a couple of recent Chomsky interviews

["nello margiotta" <nellomargiotta55 at virgilio.it>]

Sabahattin Atas Interviews Noam Chomsky

1. In many of your writings and speech you describe Israel like a terrorist
country. I read once you had lived for a while at kibbutzs in the "A Life Of
A Dissent". What was the reason for such a preference? In addition to this
how do you evaluate the legitimate (recognition) problem of Israel in terms
of world public opinion exclusively Islamic countries?

I do not remember actually calling Israel a "terrorist country," though it
certainly engages in actions of a kind that we call "terrorism" and
"aggression," among other crimes, when perpetrated by official enemies.

It is important to bear in mind that the term "terrorism" is commonly used
as a term of abuse, not accurate description. There are official definitions
of "terrorism", for example, those of the US and British governments, which
are quite similar. Bu they are not used, because they do not distinguish
between good and bad varieties of terrorism. That distinction is determined
by the agent of the crime, not its character. It is close to a historical
universal that our terrorism against them is right and just (whoever we
happen to be), while their terrorism against us is an outrage. As long as
that practice is adopted, discussion of terrorism is not serious. It is no
more than a form of propaganda and apologetics.

If we use the term in accord with its official definitions, then,
uncontroversially, Israel (like the US, Britain, Turkey, and others) is a
terrorist state by the standards we apply to official enemies. Scale and
character of course varies from case to case, but none of it is attractive,
to put it mildly.

I lived briefly in a kibbutz 50 years ago -- and, in fact, thought seriously
about staying there. I was very much attracted by the style of life and the
form of social organization, though not without serious reservations. I also
had an intimate personal involvement, from early childhood, in the social
movements of which the kibbutzim were a part. These movements were opposed
to establishment of a Jewish state, but within the Zionist movement of the
pre-State era.

On the matter of legitimacy and recognition, once the State of Israel was
established in 1948, my feeling has been that it should have the rights of
any state in the international system: no more, no less. That includes,
specifically, the right to live in peace and security within its recognized
international borders, understood to be the pre-June 1967 borders, with
minor and mutual adjustments. These rights have been recognized by a very
broad international consensus since the mid-1970s, including the major Arab
states. The US and Israel, virtually alone, have opposed the international
consensus since the mid-1970s, and still do. Since the mid-1970s the US has
vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for a two-state settlement on
the international border with full recognition of the rights of Israel and a
new Palestinian state, has regularly voted against General Assembly
resolutions to this effect (along with Israel, sometimes one or another
dependency), and blocked other diplomatic efforts seeking to achieve this
goal. The only US-Israel proposals, all informal, require that the
Palestinian territories be broken up effectively into several cantons,
virtually separated from one another and from some small part of Jerusalem,
the center of Palestinian cultural and economic life. Something similar is
projected, also without formal declaration, in the Gaza Strip. Jewish
settlements and enormous infrastructure projects proceeded without a break
right through the period of the Oslo "peace process," establishing these
"facts on the ground" while talk continued, taking control of the scarce
water resources and much of the valuable land. They still continue, at an
accelerating pace. The US and Israel have demanded further that Palestinians
not only recognize Israel's rights as a state in the international system,
but that they also recognize Israel's abstract "right to exist," a concept
that has no place in international law or diplomacy, and a right claimed by
no one. In effect, the US and Israel are demanding that Palestinians not
only recognize Israel in the normal fashion of interstate relations, but
also formally accept the legitimacy of their expulsion from their own land.
They cannot be expected to accept that, just as Mexico does not grant the US
the "right to exist" on half of Mexico's territory, gained by conquest. We
do not have sufficient archival evidence to be confident, but I suspect that
this demand was contrived to bar the possibility of a political settlement
in accord with the international consensus that the US and Israel have
rejected for 30 years.

But to repeat, Israel and a new Palestinian state should be accorded the
rights of all states in the international system, no more, no less. That
option will soon be excluded, if the US and Israel continue to carry out the
development projects in the occupied territories in such a way as to render
the Palestinian region a "permanent neo-colonial dependency" -- the goal of
the "peace process," according to Prime Minister Ehud Barak's chief
negotiator. Many Israeli and Palestinian analysts are coming to regard those
developments as irreversible, in which case an entirely new situation
emerges.

2. What do you think about the road map USA wants to put in life among
Israel and Palestine? For some it is only an attempt to propitiate (ateno
for) the Arabs for the USA's Iraq occupation. How real can this claim be?

I have written about it elsewhere, can cannot repeat the details here. In
brief, the "road map" of the Quartet (Europe, Russia, the UN, the US)
requires Palestinians to terminate all forms of resistance to the Israeli
military occupation, but is sufficiently vague in other respects so that the
US-funded Israeli settlement and development programs in the occupied
territories can proceed, guided only by President Bush's "vision," which
remains unspecified. The nature of these programs suggests an outcome that
resembles to the establishment of "homelands" for the black population by
the apartheid regime of South Africa 40 years ago, a comparison often drawn
in Israeli commentary. The US blocked the release of the "road map" for some
time, finally releasing it, one may plausibly conjecture, as part of its
efforts to reduce the enormous opposition to its invasion of Iraq by
appearing to offer something to the Palestinians.


3. In your opinion, what are the plans of America for Iraq and the future of
Middle East? How will the situation effect the Middle East if America is
exposed to the same, which was in Vietnam, also in Iraq? May the Middle East
get more confused or may a calmness take place?

The US presumably seeks to establish a powerful position right at the heart
of the world's major reserves of energy, thereby strengthening its control
over this "stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest
material prizes in world history," as the State Department described the
Gulf region at the end of World War II. Formal democracy in Iraq and
elsewhere would be acceptable, even preferable, if only for public relations
purposes. But if history is any guide, it will be the kind of democracy that
the US has tolerated within its own regional domains for a century. Here the
US has sought to bring about democratic change but only if it is restricted
to "limited, top-down forms of democratic change that did not risk upsetting
the traditional structures of power with which the United States has long
been allied," maintaining "the basic order of quite undemocratic societies";
I am quoting Thomas Carothers, a Latin America scholar and an official of
the Reagan administration who worked in its "democracy enhancement"
programs. The historical record amply supports that judgment, in the Middle
East as well. The rich and instructive historical record will be disregarded
only by those who have blind faith in powerful states. And of course the US
is by no means alone in these practices.

There is little likelihood, I think, of the kind of resistance that the US
faced in Vietnam, under very different circumstances and at a different
historical moment. The long-term effects may be to stimulate terror,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and general turmoil, much as
Western intelligence agencies and many analysts among the foreign policy
elite have predicted. But human affairs are not predictable with any
confidence: too much depends on will and choice.


4. According to the common opinion in the world is it the turn of Iran after
Iraq, do you think it is turn of Iran?

Iraq was an appropriate target because it was completely defenseless, having
been reduced to the edge of survival by a decade of murderous sanctions,
primarily targeting the civilian population, with a toll of hundreds of
thousands dead by conservative estimate, and leaving most of the country in
ruins. This followed brutal and destructive wars and horrendous internal
terror, most of it with the backing of the US and Britain, including those
now running Washington, facts regularly suppressed. Iraq had also been
virtually disarmed by rigorous inspections, and such limited defenses as it
had were destroyed by regular US-UK bombing attacks. By the time of the
invasion, Iraq was one of the weakest states of the region, with military
expenditures about a third those of tiny Kuwait and far below the US allies
in the region, let alone the US and its British client. It is astonishing
that there has been any resistance at all. Iran is a different story. It is,
I think, unlikely that the US will invade Iran, though it will presumably
continue to try to isolate it and perhaps to undermine it from within.


5. There are some evidences that a Kurdish State will be established in the
Northern Iraq with the pioneering of America and Israel. Do you agree with
this ?

I think that is extremely unlikely. Israel can do very little without US
authorization, and the US does not want to see a Kurdish state established,
under current circumstances.


6. As you know the second memorandum which would let American troops pass
through Turkey was rejected in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and
Turkey didn't join the invasion of Iraq with America. Can this be the
begining of the cold term relationships between America and Turkey as it is
widely claimed?

Washington and US elites were infuriated that the Turkish government took
the same position as 95% of the population rather than following orders. The
influential Pentagon planner Paul Wolfowitz even went so far as to condemn
the Turkish military for its weakness in permitting the government to
conform to the will of the population. This was one element of an
extraordinary demonstration of bitter of hatred and contempt for democracy,
without any counterpart that I can recall. Attitudes towards democracy were
also demonstrated with unusual clarity in the distinction that was drawn
between "Old Europe" and "New Europe," the former bitterly condemned, the
latter praised. The distinguishing criterion was sharp and clear: the
governments of "Old Europe" took the same stand as the great majority of
their populations, and were therefore reviled; the leaders of "New Europe"
overrode even larger majorities (as in Spain and Italy) and took their
orders from Crawford Texas, and were therefore hailed for their courage and
grand qualities. Meanwhile media and intellectuals were proclaiming their
deep commitment to democracy and intentions of establishing it throughout
the Middle East and elsewhere. This has been a most remarkable performance.
George Orwell would have observed it with astonishment. To anyone capable of
thinking, the performance explains rather clearly what "democracy" means in
the elite intellectual culture in the US (and the West generally): democracy
is fine, as long as you do what we we say.

The lesson in democracy that Turkey taught to the US is deeply resented by
US elites, and may elicit retaliation, but that alone is unlikely to lead to
a significant cooling of relations. However, many other processes are
underway. The worldwide US military basing system has always been oriented
in large measure towards the Middle East oil-producing region, and in the
last few years the US has been positioning military bases nearer to that
region. European military bases are being shifted from Central Europe to the
east, to former Russian satellites. The Afghan war provided the US with new
military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia. And if the US can
consolidate its control over Iraq, it will be able to establish reliable
military bases right at the heart of the oil producing region for the first
time. Previously, the closest reliable base was in the island of Diego
Garcia, a British possession from which the population was expelled, and not
permitted to return, despite the orders of the British Courts, a situation
that is not unfamiliar in Diyarbakir. Iraqi bases will lessen Washington's
dependence on the Turkish basing system that has been a core feature of the
US-Turkey military alliance. Furthermore, Turkey has independent reasons to
improve relations with Iran -- in many ways a natural trading partner. These
are steps that the US will strongly oppose, as long as Iran retains some
measure of independence. There are many possible sources of tension.


7. In one of your interviews you had talked about a local media and you had
added that " if I did not see this with my eyes I would never believe this."
Do you think that the same local media movements belong to the public can be
formed in other parts of the world? Or otherwise was that movement only
special to Brazilia? Because as you know like -in the example of Port
Alegro -Brazilia has an exceptional place on earth.

The popular media I observed were not in Porto Alegre, but in huge suburban
slums outside Rio de Janeiro. And they were quite remarkable. If these
achievements were possible under such conditions, they could be duplicated
in many other places. What is required is energy, will, commitment. It is
never easy. Every repressive society has its own barriers to freedom and
justice. But what has been achieved in Brazil is impressive, just as the
struggle for human and civil rights in Turkey is truly inspiring. In many
respects I know of nothing like it elsewhere. Every place on earth can be
truly exceptional in its own ways.


8. You have mentioned that in your second conversation in Diyarbakýr. "Once,
on the one hand I was opposing the American State policies on the other hand
I used to work at the projects which were financed by Pentagon in my
University. So they used to pay my salary." If we evaluate the subject from
this point; How must be the relationship between an intellectual and a
University where is the one of the place in which the system renews itself.
Because there is not 'a paradoxal democracy perspective' in the other most
of the world countries and much time the intellectual may choose to hide his
truths for his sake.

Intellectuals can choose to hide their beliefs and to serve power, or they
can follow the model of prominent writers, artists, journalists, publishers,
academics and others in Turkey and stand up courageously for freedom and
justice. There are rewards for conformity and often punishment for honesty
and decency, varying in ways that reflect the nature of the society. That is
true for slaves, and for everyone else. Because many people throughout
history have resisted these pressures, humanity has been able to move to a
higher plane of existence -- slowly, painfully, with frequent regression,
but over time with unmistakable progress. There are no general formulas I
know of that can be simply applied. And there is no reason to believe that
the process has come to an end, or, for that matter, that it ever will.


9. It is claimed that Turkey is successful about securalization,
democratization and the process of the securalization, and it is believed to
be a good model for the other Muslim countries. What do you think about
this?

Turkey has been successful in some ways, and has seriously failed in others.
I am in no position to hand out grades for good and bad behavior. It is for
the people of Turkey to make their country a model that others may seek to
follow, insofar as it is appropriate for them.


10. For the last, May I have a general evaluation of Your feelings, thoughts
about Diyarbakýr and the time you Passed in Diyarbakýr?

Visiting Diyarbakir several times last year was a very moving experience.
Though the visits were unfortunately very brief, I was able to meet quite a
range of people, including human rights activists, students, political
leaders, writers, families living in caves outside the city walls, many
others, and to get at least a little sense of life in the semi-official
capital of the Kurdish regions. I had a glimpse of another element of the
same tragedy and heroism in the miserable slums of Istanbul where Kurdish
refugees try to survive in tiny rooms in condemned buildings, and to create
a life for themselves with the little they have, awaiting a chance to return
to their destroyed villages in peace. The bravery of people who have
suffered gravely, and their dedication to gain their rights and their
freedom, is a remarkable tribute to what the human spirit can endure, and to
achieve. To be able to share even a bare moment with them is a wonderful
gift, which I will always cherish, along with others, among them a Kurdish
dictionary with a touching inscription given to me by students at a public
meeting, one of many acts of great courage and principle that I was
privileged to witness. These are truly unforgettable experiences. I hope to
be able to return in happier times, when the just demands of the Kurdish
people are coming to be fully realized.



Estonian newspaper Eesti Ekspress
Argo Riistan Interviews Noam Chomsky

1. Considering all the circumstances, what is your opinion on the US plan to
bring democracy and peace to Middle East, starting with Iraq?

The question is based on a presupposition: that the US plans to bring
democracy and peace to the Middle East. The presupposition is partially
correct. US planners surely do hope to bring peace, but so does everyone;
even Hitler hoped to establish peace. The question always is: On what terms?
The same is true of democracy; Stalin and his cohorts, even in internal
discussion (now available in released archives), called for protecting "true
democracy" from Western attack. The question always is: What kind of
democracy? To answer this question for the Kremlin, we look at their record
in the regions under their control. Similarly, in the US case, the rational
way to proceed is to investigate the record of the past century, until
today, in the regions that have been under US control.

And the answers are quite unambiguous. As the more honest advocates of
"democracy projects" recognize, the US has sought to bring about democratic
change, as long as it was "limited, top-down forms of democratic change that
did not risk upsetting the traditional structures of power with which the
United States has long been allied," maintaining "the basic order of quite
undemocratic societies" (Thomas Carothers, Latin America scholar and
official in the Reagan administration's "democracy enhancement" programs).

The historical record amply supports that judgment, in the Middle East as
well. The conclusion is confirmed further by the display of brazen hatred
for democracy in the past few months, which has no counterpart that I can
recall. Attitudes towards democracy were demonstrated with unusual clarity
in the distinction drawn between "Old Europe" and "New Europe," the former
bitterly condemned, the latter praised. The distinguishing criterion was
sharp and clear: the governments of "Old Europe" took the same stand as the
great majority of their populations, and were therefore reviled; the leaders
of "New Europe" overrode even larger majorities (as in Spain and Italy) and
took their orders from Crawford Texas, and were therefore hailed for their
courage and grand qualities.

Paul Wolfowitz, hailed as the "visionary" who seeks to bring democracy to
the Middle East, denounced the Turkish military because they permitted the
parliamentary government to follow the will of 95% of the population,
instead of intervening by force to ensure that Turkey would "help
Americans," and called on them to apologize for this shocking failure. It
takes real discipline not to perceive what all of this means. Fortunately,
the intellectual classes are well-disciplined, so it all passes in silence.

Like British and French rulers in their day in the sun, the US will be happy
to establish formal democracy in Iraq and elsewhere, as long as proper
discipline is maintained. And there are many ways to ensure that "democracy"
will keep to its assigned path: by force, by economic strangulation under
the neoliberal regimes designed this purpose, or in other ways.

History is of course not science. It is possible that some dramatic change
will take place, for which not the slightest evidence exists -- apart from
the noble rhetoric of leaders and the acclaim of their acolytes. But
dramatic change can be expected only by those who prefer blind faith to
rationality and the evidence of history.


2. A common opinion is that since the US is a dominating power it should
continue it's current foreign policy and stay in the business of managing
the affairs of other countries. Do you agree with that? How, in your
opinion, should the US do that?

The opinion is a very strange one. By the same logic, one could have argued
at one time that Stalin and Hitler should "stay in the business of managing
the affairs" of the countries subject to their rule, and then ask "how
should they do that"? For those who regard freedom, democracy, and
elementary justice as ideals worth upholding, the question simply does not
arise.


3. New countries, including Estonia, are about to join the NATO and EU. What
kind of an impact do you expect this expansion to have on the future of
these organizations?

That is a choice for the people of Estonia and other new members. US
planners and elites have made it reasonably clear what they hope the impact
will be. As the Western business press has explained with much joy, they
expect that Eastern Europe will provide cheap and disciplined labor that
will undermine the hated European social market system, enabling business
leaders and governments to "hammer away at high wages and corporate taxes,
short working hours, labor immobility, and luxurious social programs" and to
impose the US-UK model of low wages and benefits, the longest working hours
of the industrial world, and other such "market reforms" that are resisted
by the "pampered" workers of the West.

In the political sphere, US planners hope that Eastern Europe will be more
subordinate to Washington's will, and will serve as a "Trojan Horse" that
will impede European moves towards an independent role in world affairs.
That is a concern shared by Washington and Moscow during the Cold War years.
For the US, it persists, and now extends to Northeast Asia as well. But the
answer to the question is for the people of the "new countries" to provide.


4. There have been several serious diplomatic and political crashes between
the governments of European countries and the US government. What can be
done in order to improve the relationships between Europe and the US?

We have to begin by identify the basis for these clashes. The US leadership
and intellectual classes (including elite media) are bitterly resentful that
the governments of "Old Europe" -- that is, the industrial and financial
heartland of Europe -- did not assist the US in pursuing its goals.
Relations will improve, from this point of view, if Europe recognizes its
responsibility to follow Washington's lead. "Old Europe" sees the matter
differently. Its governments joined the vast majority of the population of
Europe, and the rest of the world (insofar as evidence exists), in objecting
to the Bush administration declaration in September 2002, in its National
Security Strategy, that it intended to control the world indefinitely, by
force if necessary; and in objecting to the exemplary action selected to
establish that "new norm in international relations," the invasion of Iraq.

Like most of the rest of the world, Europeans also objected to the Bush
administration's dismissal of international institutions and international
law, and its undermining of treaties designed to reduce threats of
destruction that are quite serious: the Kyoto Protocols, the Biological
Weapons Convention against Germ Warfare, bans on militarization of space,
crucial arms control agreements, and so on.

There are more long-standing concerns, for example, those expressed lucidly
by Henry Kissinger 30 years ago when he addressed Europeans during the "Year
of Europe," advising them that they must keep to "regional interests" within
an "overall framework of order" managed by the United States. These are real
differences, not to be wished away. They can be overcome, but only by
dedicated commitment of people who care about the world that they are
leaving to their grandchildren.


5. Do you have any predictions about the results of 2004 Presidential
election in the United States?

The incumbents have great advantages, primarily overwhelming financial
resources, thanks to the gifts they have showered on the wealthy and
powerful. They also have the ability to conjure up threats to frighten the
population, with the support of the loyal media. And other advantages as
well. However, they face serious problems. Their domestic programs are
highly unpopular. That is not surprising. The programs are designed to
create what economists call a "fiscal train wreck," by vast increases in
government spending (benefiting largely the wealthy, often under the pretext
of "defense") and sharp tax cuts primarily for the very rich.

Vast unpayable bills, they assume, will enable them to "starve the beast,"
to borrow the rhetoric of their first tenure in power during the Reagan
years; the present incumbents are largely drawn from the more reactionary
jingoist sectors of the Reagan and Bush Senior administrations. Their phrase
"starve the beast" refers to the openly-declared intention to undermine
government services that benefit the general population: the limited health
care programs that exist, social security, schools, etc.

But these policies are, naturally, opposed by the general population, just
as they were during the Reagan years; Reagan ended up being the most
unpopular living president, ranking alongside of Nixon. There is only one
known way to hold political power under such circumstances: press the panic
button. And at least in the short term, it often works, as many other
unscrupulous leaders have understood throughout history. During the Reagan
years, the population was regularly frightened by a series of concocted
demons: Libyan hit-men wandering the streets of Washington, trying to
assassinate the bold cowboy leader barricaded in the White House; an air
base in Grenada that the Russians could use to bomb us (if they could find
it on the map); the grave threat of the Nicaraguans only "two-days driving
time" from Texas; black rapists in the streets; hispanic narcotraffickers;
and on, and on. The same measures are adopted today.

The vast propaganda campaign initiated in September 2002 succeeded quickly
in convincing Americans that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to their
existence and that he was responsible for the 9-11 atrocities, beliefs held
nowhere else in the world, even in Kuwait and Iran, brutally attacked by
Saddam. How long such will work, no one can predict. There have always been
strong and healthy currents of independence of thought and resentment of
illegitimate authority among the general population, and they constantly
reveal themselves in unanticipated ways. A great deal is uncertain -- 
meaning, subject to will and choice.


6. You and Susan Sontag were two intellectuals seriously attacked because of
your statements after the Sept. 11th terrorist attacks. Were you surprised?
What do you think caused these furious reactions?

It is a familiar experience for me, or for anyone who does not reflexively
line up in the service of power, not just in the United States but almost
everywhere, and throughout history. Why should there be any surprise?