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Bombardare l'Afghanistan? Non sara' una cosa rapida
Secondo un'analisi della Straftor, nota agenzia informativa staunitense di
"intelligence", bombardare l'Afghanistan non e' affatto la cosa semplice e
rapida che si potrebbe credere (vedi il testo sottostante). Per fortuna.
Significa che potrebbe esserci addirittura qualche mese di tempo per cercar
di fermare il disastro....
paola
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S T R A T F O R
THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
http://www.stratfor.com
____________________________________________________________
18 September 2001
-> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY:
* Central Asia: Backdoor to Afghanistan
http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109182330.htm
* Egypt: A Precarious Ally
http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109182150.htm
* The Limits of Solidarity
http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109181830.htm
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Washington Prepares for Long Campaign
2300 GMT, 010918
Summary
As Washington tries to build an international coalition against
terrorism, the Bush administration is preparing the nation for a
long campaign rather than a single retaliatory strike. With
Afghanistan the primary initial target, Washington must deal with
a problem it has rarely encountered since World War II: attacking
a landlocked country.
Analysis
The Bush administration is searching the globe for coalition
support for its war on terrorism. At the same time, it is
preparing Americans for a long campaign that may not include a
rapid, high-profile, retaliatory strike.
Washington's initial military response to the Sept. 11 attacks
will shape U.S. relations not only with Middle Eastern nations
but also with the rest of the world.
For this reason the administration must carefully consider its
reprisal so as not to undermine the confidence of allies or fuel
wider enmity among Arab and Islamic nations. Although strikes are
inevitable, they will likely take much more time and preparation
than the cruise missile strikes that followed the 1998 bombings
of the embassies in Africa.
By labeling Osama bin Laden the key suspect, Washington has also
marked Afghanistan, where the Saudi exile has been living, as the
likely first target. This presents a problem the U.S. military
has rarely encountered since World War II: attacking a landlocked
nation. The effectiveness of U.S. carrier battle groups will be
severely reduced in any operation against Afghanistan.
In terms of logistics, Washington must find either land bases for
a sustained coalition air strike against Afghanistan or provide
in-air refueling for carrier-based planes.
Afghanistan's neighbors, with whom the United States has tenuous
relations, limit both choices. Afghanistan is bounded by
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north, Iran to the
west, China to the east and Pakistan to the south. Any
partnership with the northern neighbors will require substantial
negotiations with Russia, which retains a strong influence and
military presence in Central Asia. Even with permission to fly
out of Central Asia, the supply chain into these nations would be
long and difficult to maintain.
Iran, which has no love for the Taliban, is even more unlikely to
offer basing for U.S. aircraft. China, too, is unlikely to offer
basing, and even if it does, significant supply line problems
would remain.
Washington's best hope for regional assistance, then, is
Pakistan. Pakistan was once a close ally, and its port access is
useful for logistical purposes. Pakistan's long border along the
southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan also offers the closest
access to the cities of Kandahar, the Taliban headquarters, and
Kabul, the frontline in the battle between the Taliban and the
opposition Northern Alliance.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has offered substantial
cooperation to the United States in the wake of the Sept. 11
attacks. But pro-Taliban forces inside Pakistan threaten his hold
on power.
These threats come from those who feel he is too secular as well
as from ethnic rivalries within Pakistan. Musharraf is a Muhajir,
an Urdu-speaking member of an immigrant family from India.
Although Urdu-speakers have dominated Pakistan's political and
economic elite, the many of the country's indigenous groups --
including the native Pushtun population, which geographically
straddles the border with Afghanistan -- view them as usurpers.
Even with Musharraf's promises of cooperation, military planners
in Washington must be absolutely sure that he has control of his
entire military. The main questions in Washington now are whether
Pakistan's offer of assistance is firm and whether the government
is stable enough to allow the United States to strike Afghanistan
from Pakistan.
Whether the U.S. military is based in Pakistan or not, simply
flying over Pakistan on the way to Afghanistan poses a serious
security challenge. First, bringing significant firepower to bear
on Afghanistan requires Washington to bring in more carriers or -
- for a sustained and more effective operation -- to establish
land bases. The nearest places for such land bases are in India,
Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
If the aircraft are launched from carriers, they will require in-
air refueling somewhere over Pakistan. This presents a
significant security risk: Tanker aircraft would provide a ready
target for potential rogue elements inside Pakistan's army or air
force. With the situation in Pakistan still uncertain, it would
be hard for a U.S. military commander to confidently fly tankers
over Pakistan. The loss of a single tanker to surface-to-air
missiles or fighter aircraft would also lead to the loss of
mission-bound aircraft that depended on the tanker for fuel.
Similar problems pertain to operations not based on carriers.
Because land-based aircraft generally have a longer combat
radius, it is possible that flights from Oman, the UAE or Qatar
could refuel over the Pakistani coast and still have the range to
strike at Kandahar or other targets in Afghanistan. Operating
from land bases in the Gulf or from India, however, would require
a long buildup.
It is for this kind of protracted operation rather than a quick
retaliation that Washington is preparing. During a briefing Sept.
18, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reiterated the
dominant theme in Washington now -- that this will be a new style
of war, one that will be fought for a long time. Rumsfeld
emphasized that this is "not a matter of a single event" nor a
campaign against one or two terrorist leaders.
Washington needed six months to gear up for Operation Desert
Storm, and preparations for strikes on Afghanistan or other
targets may take as long. Although pressure from within the
United States for a retaliatory strike will grow, President
George W. Bush currently enjoys high popularity ratings. His
administration is much more likely to take the heat now rather
than risk a disastrous attack that accomplishes little.
If Washington could fully trust Pakistan's stability, it would
likely have begun operations already. But the administration is
making every effort to prepare a long-term strategy -- to avoid
the appearance abroad and at home of a Clinton-esque strategy of
launching an ineffective cruise-missile strike against some tents
in Afghanistan as well as to avoid undermining tenuous relations
with the Arab and Muslim world.
This strategy may involve more carrier-based aircraft, land-based
assets or even long-range strategic bombers from the United
States and the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Such
strikes will ultimately take place but only after the
administration can overcome the logistical concerns posed by
Pakistan's delicate political balance