Re: Sudan, the United States and Allegations of Biological Weapons

["Fulvio Grimaldi" <bassottovic at libero.it>]

Ottima analisi. Grazie per avercela inoltrata. Estremamente illuminante,
anche in relazione alle ricorrenti campagne antisudanesi di ambienti
vaticani.
Ciao,
Fulvio
----- Original Message -----
From: "Nello Margiotta" <animarg at tin.it>
To: <pck-pace at peacelink.it>
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2001 12:13 AM
Subject: Fw: Sudan, the United States and Allegations of Biological Weapons


>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "ESPAC" <director at espac.org>
> Sent: Monday, December 10, 2001 1:34 PM
> Subject: Sudan, the United States and Allegations of Biological Weapons
>
>
> > The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
> > 1 Northumberland Avenue
> > London
> > WC2N 5BW
> > England
> >
> > Tel:    020 7872 5434
> > Fax:    020 7753 2848
> > Email: director at espac.org
> > http://www.espac.org
> >
> >
> > Date of Publication:  10 December 2001
> >
> >
> >
> > SUDAN, THE UNITED STATES AND ALLEGATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:
> > IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNSUSTAINABLE
> >
> >
> > On 19 November 2001, the United States government stated that "we are
> > concerned about the growing interest of Sudan...in developing a
> > biological weapons programme". (1)  This unsubstantiated claim was made
> > by John Bolton, American Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, at a
> > conference in Geneva. It must be said that such a claim is deeply
> > irresponsible to say the very least, and is very much in keeping with
> > the previous Clinton Administration's failed attempts to isolate Sudan
> > from the international community by making similarly unsubstantiated
> > claims. It is also clear that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
> > Agency has previously played its own part in putting political policy
> > and expediency before science with regard to Sudan. Following
> > Washington's disastrously inept attack on the al-Shifa medicines factory
> > in Khartoum in 1998, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency made
> > inaccurate and misleading claims which it subsequently had to retract.
> > It should also be noted that John Bolton is an appointee more responsive
> > to United States domestic politics with regard to Sudan than scientific
> > facts. (2)  Bolton's claims also jar with Bush Administration statements
> > that Sudan has been cooperative on security issues.
> >
> > The cornerstone of the previous Administration's rationale for its
> > policies towards Sudan were similarly vague, repeated claims that Sudan
> > was a supporter of international terrorism. This was constantly cited
> > both in statements by Administration officials and in media coverage.
> > That much of this imagery was very flawed has become increasingly
> > obvious. The Clinton Administration's 1993 listing of Sudan as a state
> > sponsor of terrorism was questioned from the start by former President
> > Jimmy Carter. The 1998 attack on the al-Shifa medicines factory in
> > Khartoum because of alleged involvement with chemical weapons was
> > subsequently revealed to have been a disastrous fiasco, with Washington
> > repeatedly turning down invitations for weapons inspectors to visit
> > Sudan. And it is also documented that over one hundred CIA reports on
> > Sudan and terrorism from 1993-96 had to be withdrawn as unreliable or
> > having been fabricated. This level of incompetence led the London
> > 'Times' newspaper to state that such a circumstance "is no great
> > surprise to those who have watched similar CIA operations in Africa
> > where 'American intelligence' is often seen as an oxymoron." (3)  There
> > is nothing to suggest that the basis for Mr Bolton's unsubstantiated
> > claims differs in any way from this pattern of unreliability. American
> > "intelligence" on Sudan is not just unreliable, but disinformation - and
> > what amounts to little more than propaganda - has often been dressed up
> > as "intelligence", and then used in attempts to justify questionable
> > policy towards Sudan. This has not gone unnoticed by the European Union
> > and other members of the international community. For its own
> > credibility on this serious issue the Bush Administration cannot allow
> > its reputation with regard to arms control and non-proliferation to be
> > sullied for the sake of cheap propaganda attacks on Sudan.
> >
> > Additionally, a September 2001 article in 'The Observer' newspaper in
> > Britain reported that Sudan's attempts to actually cooperate with the
> > United States on anti-terrorism issues had been rebuffed for several
> > years before being acted upon by Washington in 2000. (4)  It has also
> > been revealed that Sudan offered to hand Osama bin-Laden over to the
> > American government in 1996. Amazingly, the offer was declined. (5)
> > After several years of declining repeated Sudanese invitations for
> > American intelligence and counter-terrorist personnel to come to Sudan
> > and investigate whatever they wanted to, joint CIA, FBI and State
> > Department teams have been in Sudan since early 2000. (6)  In August
> > 2001 Bush Administration officials confirmed that the Sudanese-American
> > cooperation on counter-terrorism had been positive. (7)  In fact, based
> > on this dialogue, the United States had agreed to the lifting of the
> > limited United Nations sanctions on Sudan. (8)  They were originally due
> > to have been lifted in the same week as the attacks on America. 'The
> > Observer' observed that Washington had given Sudan "a clean bill of
> > health" in May 2001, a long-overdue development.
> >
> > This American-Sudanese intelligence cooperation was said to have
> > "covered everything". (9)  Given that Mr Bolton is, by statute, defined
> > as advising the Secretary of State on matters "related to international
> > security policy, arms control and proliferation" one would have expected
> > him to have been aware of these key developments pertaining to
> > "international security". There are simple questions that must be asked.
> > Given that CIA, FBI and State Department investigation teams have been
> > active in Sudan for eighteen months or so (and bearing in mind that the
> > U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is part of the State
> > Department) were the claims in question not raised or investigated?
> > Would queries about biological warfare programmes not be at the top of
> > the agenda for any such investigation teams? If they were raised with
> > the Sudanese government, and Khartoum was uncooperative would Washington
> > have described Sudanese-American cooperation as positive? Surely the
> > American government would not have given Sudan "a clean bill of health"
> > if there had been either any evidence whatsoever of Sudanese involvement
> > in developing a biological warfare programme or if Khartoum had been
> > uncooperative in American enquiries?
> >
> > Given the seriousness of the claims made by Mr Bolton, especially in the
> > wake of the horrific attacks on New York and Washington-DC, and in the
> > light of previous American intelligence incompetence with regard to
> > Sudan, one would have expected considerably more professionalism from
> > him, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the American
> > government in general. The time of repeating almost ritual,
> > unsubstantiated claims about Sudan is over. One had hoped that the Bush
> > Administration would be distancing itself from the failed policies and
> > propaganda excesses of the Clinton Administration. (10)  All this has
> > succeeded in doing is fuelling an already extensively misinformed and
> > increasingly vocal anti-Sudan lobby within the United States which
> > continues to distort American policy towards Khartoum. Such claims also
> > undermine the reputation of the United States within the international
> > community.
> >
> > In addition to the al-Shifa fiasco, it is also worth noting that there
> > have been several other attempts to propagandistically implicate Sudan
> > with weapons of mass destruction. In February 1998, the Congressional
> > Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare claimed that 600 Scud
> > missile systems had been transferred to Sudan from Iraq. Even the
> > Clinton Administration had to deny this claim, stating that: "We have no
> > credible evidence that Iraq has exported weapons of mass destruction
> > technology to other countries since the (1991) Gulf War." (11)  In
> > addition to the American government, in February and March 1998, the
> > British government also stated that there was no evidence for any such
> > weapons of mass destruction technology transfers from Iraq to Sudan.
> > This was the view of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the
> > Defence Intelligence staff of the British Ministry of Defence. On 19
> > March 1998, Baroness Symons, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of
> > State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, stated in Parliament in
> > relation to claims of weapons of mass destruction technology transfers,
> > including chemical and biological weapons, from Iraq to Sudan, that: "We
> > are monitoring the evidence closely, but to date we have no evidence to
> > substantiate these claims.... Moreover, we know that some of the claims
> > are untrue...The defence intelligence staff in the MoD (Ministry of
> > Defence) have similarly written a critique which does not support the
> > report's findings." (12)  Baroness Symons also stated that: "Nor has the
> > United Nations Special Commission reported any evidence of such
> > transfers since the Gulf War conflict and the imposition of sanctions in
> > 1991." (13)
> >
> > There have also been several claims that the Sudanese government used
> > chemical weapons in southern Sudan in July 1999. (14)  In this instance
> > it was possible to take samples from the area concerned. The British
> > government's chemical and biological defence agency at Porton Down
> > rigorously tested seventeen such samples of water, soil and shrapnel for
> > the spectrum of known chemical agents. In the government's response, the
> > British Minister of State for Defence stated that "very careful analysis
> > of all the available evidence" led the government to "conclude that
> > there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations that chemical
> > weapons were used in these incidents in the Sudan." More samples were
> > independently tested in Finland and the United States. These also tested
> > negative. In fact, the British government remarked on "the consistency
> > of results from these three independent sets of analysis". The British
> > government reiterated its findings in October 2000, when they once again
> > stated that "there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations that
> > chemical weapons were used in Sudan. (15)  A United Nations medical team
> > had also travelled to the area in which it was claimed the chemical
> > weapons attack took place. The United Nations stated that: "The
> > results...as reported to the United Nations, indicated no evidence of
> > exposure to chemicals." (16)
> >
> > The United States government has been party to a series of blunders, or
> > outright deceit with regard to its claims about Sudan. It is against
> > this background that these, the most recent claims of interest in
> > biological warfare should also be viewed and assessed.
> >
> >
> > The Listing of Sudan as a "State Sponsor of International Terrorism"
> >
> > The Clinton Administration listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism
> > in August 1993. Sudan joined Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and
> > Cuba on the American list.  Whatever other states on the list may or may
> > not have done, Sudan was included in spite of the fact that there was
> > not a single example of Sudanese involvement in any act of international
> > terrorism. And it is also clear that Sudan was listed without any
> > evidence of its support for terrorism. This much is a matter of record.
> > Former United States President Jimmy Carter, long interested in Sudanese
> > affairs, went out of his way to see what evidence there was for Sudan's

> > listing. Carter was told there was no evidence: "In fact, when I later
> > asked an assistant secretary of state he said they did not have any
> > proof, but there were strong allegations." (17)
> >
> > It would appear, therefore, that despite no evidence whatsoever of
> > involvement in any act of terrorism, Sudan was listed as a state sponsor
> > of terrorism. In addition to former President Carter, Donald Petterson,
> > the United States ambassador to Sudan at the time of Sudan's listing,
> > stated that he was "surprised" that Sudan was put on the terrorism list.
> > Petterson said that while he was aware of "collusion" between "some
> > elements of the Sudanese government" and various questionable
> > organisations: "I did not think this evidence was sufficiently
> > conclusive to put Sudan on the U.S. government's list of state sponsors
> > of terrorism." (18) Moreover, it would seem that Ambassador Petterson,
> > the American ambassador to Sudan, was not even briefed prior to the
> > decision to list Sudan being taken. When he queried the decision, he was
> > told by an assistant secretary of state that the "new evidence was
> > conclusive". (19) One can only speculate as to whether the assistant
> > secretary of state briefing Ambassador Petterson was the same assistant
> > secretary of state who told former President Carter a few days later
> > that the Clinton Administration did not have any proof, but that there
> > were "strong allegations".
> >
> > A clear example of an American policy of putting a policy of demonising
> > Sudan before facts.
> >
> >
> > The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
> >
> > The United States government has also both claimed and denied that Sudan
> > had been involved in the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center
> > in New York. At first, the United States government reported that the
> > World Trade Center bombing was carried out by a poorly trained local
> > group of individuals who were not under the auspices of a foreign
> > government or international network. (20) In June 1993, the American
> > authorities again stated there was no evidence of foreign involvement in
> > the New York bombing or conspiracies. (21) In August 1993 it was alluded
> > to that Sudan had in some way been involved in the attack. In late April
> > 1996, however, in the wake of two lengthy trials which convicted those
> > responsible for the outrage, Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr, the
> > Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, made it very
> > clear that there was no Sudanese involvement whatsoever in the World
> > Trade Center bombings:
> >
> > "We have looked very, very carefully and pursued all possible clues that
> > there might be some state sponsorship behind the World Trade Center
> > bombing. We have found no such evidence, in spite of an exhaustive
> > search, that any state was responsible for that crime. Our information
> > indicates that Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang were a group of freelance
> > terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan, who came from
> > various nations but who did not rely on support from any state." (22)
> >
> > Yet, earlier that month, on 3 April, the then American ambassador to the
> > U.N., Madeleine Albright, in meetings at the United Nations, claimed
> > that two Sudanese diplomats had been involved in the World Trade Center
> > bombing, and other "plots". (23) This presents an interesting situation.
> > The political appointee, Mrs Albright, with a political and policy line
> > to follow, claiming one thing, and the professional anti-terrorism
> > expert, Ambassador Wilcox, saying something completely different.
> >
> > On an issue as serious as allegations of terrorism such as divergence is
> > totally unacceptable and once again undermines the credibility of
> > American claims with regard to Sudanese "involvement" in terrorism.
> >
> >
> > The 1998 American Attack on the al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory
> >
> > The American government's cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa
> > medicines factory in Khartoum in August 1998 provides a case study of an
> > incompetent, bumbling intelligence and policy process concerning claims
> > of Sudanese involvement in international terrorism.
> >
> > On 7 August 1998, terrorist bombs devastated United States embassy
> > buildings in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds of people, some of them
> > American, were killed in the explosion in Nairobi and dozens in the
> > blast in Dar-es-Salaam. Thousands more were injured. On 20 August,
> > American warplanes attacked and destroyed the al-Shifa medicines factory
> > in Khartoum. The American government claimed that the factory was linked
> > to Osama bin-Laden and the National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, went
> > on record stating: "There is no question in our mind that facility, that
> > factory, was used to produce a chemical that is used in the manufacture
> > of VX nerve gas and has no other commercial distribution as far as we
> > understand. We have physical evidence of that fact and very, very little
> > doubt of it." (24)
> >
> > Sudan requested the convening of the Security Council to discuss the
> > matter, and also requested a technical fact-finding mission to verify
> > American claims. (25)  The United States deputy ambassador to the United
> > Nations, Peter Burleigh, dismissed Sudanese calls for independent
> > verification of the site: "I don't see what the purpose of the fact-
> > finding study would be. We have credible information that fully
> > justifies the strike we made on that one facility in Khartoum." (26)
> >
> > The Sudanese government also stated that it was prepared to allow
> > Americans to visit Khartoum to establish whether the al-Shifa factory
> > was involved in the production of chemical weapons. (27) The Sudanese
> > foreign minister also invited an investigation committee from the United
> > States government itself to come and investigate "whether this
> > factory...has anything to do with chemical (weapons)." (28)  On 22
> > August, the Sudanese President invited the United States Congress to
> > send a fact-finding mission: "We are fully ready to provide protection
> > and all other facilities to enable this mission to obtain all
> > information and meet anyone it wants." (29)  In the weeks and months
> > following the al-Shifa bombing, the Sudan repeatedly called upon the
> > United Nations and United States to inspect the remains of the factory
> > for any evidence of chemical weapons production. The Americans have
> > steadfastly refused to inspect the site. This is ironic given that in
> > 1998, the United States and Britain militarily attacked Iraq because
> > that country would not allowed the inspection of certain factories and
> > the remains of factories, but when the Sudanese requested a similar
> > inspection of a site claimed to have been a chemical weapons factory,
> > the Clinton Administration pointedly refused. 'The Washington Post'
> > quoted a Sudanese diplomat at the United Nations: "You guys bombed Iraq
> > because it blocked U.N. weapons inspectors. We're begging for a U.N.
> > inspection and you're blocking it." (30)
> >
> > The American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory fell by the
> > wayside one by one. After just over one week of sifting through American
> > government claims, 'The Observer' newspaper spoke of: "a catalogue of US
> > misinformation, glaring omissions and intelligence errors about the
> > function of the plant." (31)
> >
> > The American Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering went on record to
> > claim that: "The physical evidence is a soil sample, analysis of it
> > shows the presence of a chemical whose simple name is EMPTA, a known
> > precursor for the nerve agent VX....We think that it was this evidence,
> > and evidence like it, which made our decision to carry out this strike
> > on this particular target the correct and proper decision under the
> > circumstances." (32)
> >
> > The soil samples were said to have been obtained from the factory
> > itself. (33) An American intelligence official added that: "It is a
> > substance that has no commercial applications, it doesn't occur
> > naturally in the environment, it's not a by-product of any other
> > chemical process. The only thing you can use it for, that we know of, is
> > to make VX." (34)  This was immediately challenged by 'The New York
> > Times', which stated that: "The chemical precursor of a nerve agent that
> > Washington claimed was made at a Sudanese chemical factory it destroyed
> > in a missile attack last week could be used for commercial products."
> > (35)  'The New York Times' cited the Organization for the Prohibition of
> > Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as stating that the chemical could be used "in
> > limited quantities for legitimate commercial purposes". These purposes
> > could be use in fungicides, and anti-microbial agents. It should be
> > noted that the OPCW is an independent international agency which
> > oversees the inspections of governments and companies to ensure they are
> > not making substances that contravene the chemical weapons ban treaty.
> >
> > It also appears that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency played
> > its part in putting propaganda policy before science. On 26 August, for
> > example, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency claimed that Empta
> > was listed as a so-called Schedule 1 chemical - an immediate chemical
> > weapons precursor with no recognised commercial use - by the
> > Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The U.S. Arms
> > Control and Disarmament Agency had to change its position within a
> > matter of hours, after OPCW officials confirmed that Empta could have
> > commercial uses. Contradicting the claims made by the U.S. Arms Control
> > and Disarmament Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
> > Weapons said that the organisation classifies Empta on its Schedule 2b
> > of compounds that could be used to make chemical weapons but which also
> > have commercial uses. The OPCW said that Empta is identified with a
> > process to make plastics flexible and also with some fungicides and
> > anti-microbial agents. (36) Sources at the Organisation for the
> > Prohibition of Chemical Weapons also pointed out that Empta is difficult
> > to isolate when in soil. A chemical weapons expert at OPCW also stated
> > that pesticide traces in the soil could result in a false-positive
> > result. (37) Mike Hiskey, an expert at the world-renowned Los Alamos
> > National Laboratory in the United States, said that the chemical had
> > commercial uses, including the manufacture of some herbicides and
> > pesticides. (38)  'The Guardian' newspaper in London also reported that:
> > "a search of scientific papers showed that it could be used in a variety
> > of circumstances." (39)
> >
> > The London newspaper, 'The Observer', stated that:
> >
> > "US credibility has been further dented by Western scientists who have
> > pointed out that the same ingredients are used for chemical weapons and
> > beer, and that mustard gas is similar in make-up to the anti-clogging
> > agent in biro ink. It has also been pointed out that the cherry
> > flavouring in sweets is one of the constituent parts of the gas used in
> > combat. Empta also has commercial uses not linked to chemical weapons."
> > (40)
> >
> > On 6 September 1998, 'The Washington Post' in an editorial entitled
> > 'Intelligence Lapse?', called American intelligence claims about the al-
> > Shifa factory into question:
> >
> > "the possibility of an intelligence failure in the choice of targets in
> > Sudan is so awful to contemplate...But enough questions have been
> > raised, and the administration's story has been often enough revised, to
> > warrant further inquiry...How could the CIA not have known more about
> > the factory - not have known what so many ordinary citizens apparently
> > knew? Some officials reportedly pointed to a search of the factory's
> > Internet site that listed no products for sale. We can only hope that,
> > if the administration could speak more openly, it could make a more
> > persuasive case. At a minimum, there is room here for congressional
> > intelligence committees to inquire further."
> >
> > This editorial was amongst the first of many American newspaper
> > editorials and articles explicitly questioning the Clinton
> > Administration's attack on the al-Shifa factory.  In February 1999,
> > extensive tests by Professor Thomas Tullius, chairman of the chemistry
> > department at Boston University, on samples taken from the wrecked al-
> > Shifa plant and its grounds, found that "to the practical limits of
> > scientific detection, there was no Empta or Empa, its breakdown
> > product." (41)  In a 1 September briefing, American Defence Secretary
> > Cohen was forced to admit that the evidence linking bin-Laden to the al-
> > Shifa plant "was a little tenuous". (42) That is to say, two weeks after
> > the American government destroyed the al-Shifa factory because, in large
> > part, American intelligence claimed that Osama bin-Laden either owned,
> > part-owned, or had a financial interest in, the al-Shifa factory, the
> > best the American Defence Secretary could come up with was that the
> > claimed link was "a little tenuous".
> >
> > For the National Security Advisor to have publicly made such a mistake
> > over what should have been the very easily verifiable issue of whether
> > al-Shifa produced medicines or is yet another key indicator as to the
> > quality and accuracy of American intelligence on the factory. A simple
> > telephone call to the Sudanese chamber of commerce would have sufficed.
> >
> > The al-Shifa incident also provided a further clear cut example of
> > serious claims made by the American government which subsequently turned
> > out to have been false. Following the attack Under Secretary of State
> > Thomas Pickering stated that who owned the plant "was not known to us".
> > When, several days later, the American government learnt, from
> > subsequent media coverage of the attack, who actually owned the factory,
> > that person, Mr Saleh Idris, was then retrospectively listed under
> > legislation dealing with  "specially designated terrorists". On 26
> > August, 1998, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the unit within the
> > U.S. Treasury Department charged with the enforcement of anti-terrorism
> > sanctions, froze more than US$ 24 million of Mr Idris's assets. These
> > assets had been held in Bank of America accounts. On 26 February 1999,
> > Mr Idris filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
> > Columbia, for the release of his assets, claiming that the government's
> > actions had been unlawful. His lawyers stated that while the law used by
> > the Clinton Administration to freeze his assets required a finding that
> > Mr Idris was, or had been, associated with terrorist activities, no such
> > determination had ever been made. Mr Idris had never had any association
> > whatsoever with terrorists or terrorism. On 4 May 1999, the deadline by
> > which the government had to file a defence in court, the Clinton
> > Administration backed down and had to authorise the full and
> > unconditional release of his assets. (43)
> >
> > Given that the credibility of the American government was in question
> > regarding al-Shifa, perhaps the final word about the attack should be
> > given to U.S. Senator Pat Roberts: "[T]he strike in regards to the
> > Khartoum chemical plant cannot be justified...These are pretty harsh
> > words. I know one thing for sure. The intelligence agencies of other
> > countries look at that and they think, 'Wait a minute, if you hit the
> > wrong target or if in fact the justification was not accurate, it is
> > either ineptitude or, to get back to the wag-the-dog theory, something
> > else is going on. That gets to our credibility. And that is why both the
> > administration and the Congress must insist on a foreign policy where if
> > you draw a line in the sand, if you make a statement, your credibility
> > is tremendously important." (44)
> >
> >
> > The American Government Has Previously Had to Withdraw Over 100
> > "Fabricated" Reports on Sudan
> >
> > There is ample evidence that American government has repeatedly accepted
> > at face value claims about Sudanese involvement in terrorism which were
> > subsequently revealed to have been fabricated. In September 1998, in the
> > wake of the al-Shifa fiasco, both 'The New York Times' and 'The Times'
> > of London reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had previously
> > secretly had to withdraw over one hundred of its reports alleging
> > Sudanese involvement in terrorism. The CIA had realised that the reports
> > in question had been fabricated. (45)
> >
> > A striking example of this was the closure by the Clinton Administration
> > of the American embassy in Khartoum in 1996. This decision was presented
> > as yet one more example of concern over Sudan's alleged support for
> > international terrorism. CIA reports were said to have stated that
> > American embassy staff  and their families were in danger. (46) The
> > Clinton Administration's spokesman, Nicholas Burns, stated at the time
> > that:
> >
> > "We have been concerned for a long period of time about the activities
> > and movements of specific terrorist organizations who are resident in
> > Sudan. Over the course of many, many conversations with the Sudanese
> > Government, we simply could not be assured that the Sudanese Government
> > was capable of protecting our Americans against the specific threats
> > that concerned us...[T]he specific nature of these threats, the
> > persistence of these threats, and our root belief at the end of all
> > these conversations that this particular government could not protect
> > them led us to take this extraordinary measure of withdrawing all of our
> > diplomats." (47)
> >
> > It is now admitted the reports cited in justifying this decision were
> > subsequently withdrawn as having been fabricated.  As 'The New York
> > Times' investigation documented:
> >
> > "In late 1995 the CIA realized that a foreign agent who had warned
> > repeatedly of startling terrorist threats to U.S. diplomats, spies and
> > their children in Khartoum was fabricating information. They withdrew
> > his reports, but the climate of fear and mistrust created by the reports
> > bolstered the case for withdrawing personnel from the U.S. Embassy in
> > Khartoum, officials said...The embassy remained closed, even though, as
> > a senior intelligence official put it, "the threat wasn't there" as of
> > 1996." (48)
> >
> > 'The New York Times' also reported that there were similar unverified
> > and uncorroborated reports that the then national security advisor,
> > Antony Lake, had been targeted for assassination by terrorists based in
> > Sudan. Lake was moved into Blair House, a federal mansion across the
> > street from the White House and then to a second, secret, location. 'The
> > New York Times' reported that Lake "disappeared from view around the
> > time the embassy's personnel were withdrawn". There is little doubt that
> > the supposed threat to Lake was as fabricated as the CIA reports
> > concerning the American embassy in Khartoum. The newspaper stated that:
> > "The threat to Tony Lake had a chilling effect on the National Security
> > Council."
> >
> > There is no doubt that the equally spurious "threats" to American
> > diplomats and their children in Khartoum had an equally chilling effect
> > on the State Department and other agencies. The fact remains however
> > that these "threats", then seen as proof of Sudanese complicity in
> > terrorism, were contained in the over one hundred reports that the CIA
> > later admitted it had to withdraw because they had been fabricated. To
> > have to withdraw one or two intelligence reports on such serious matters
> > is bad enough. To have to withdraw over one hundred such reports can
> > only be described as a massive systemic intelligence failure. One can
> > only but point out that the Clinton Administration used the Sudanese
> > government's inability to react to "specific" threats made by "specific"
> > terrorist organisations against American diplomats, non-existent
> > fabricated threats, as one more example of Sudan's involvement with
> > terrorism. The American embassy in Khartoum was subsequently partly re-
> > opened in October 1997, and Antony Lake eventually did come out of
> > hiding. And yet, as late as March 2000, four years after the above
> > intelligence fiasco, the White House was still falsely stating: "In
> > 1996, we removed full-time staff from the Embassy and relocated them to
> > Nairobi for security reasons." (49)  In what could pass for a snapshot
> > of the accuracy of Clinton Administration claims about Sudan and
> > terrorism in general, 'The New York Times' stated that:
> >
> > "the Central Intelligence Agency...recently concluded that reports that
> > had appeared to document a clear link between the Sudanese Government
> > and terrorist activities were fabricated and unreliable...The United
> > States is entitled to use military force to protect itself against
> > terrorism. But the case for every such action must be rigorously
> > established. In the case of the Sudan, Washington has conspicuously
> > failed to prove its case." (50)
> >
> > Ambassador Petterson, the United States ambassador to Sudan from
> > 1992-95, clearly documents an earlier example of the Clinton
> > Administration acting upon fabricated and unreliable claims of Sudanese
> > complicity in "terrorism". In his memoirs of his time in Sudan
> > Ambassador Petterson reveals that in August 1993, "information about a
> > plan to harm American officials led the State Department to order an
> > evacuation of our spouses and children and a reduction of my American
> > staff by one-third". Petterson stated that "[w]e at the embassy had seen
> > or heard nothing manifesting a clear and present danger from either
> > terrorists or the Sudanese government. But the order was firm and
> > irrevocable". (51) Petterson also documented that subsequently "new
> > information" had been "acquired" which indicated "an increasingly
> > precarious situation for Americans in Khartoum". Ambassador Petterson
> > later reveals that the allegations in question were unfounded:
> >
> > "The months wore on, no credible threat to embassy Americans
> > materialized, and eventually serious doubt was raised about the validity
> > of the information that had led to the evacuation." (52)
> >
> > It perhaps goes without saying that for a government to evacuate the
> > spouses and children of diplomats, and to reduce its embassy staff, is a
> > serious matter. It is an even more serious matter when a government
> > totally closes an embassy, withdrawing all diplomats and dependants.
> > This was done on two occasions in Sudan. The partial evacuation happened
> > in 1993. The total evacuation was carried out in 1996. The Clinton
> > Administration ordered both evacuations on the basis of intelligence
> > information received which supposedly warned of threats to American
> > diplomats and their families. On both occasions the Administration also
> > demanded that the Sudanese government somehow deal with these threats,
> > and it was inferred that if Khartoum did not do so this would be more
> > evidence of Sudan's involvement with terrorism. It is now clear, as
> > outlined by independent sources such as Ambassador Petterson, and 'The
> > New York Times' that both the partial evacuation of American embassy
> > staff and dependants in 1993, and the full withdrawal of the embassy in
> > 1996, were the results of faulty intelligence reports based on claims
> > subsequently revealed to have been fabricated.
> >
> >
> > The American Government Refused Several Previous Requests for American
> > Investigations
> >
> > After other invitations, in early 2000 the Clinton Administration
> > finally accepted Sudanese invitations to send anti-terrorist and
> > counter-terrorism teams down to Sudan to investigate anything they
> > wished to. It is clear that several other attempts on the part of the
> > Sudanese government to enter into cooperation with Washington on
> > counter-terrorism were similarly ignored or rejected. The Clinton
> > Administration's poor record and questionable judgement with regard to
> > intelligence and the issue of terrorism was further highlighted by the
> > September 1998 revelation of 'The New York Times' that: "In February
> > 1997, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir sent President Clinton a
> > personal letter. It offered, among other things, to allow U.S.
> > intelligence, law-enforcement and counterterrorism personnel to enter
> > Sudan and to go anywhere and see anything, to help stamp out terrorism.
> > The United States never replied to that letter."
> >
> > In April 1997, there was another invitation, once again inviting the
> > Clinton Administration to send FBI counterterrorism units to Sudan to
> > verify any information they may have had about terrorism. The letter was
> > addressed to Representative Lee Hamilton, the then chairman of the House
> > Foreign Affairs Committee, and is part of the Congressional Record. (53)
> > This offer was eventually turned down four months later. Several other
> > invitations followed before one was accepted.
> >
> >
> > Conclusion
> >
> > Within the context of this catalogue of American intelligence blunders,
> > together with Washington's questionable and increasingly transparent use
> > of serious allegations against Sudan for policy and propaganda reasons,
> > renewed American claims about Sudanese involvement "in developing a
> > biological weapons programme" must be seen for what they are,
> > unsustainable and deeply irresponsible.
> >
> >
> > Notes
> >
> > 1       "US Accuses Iraq, N.Korea, Iran of Building Germ Warfare
> > Stocks", News Article by Agence France Press, 19 November 2001.
> > 2       For example, Bolton was also previously involved with the U.S.
> > Commission on International Religious Freedom, a federally-funded body
> > that has produced very questionable and deliberately skewed material on
> > Sudan. In his March 2001 nomination hearing Bolton stated that he had
> > met on the issue of Sudan with former Secretary of State Albright and
> > National Security Adviser Samuel Berger while working with the
> > Commission. Both Albright and Berger who have been identified with
> > claims on Sudan that were either distorted or deliberately deceitful.
> > See, for example, 'Partisan and Hypocritical: The U.S. Commission on
> > International Religious Freedom and Sudan', The European-Sudanese Public
> > Affairs Council, London, 2000, available at www.espac.org
> > 3       'The Times', London, 22 September 1998.
> > 4       David Rose, "Resentful West Spurned Sudan's Key Terror Files",
> > 'The Observer', London, 30 September 2001.
> > 5       "Sudan Offered Up bin Laden in '96", 'The Washington Post', 3
> > October 2001.
> > 6       See, for example, "US Sees Good Progress in Terrorism Talks with
> > Sudan ", News Article by Reuters on 25 September 2001.
> > 7       "Powell Mulls U.N. Action on Sudan After Report African
> > Government is Moving in Right Direction on Terrorism ", News Article by
> > Associated Press on 22 August 2001 and "Sudan Provides Intelligence to
> > U.S.", News Article by Reuters, 29 September 2001.
> > 8       See, for example, "US Allows UN Council to End Sanctions Against
> > Sudan", News Article by Reuters on 28 September 2001; "US Ready to End
> > U.N. Sanctions on Sudan Friday", News Article by Reuters on 28 September
> > 2001; "US Allows UN Council to End Sanctions Against Sudan", News
> > Article by Reuters, 28 September 2001.
> > 9       "Foreign Minister Says Sudan has been Cooperating with the
> > United States in the Fight Against Terrorism for More Than a Year ",
> > News Article by Associated Press on 25 September 2001.
> > 10      See, 'Farce Majeure: The Clinton Administration's Sudan Policy
> > 1993-2000', The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, 2000,
> > available at www.espac.org
> > 11      "White House Says No Sign Iraq Exported Arms", News Article by
> > Reuters on 17 February 1998.
> > 12      House of Lords 'Official Report', London, 19 March 1998, cols.
> > 818-820.
> > 13      House of Lords 'Official Report', London, 19 March 1998, cols.
> > 818-820.
> > 14      See, for example, Norwegian People's Aid, 'Confirmed Chemical
> > Bombing in Southern Sudan', 2 August 1999, posted on Relief Wet,
> > www.reliefweb.int.
> > 15      House of Lords 'Official Report', 31 October 2000, cols. WA81.
> > 16      'Note for the Spokesman of the Secretary-General on Sudan', Note
> > delivered by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, Mr Philippe Borel,
> > to the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, 17 October 1999.
> > 17      'The Independent', London, 17 September 1993.
> > 18      Donald Petterson, 'Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and
> > Catastrophe', Westview Books, Boulder, 1999, p.69.
> > 19      Ibid.
> > 20      'The New York Times', 26 March 1993.
> > 21      See, for example, 'The New York Times', 'The Washington Post',
> > 25 June 1993.
> > 22      'Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 Briefing', Press briefing by
> > Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr, Washington-DC, 30 April 1996 on US
> > Government Home Page, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/96043
> > 0.html
> > 23      "U.S. Expels Sudanese Diplomat: Diplomat Implicated in U.N. Bomb
> > Plot", News Article by United States Information Agency, 10 April 1996.
> > 24      "Sample From Sudan Plant Said to Link It to Weapons",
> > 'International Herald Tribune', 25 August 1998.
> > 25      'Letter of H.E. Bishop Gborial Roric, State Minister at the
> > Ministry of External Affairs to the President of the United Nations
> > Security Council on the Flagrant American Aggression Against the Sudan',
> > Ministry of External Affairs, Khartoum. See, also, "Sudan Formally Asks
> > for UN Meeting, Probe of Plant", News Article by Reuters on 22 August
> > 1998 at 05:44 pm EST; "Khartoum Seeks Condemnation, Damages and Fact-
> > Finding Team", News Article by Agence France Presse, 23 August 1998.
> > 26      "US "Reveals" Nerve Gas Evidence", News Article by BBC World, 25
> > August 1998.
> > 27      "Sudan Willing to Accept US-led Probe into Factory Attack", News
> > Article by Agence France Presse, 23 August 1998.
> > 28      "Minister: Sudan Invites an American Verification Committee",
> > News Article by Associated Press, 22 August 1998.
> > 29      "Sudan President Invites Fact-Finders, Warns of Retaliation",
> > News Article by BBC Online, 22 August 1998.
> > 30      "Absent at Conference, Sudan is Still Talking With U.S. ", 'The
> > Washington Post', 17 March 2000.
> > 31      "Sudanese Plant 'Not Built for Weapons", 'The Observer', London,
> > 30 August 1998.
> > 32      "U.S. State Dept. Says Soil Showed VX-Sudan Link", News Article
> > by Reuters, 26 August 1998.
> > 33      "US Strives to Justify Air Strike on Sudan Factory", 'The
> > Independent' 26 August 1998.
> > 34      "US Strives to Justify Air Strike on Sudan Factory", 'The
> > Independent' 26 August 1998.
> > 35      "Chemical Made at Bombed Sudanese Factory had Commercial Uses:
> > Report", News Article by Agence France Presse, 27 August 1998.
> > 36      "'Smoking Gun' for Sudan Raid Now in Doubt", 'The Chicago
> > Tribune', 28 August 1998.
> > 37      "More Doubts Rise Over Claims for U.S. Attack", 'The Wall Street
> > Journal', 28 August 1998.
> > 38      "'Smoking Gun' for Sudan Raid Now in Doubt", 'The Chicago
> > Tribune', 28 August 1998.
> > 39      "Expert Queries US Labelling of Sudan Chemicals", 'The
> > Guardian', London, 28 August 1998.
> > 40      "Sudanese Plant 'Not Built for Weapons'", 'The Observer',
> > London, 30 August 1998.
> > 41      "Experts Find No Arms Chemicals at Bombed Sudan Plant", 'The New
> > York Times', 9 February 1999.
> > 42      "Administration Officials Detail Missile Strike Strategy", News
> > Article by Associated Press, 2 September 1998.
> > 43      See, "US Unfreezes Assets of Sudan Factory Owner", News Article
> > by Agence France Press, 4 May, 1999, 20:51 GMT; "US Oks Payout for
> > 'Sudan Mistake': Faulty Intelligence Blamed for Air Strike", 'The
> > Washington Times', 5 May 1999; "US Admits Sudan Bombing Mistake", 'The
> > Independent', London, 4 May 1999; "US to Unfreeze Accounts Frozen Over
> > Plant", 'The Asian Wall Street Journal', 5 May 1999.
> > 44      "Roberts Calls US Missile Attack on Sudan Unjustified", by
> > Dennis Pearce, 'The Wichita Eagle', 28 October 1998. Senator Roberts is
> > a member of both the Senate Intelligence and Armed Forces Committees.
> > 45      'The Times', London, 22 September 1998; 'The New York Times', 21
> > and 23 September, 1998.
> > 46      "Withdrawal of US Diplomats - Security Council Condemnation",
> > 'Keesings Archives', Volume 42, 1996.
> > 47      Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 1 February 1996
> > available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996
> > /9602/960201db.html
> > 48      "Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise", 'The New
> > York Times', 21 September 1999.
> > 49      Extract on Sudan from the Daily Press Briefing, the United
> > States Department of State, 3 March 2000, 12:35 PM.
> > 50      "Dubious Decisions on the Sudan, Editorial", 'The New York
> > Times,' 23 September 1998.
> > 51      Petterson, op.cit., p.71.
> > 52      Petterson, op.cit., p.91.
> > 53      "Perspective on Terrorism - Olive Branch Ignored", 'The Los
> > Angeles Times', 30 September 1998.
> >
> > ENDS
> >
> > You have been sent this document as someone who may be interested in
> > Sudanese affairs,  someone who has requested to be on our mailing list,
> > someone referred to us by a friend, or as a media outlet.
> > If you do not wish to receive any further publications from ESPAC simply
> > return this message to director at espac.org with the instruction REMOVE at
> > the top, and you will be immediately removed from our mailing list.
> > (Please ensure that you reply from the actual email address at which you
> > received our posting, or that you include that address in the text of
> > your request.)
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
> > 1 Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2N 5BW
> > Tel: 0207 872 5434   Fax: 0207 753 2848
> > E-mail: director at espac.org
> >
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > This email server is running an evaluation copy of the MailShield anti-
> > spam software. Please contact your email administrator if you have any
> > questions about this message. MailShield product info:
www.mailshield.com
>
>