alienation has been further complicated by
Taliban/Qaida dependence on Arab and Pakistani volunteers, which we
hated even by the Pahstuns, and on Pakistan, which led to charges that
the Taliban elite had sold out to Pakistan. While Islam is certainly
an issue in the region, Islamic solidarity and causes are often a
fragile source of unity compared to personal, clan, ethnic and
national rivalries.

2. Loss of Pakistani Support and Resupply

The Taliban won at least some of its battles because it could get
rapid resupply and help from Pakistan. When the U.S. bombing effort
began, the Taliban became limited to limited resupply from smuggling
across the border with Pakistan, and this did not allow it to properly
resupply areas like Mazaar e-Shariff or Herat. The problem was further
complicated by U.S. air strikes on depots and the vulnerable supply
routes north to Kunduz and the fronts against the Tajik forces in the
Northern Alliance.

The Taliban had also won many of its past battles because of its
ability to move reinforcements and resupply freely and securely by
truck, and to rush in reinforcements by air. This made up for poor
planning and logistics and became impossible after the U.S. air
attacks.

In contrast, British sources report heavy Russian resupply of armor,
fuel, and ammunition to the Northern Alliance before the advances,
although the increases were in tens of armored weapons, not the
hundred that would be "heavy" reinforcements in other wars.

3. Force Density and Too Many Low-grade Volunteers

The Taliban only had a core strength of around 25,000 real troops and
45,000 experienced fighters to cover a nation the size of Texas with
over 24 million people. This simply was far too thin a force once the
U.S. and others added in air power, major resupply, and training. It
meant it would be very difficult to hold the North and center and
things were made worse by the need to create defensive lines with
low-grade volunteers.

Ideological or fanatic troops can often fight well in extended
guerrilla combat but have a terrible record of holding up in
conventional combat in the face of major firepower. Furthermore, once
one part of a defensive line collapses which only has thinly held
perimeters, the entire line and defense tends to roll up.

Retreating and repositioning under military pressure is also one of
the most difficult maneuvers possible even for good forces, and many
defensive forces catalytically collapse after losing a meeting
engagement. Furthermore, it takes great discipline to organize
cohesive movement of both men, major weapons, and resupply, and adjust
the command chain. The Taliban did not have this capability, and even
when forces retreated in the right direction, they often left supplies
and sustainability behind.

4. Communications and Command and Control

British sources claim the U.S. bombing really did heavily disrupt an
already awkward command chain, affecting both reinforcement and
resupply before the retreat, and the ability to manage operations the
moment things when wrong and the Taliban had to maneuver and retreat.
This disruption was a function of the relocation of command centers, a
break down in the satellite phone communication system, and the
inability of the dispersed forces to restructure command and
communications once they had to retreat.

5. Bombing and Special Forces

The fact that the bombing was slow and cumulative makes it impossible
to know how much the Taliban lost in terms of major weapons and
supply, but this is not always a matter of numbers of personnel or
equipment kills. Relatively small levels of damage at the right place
can have extraordinary impact in disrupting operations of a poorly
organized defensive force and allow even a relatively weak ground
attack to succeed with little or no real fighting.

The addition of British and U.S. special forces to help target Taliban
ground forces, coordinate Northern Alliance movements, and handle
resupply may also have been critical. The physical and psychological
impact of bombing timed to support an ongoing tactical advance is far
greater than other uses of air power. This is particularly true when
the defending forces are overstretched and lack the command capability
and training to cross-reinforce.

As a result, it is unclear that BDA focusing on equipment kills ever
really gives a clear picture of the real impact of air power. It will
be some time, however, before the role of outside Special Forces is
clear and the actual fighting capability of the Northern Alliance is
clear. The battles to date seem to have involved actually firefighters
of some 50 to several hundred people -- a small part of the force --
and there is a lot of TV coverage of Northern Alliance armor which has
guns covered or does not show signs of field wear and fighting.

6. Divisions in the Taliban/Al Qaida and the Pashtun "Backlash Effect"

The Taliban could hold its Pashtun support together as long as it
seemed able to survive, but the fears of Pashtun groups of being left
out of any Northern Alliance victory, tensions over Taliban ties to
Pakistan, and tensions with Arab and Pakistani volunteers, created a
situation where the Taliban has faced considerable internal
vulnerability.

This "backlash" effect of the threat of a Northern Alliance victory
has almost certainly been fueled with great intensity by Pakistan,
which desperately wants to avoid a future non-Pahstun government, and
which now has great incentive to pay off any Pashtun factions it can
to dump the Taliban. The presence of U.S. special forces and
U.S.-backed Pashtun leaders in the area cannot hurt



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