Europe Missile Defense

[rossana <rossana at comodinoposta.org>]

Seguire quanto accade nella realizzazione della difesa antimissile è la 
naturale conseguenza delle inchieste sui territori concepite per 
ricostruire una mappa aggiornata delle basi militari.
Sapevamo della trasformazione e del riposizionamento strategico USA in 
Europa. Sapevamo che Bulgaria e Romania sarebbero divenute la nuova 
frontiera orientale della NATO e poi dell'Europa.
Sapevamo che la Francia sebbene restia ai propositi di difesa 
antimissile americano, nel 2003 ha voltato pagina. Buona parte dei 
sistemi (satelliti, missili tattici, ecc) di quella architettura sono a 
buon punto. Certo la Francia, in prima linea nei progetti antimissili 
NATO, continua a pensare che i suoi risultati potrebbero plasmare un 
sistema completamento europeo.

Europe

In their thinking about missile defense, Europe and the United States, 
broadly speaking, have come from opposite sides of the spectrum. Defense 
against aircraft was a major NATO-European Cold War preoccupation 
leading to the development of an air defense belt across the NATO 
central front. In the United States, the debate has historically focused 
on defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles especially after 
President Reagan’s March 23, 1983 speech calling for a concerted effort 
to develop a missile defense. The discussion of missile defense in 
Europe has evolved from defense against aircraft to defending also 
against short-range missiles (extended air defense). In the United 
States, faced with the growing threat of missiles armed with weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), the debate has increasingly emphasized defense 
against mis¬siles of varying ranges. The effect of 9/11 was to bring 
into the U.S. discussion a greater appreciation of the destruction that 
could be wrought by an aircraft used as a weapon. In Europe the 
implications of 9/11 include a greater recognition of vul¬nerability 
from terrorist action. European support – in so far as it exists – for 
the development of missile defense systems represents a logical 
evolution from air defense. In the United States the effect of 9/11 was 
to reinforce the need for defense against a broad range of threats. The 
extent to which there will be a narrowing of the transatlantic gap in 
this spectrum leading to consensus strong enough to support 
transatlantic missile defense remains to be seen.
To the extent that Europeans have considered missile defense, the 
emphasis has been on TMD systems. This is the focus of NATO efforts 
based on the TMD feasibility studies approved by the Alliance in October 
1999. The need for a unified, in¬teroperable NATO-wide TMD architecture 
has become more urgent in light of coalition operations and the 
multiplicity of tasks for missile defense. Such systems would form the 
terminal defense against shorter-range missiles and could become part of 
a broader architecture providing for a layered missile defense, thus 
creating the basis for a transatlantic division of labor or at least 
greater specialization of effort between NATO Europe and the United 
States in defense against ballistic missiles.
In addition to ongoing work on programs such as the Medium Extended Air 
Defense System (MEADS),(14) the United States has also moved forward 
with plans for a larger regional anti-missile architecture.

14The project, pursued trilaterally by the United States, Germany, and 
Italy, is designed to produce a tactical, mobile terminal-phase theater 
missile defense complement for deployed American and European troops. 
The United States and Italy signed the MEADS Design and Development 
Memorandum of Understanding in September 2004, allowing the two 
countries to proceed with the project on a “limited basis.” In May 2005, 
the Bundestag approved entry into the design and development phase of 
MEADS, allowing Germany to become an official signatory. See “Germany 
Approves Involvement in MEADS Missile,” Defense Industry Daily, May 2, 2005.
___________________________________________________________________________________
This includes agreements to upgrade two crucial radar bases, the 
Fylingdales Royal Air Base in northern England and the Thule facility 
(expected to be finished by 2007) on the Danish autonomous colony of 
Greenland – for missile defense duties, as well as institutionalizing an 
ongoing ABM dialogue with both Copenhagen and London. The upgrades will 
give the radars the capacity to track and establish the flight 
trajectories of the missiles and their payloads, making the two radars 
more capable of guiding U.S. missiles to intercept
ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.(15)
U.S. officials state that the ABM dialogue does not currently include 
discussions on deployment of interceptors in either the United Kingdom 
or Greenland.
A substantial diplomatic campaign launched by the White House beginning 
in mid-2002 also elicited positive preliminary responses from a number 
of Eastern European countries – including Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic – on a broad range of possible anti-missile roles, ranging from 
early warning to the basing of terminal-phase defenses. In 2004 and 
2005, the United States held exploratory discussions with these three 
nations on the possibility of basing a third GMD in¬terceptor site 
(beyond those in Alaska and California) on one of their territories. No 
decision has yet been taken. However, such a site could defend much of 
Europe while also supplementing the capability to defend the United 
States. U.S. officials indicate that such discussions underscore 
America’s commitment to protecting U.S. allies and deployed forces.(16)

15 Agreements on these upgrades were formalized with Britain and Denmark 
in February 2003 and August 2004, respectively. For more information, 
see Mike Rance, “U.K.-U.S. Missile Defense: Would British Accept Missile 
Emplacements?,” DefenseNews.com, May 15, 2005, 
<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=854800&C=commentary>; Matthew 
Lee, “US, Denmark, Greenland Sign Agreement to Modernize US Base,” 
Agence France Presse, August 6, 2004; Wade Boese, “Greenland Radar 
Cleared for U.S. Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2004, 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/GreenlandRadar.asp>; and 
Baker Spring, Executive Memorandum: Congress Should Commend Britain on 
Missile Defense Radar Upgrade, The Heritage Foundation, February 21, 
2003, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/em861.cfm>.
16 “Iran Minister Tells Hungary USA ‘Fanning Flames’ of Iranian Nuclear 
‘Threat’,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, February 16, 2005; 
“Opposition Head Demands Briefing on Hungary – USA Talks on Missile 
Network,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, January 12, 2005; see 
also Wade Bose, “U.S. Eyes Missile Defense Site in Europe,” Arms Control 
Today, July/August 2004, 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/MDSite.asp>.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________


This focus has been matched within NATO. The November 2002 NATO Prague 
Summit produced an unprecedented consensus regarding the growing 
ballistic missile threat confronting Alliance members. The final 
communiqué emphasized that NATO had reached an Alliance-wide commitment 
to examine “options for addressing the increasing missile threat to 
Alli¬ance territory, forces and population centers.”(17)
Following up on this commitment, in January 2004 NATO commissioned a 
study to explore the feasibility of a strategic missile defense system 
that would protect the alliance from a ballistic missile attack. The 
classified report was completed in early July 2005, and it reportedly 
addressed a variety of issues, including the location of interceptor 
sites and sensors, management of debris (from intercepts of incoming 
missiles), the rules of engagement for an allied ballistic missile 
system, the sensors needed for an early warning system, cost estimates, 
and a threat analysis.(18)
This report will form an input into a final report from NATO’s 
Conference of National Armaments Directors, which will serve as the 
basis for all future consultations on this system. This latter report is 
expected in 2006.(19)
In addition, NATO is moving ahead with the development of a deployable 
Alliance Theater Missile Defense System that would be used to protect 
NATO troops during operations and to defend territory/troops from short- 
and medium-range missile threats in certain regional settings.(20)
In July 2005, NATO authorized $480 million for this purpose, and the 
final system will incorporate member countries’ TMD components in an 
overall system that will target a missile in its boost, midcourse and 
terminal phases.(21)
For instance, for the boost phase, NATO expects to employ armed unmanned 
aerial vehicles or, if available, airborne lasers, and for the midcourse 
phase, it may employ the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
system. For the terminal phase, NATO may utilize MEADS or the PAC-3 
system, or perhaps the Franco-Italian Surface Air Moyenne Portée/Terre 
system. A program management organization has even been established to 
develop management and technical capacities so that the Alliance TMD 
System can establish an initial operating capability by 2010.(22)

17 Prague Summit Declaration, Prague, Czech Republic, November 21, 2002.
18 “Industry Study Weighs Feasibility of NATO Strategic Missile 
Defense,” Inside Missile Defense, July 20, 2005.
19 Ibid.
20 NATO Briefing, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” March 2005, 
p3, <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/wmd-e.pdf>.
21“NATO Releases First Batch of Theater Missile Defense Funds,” Inside 
Missile Defense, July 20, 2005.
22 Ibid.