Steps Required to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

["Ernesto Burgio" <erburg at libero.it>]

Just Say No

Author Spells Out Steps Required to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism


Commentary
By John Allen Paulos *

Oct. 3, 2004 - Nuclear terrorism is a horrifying possibility, but it
needn't be a paralyzing one. That's the message of a new book, Nuclear
Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, by Graham Allison. He
begins by sketching a realistic scenario in which as many as a million
lives could be lost following explosion of a nuclear device in a large
American city. Such a toll would be hundreds of times as great as that of
Sept. 11.

Understandably enough, most of us would rather talk about Kitty Kelley's
book or possibly counterfeit memos than such a prospect. Unpleasant though
it is, we should pay close attention to the feasible steps that Allison
argues can greatly reduce the probability of such a nuclear terrorist
attack.

Compared to the cost in human life, financial resources, and international
goodwill of the Iraq war, Allison argues that these steps are almost cheap.
Formerly dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and assistant
secretary of defense for policy and plans in the first Clinton
administration, the professor backs up his dire warnings with considerable
expertise.

His outline of what must be done to avoid a calamity is comprised of three
Noes, and seven Yeses. The heart of the book, however, is the Noes, which
are: No loose nukes, No new nukes, No new nuclear states.

The Three Noes

The first and most important No requires that the United States help secure
Russia's huge and poorly guarded stockpiles of fissile material (enriched
uranium and plutonium) and nuclear weapons. Of particular concern is its
supply of so-called suitcase nuclear bombs, an unhealthy fraction of which
are unaccounted for.

Securing of the stockpiles is being done in a limited way under the
auspices of the Nunn-Lugar Act, which was passed by Congress for this
purpose. Allison argues, however, that it will take 13 years to secure all
of Russia's fissile material at the rate we're going and that we should
spend the money to help them do the job in four years. (This position, it
should be noted, has been endorsed by the Kerry campaign, for which Allison
serves as a consultant.)

Obtaining fissile material is the primary difficulty facing those trying to
make a weapon. No material, no bomb. But with enough enriched uranium or
plutonium, some knowledge of physics, and a little Internet surfing, a
crude weapon can easily be made in less than a year. And the unfortunate
fact is that in Russia there is enough fissile material vulnerable to theft
to make 30,000 additional nuclear weapons. Furthermore, though it contains
90 percent of all existing fissile material outside the United States,
Russia is not the only worry. Allison writes that 32 other countries have
some, and about 25 of the 130 nuclear research reactors in 40 countries
contain sufficient fissile material to produce at least one nuclear bomb.

The second No requires that we ensure that more fissile material is not
produced by countries such as Iran whose generators' avowed rationale is
the peaceful production of electricity. Easier said than done, but he
recommends strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty's terms
regarding these reactors. The deal that would be needed for this to work
might include a program whereby countries with nuclear capabilities would
sell enriched uranium to those countries that want or need electricity from
nuclear reactors.

Allison's third No requires that the so-called nuclear club (which ideally
should have no members) should be limited to the present eight members (the
United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, and Israel)
or else the membership will mushroom (sorry) out of control. Both Iran and
North Korea, which probably already has a couple of bombs, must be
persuaded in one way or another to give up their nuclear aspirations, and
this "persuasion" should not be a simplistic choice between ineffective
pleading and counterproductive bombing

Pressure must continue to be carefully applied to Pakistan, whose black
marketers have recklessly sold "nuclear starter kits" and personal
consulting services to anyone willing to pay for them.

Misplaced Priorities

In fact, all three of these Noes require "muscular diplomacy."

Given the way the United States is viewed around the world today, however,
this is going to be even more difficult than it otherwise would be. This
fact is at the root of Allison's contention that the Bush administration
has misplaced priorities and squandered opportunities to improve national
security. (Instead of fixing the gaping hole in our roof in preparation for
the upcoming hurricane, we're spending time and money sewing a rip in our
umbrella.)

Implementing the three Noes will be expensive. Allison's estimate of the
cost of securing all the fissile material in the world, for example, is $30
billion to $40 billion (although getting rid of the more extreme
vulnerabilities would cost considerably less).

Work must be done and money expended in this country as well - very much
less than the $200 billion dollars authorized (though not all spent yet) in
Iraq - but still a substantial amount for a deficit-burdened budget. More
containers coming into this country must be inspected and more radiation
sniffers and detectors purchased. As Allison notes, 30,000 trucks, 6,500
rail cars, and 140 ships bring in 50,000 cargo containers every day. Only
one in 20 of them are screened, and even these screenings will not always
detect nuclear weapons or enriched uranium or plutonium.

The seven Yeses that Allison discusses are important, but rather standard
proposals. In particular he stresses putting together global alliances with
specific aims.

The virtue of this is underlined by a telling comparison. Unlike the Iraq
war with its ever-changing rationales (talk about flip-flopping!) and
largely unilateral prosecution, the Gulf War had a clearly delineated goal
and more than 90 percent of its cost was paid by our allies. His other
Yeses include getting better intelligence, conducting a more humble foreign
policy, and pursuing a more focused policy against Islamic terrorists that
does not produce more of them than it neutralizes.

Allison credits the Bush administration for quickly recognizing the nexus
between terrorism and nuclear weapons, but decries its "absence of urgency"
in dealing with nuclear nonproliferation. "We've either been plodding along
at a snail's pace or gone backward, way backward."

Some of the book's premises, facts, and conclusions may be questioned, but
Nuclear Terrorism has a subtitle that everyone should take seriously: The
Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

* Professor of mathematics at Temple University, John Allen Paulos is the
author of best-selling books, including Innumeracy and A Mathematician
Plays the Stock Market. His Who's Counting? column on ABCNEWS.com appears
the first weekend of every month