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[Disarmo] I prossimi impegni di guerra dell'esercito europeo
- Subject: [Disarmo] I prossimi impegni di guerra dell'esercito europeo
- From: glry <glry at ngi.it>
- Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2014 02:05:28 +0100
http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58712 The Agenda 2020 2014/01/21 BERLIN/PARIS/BANGUI/BAMAKO (Own report) - The EU has announced a military intervention into the Central African Republic. Last Monday, EU foreign ministers in Brussels decided to soon send soldiers from several EU countries to Bangui to support French troops in that country. The Bundeswehr will most likely participate with transport aircraft and a MedEvac Airbus. The German Foreign Minster has also suggested the possibility of expanding the deployment of German military in Mali. This is where the Franco-German Brigade is due to make its first major deployment. But the power struggle between Germany and France continues to loom in the background. Berlin wants to use the mission in Mali to break France's exclusive influence in the West African francophone countries. Members of the Bundeswehr have announced that "over the next few years" Germany will have "to deal with Africa, particularly its north and center." Even before ending its (partial) withdrawal from Afghanistan, Germany is already focusing on a new intervention - in line with the global offensive Berlin's foreign policy establishment has been pushing for with growing intensity since last autumn. The Traditional Regulatory Power Last Monday, EU foreign ministers decided to rapidly deploy EU troops to the Central African Republic, because of the threat of the country's violent clashes escalating. France has already stationed its troops in the country and is trying to assert its traditional role as the "regulatory power" in African francophone countries. To provide relief for its army, which is already involved in Mali, Paris has pressured the EU into participating in an intervention. According to yesterday's decision, soldiers from various EU countries will soon be deployed to Bangui - 500 soldiers are presently under consideration. Berlin will probably contribute air transport, in-flight refueling and an Air Force MedEvac Airbus to rescue the wounded. Should Paris provide the intervention's headquarters - which seems likely - Brussels would help finance part of its future mission in Bangui. German "Schutztruppe" Already last weekend, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested the possibility of expanding the deployment of German troops in Mali. Mali, like the Central African Republic, is one of the francophone countries, where France is deploying the, by far, largest contingent and is therefore seeking relief. "We have to examine ways to increase our support, for example in Mali," Steinmeier declared.[1] The Süddeutsche Zeitung had previously, reported that Germany is already planning to boost the size of its troops. Soldiers of the Franco-German Brigade are due to soon be sent to Mali. "Military circles" are planning to station a "Schutztruppe" (a protection force)[2] in Bamako and to "deploy another military unit in a smaller town to secure a training project." It is also very interesting that, according to the Süddeutsche Zeitung last week, Inspector General Volker Wieker announced in the Bundestag's Defense Committee an "increase" in the German "commitment in Mali."[3] In Germany, it is the parliament - rather than the Inspector General - which officially decides on military missions. The Most Important Partner This new Africa offensive illustrates the current state of the power struggle between Berlin and Paris over the predominance in EU military policy. Since the beginning of planning for a common EU military policy, Germany has been blocking - or reducing to a minimum - interventions in the francophone countries, so as not to help France shore up its role as a "regulatory power." (german-foreign-policy.com <http://german-foreign-policy.com> reported.[4]) Berlin has supported longer interventions only in Southeast Europe or in non-francophone African countries (Sudan, Horn of Africa), where it pursues its own interests. This policy has only been carefully revised since its participation in early 2013 in the Mali intervention. This has been accompanied by an attempt to break the predominating French influence in the francophone West African countries and strengthen German positions.[5] Mali can serve as the best example. Last December, the German Chancellor held negotiations with the Malian President on increasing German activities in that West African country. Following the negotiations, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta explained to the press that Germany is enjoying "the diplomatic code 001" in Mali and is "the most important partner."[6] Up to now, France has held this position. An Unequal Trade-Off Now, Berlin is accordingly reinforcing Bundeswehr units in Mali. German interests in the Central African Republic can be succinctly summed up by pointing to the fact that Berlin does not even maintain a diplomatic mission in that country. This is why Chancellor Merkel had categorically ruled out sending German ground troops to that country last year. There is a dual reason for Berlin's current partial change in policy of no longer blocking an EU mission to the Central African Republic and of even making several Bundeswehr aircraft available. On the one hand, France's president gave up his final resistance to the German Euro austerity dictate last week. He officially announced double-digit billions in budget cuts and lucrative favors for business - modeled along the lines of the German "Agenda 2010". For Europe, this has economically dealt Berlin a free hand.[7] Commentaries in the media have clearly made allusion to a trade-off between Hollande's "promises of reforms" and Berlin's approval of the EU mission to the Central African Republic.[8] Albeit, this trade-off has a strict time limit. The German Foreign Minister made it clear that the intervention in the Central African Republic is a "European stop-gap mission," which will be terminated as soon as an African intervention force of sufficient strength is ready for deployment.[9] Berlin has also blocked the deployment of an EU battle group to that country. Therefore Paris has only limited "European" means at its disposal for a limited amount of time. German Global Policy On the other hand, the intervention in the Central African Republic and, above all, the reinforcement of German troops in Mali, provide an opportunity for an ostentatious build-up of the German-European presence is sub-Saharan Africa. In the fall of 2013, Berlin had launched a PR offensive for a more aggressive global policy.[10] In German concepts, EU military interventions - more than those of NATO - will play fundamental roles in the future. At the Bundeswehr's Annual Reception in Potsdam last week, commander of the Bundeswehr's Joint Operations Command, Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Fritz announced "that we will be dealing with Africa, particularly its north and center, for the next few years."[11] Berlin's policy toward Mali is an indication that, below the surface of EU military interventions, massive German efforts to break France's influence in Francophonie can be expected. The New Europe Over the past few days, the head editor of the foreign policy desk of the Süddeutsche Zeitung had also reported on the expansion of German operations in Africa. This editor is among the "elite journalists" listed in a recent scientific study, who propagates the views of the leading political/military circles of commanders to public opinion - using, at times propaganda techniques.[12] "Mali and Central Africa," that editor explained, even in the context of German-French rivalry, are "test cases" for "a new European balance." "The script for this new Europe is not yet on the table," he wrote, "but the appetite to write it is growing." The expansion and reinforcement of the common EU military policy in Africa has the wherewithal to become "an Agenda 2020 in foreign policy."[13] [1] Steinmeier prüft Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Mali. www.finanznachrichten.de <http://www.finanznachrichten.de> 18.01.2014. [2] "Schutztruppe" war die offizielle Bezeichnung für die Kolonialtruppen in den Kolonien des Deutschen Kaiserreichs. [3] Christoph Hickmann, Stefan Kornelius: Bundesregierung bereitet Afrika-Einsatz vor. www.sueddeutsche.de <http://www.sueddeutsche.de> 17.01.2014. [4] See Desert War <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58502> and Die Abkopplung Frankreichs <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58733>. [5] See Nur ein erstes Signal <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58513>. [6] See Deutschland 001 <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58759>. [7] See Le Modèle Gerhard Schröder <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58711>. [8] Stefan Kornelius: Nach Afrika, für Europa. www.sueddeutsche.de <http://www.sueddeutsche.de> 20.01.2014. [9] EU beschließt Militärmission in Zentralafrika. www.spiegel.de <http://www.spiegel.de> 20.01.2014. [10] See Sleeping Demons <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58684>, The Re-Evaluation of German Foreign Policy <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58691> and Bereit zur globalen Ordnungspolitik <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58728>. [11] Daniel Brössler, Christoph Hickmann, Stefan Kornelius: Wie Deutschland den Franzosen in Afrika hilft. www.sueddeutsche.de <http://www.sueddeutsche.de> 18.01.2014. [12] See Elitejournalisten <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58688> and Rezension: Uwe Krüger: Meinungsmacht <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58687>. [13] Stefan Kornelius: Nach Afrika, für Europa. www.sueddeutsche.de <http://www.sueddeutsche.de> 20.01.2014. http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58710 This Year's Wars 2014/01/14 BERLIN (Own report) - The periodical of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) has published a survey on this years' ten possibly most dangerous conflicts. As author, Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, writes, her list covers ten countries / regions of conflict, where a range of factors have led or could lead to escalation: For example, these include "organized crime," "political competition," "authoritarian rule." The author does not mention western interventions as a cause of the desolate situations in a whole series of countries, even though she lists Libya as one example of the "top ten" conflicts. Libya was crushed by the 2011 NATO aggression and has been unable to recover since. Her list, published by the DGAP, does not mention South Sudan - a product of a geostrategically motivated western secessionist policy, which, last December, has erupted into bloody battles. Louise Arbour anticipates the aggravation of conflicts particularly in Russia's northern Caucasus. Severe conflicts in that region could seriously weaken Russia. The "Top 10" Conflicts The periodical of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) "Internationale Politik" has published the article entitled "Next Year's Wars" on its website.[1] The article originally appeared December 30 in the US publication, "Foreign Policy." This article was authored by Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004 - 2008) and since 2009 President and CEO of the transatlantic "International Crisis Group." In her article, Arbour focuses on ten countries / regions where dangerous conflicts are smoldering, which, in her opinion, could escalate at any moment. A Range of Factors According to the author, the list of conflict countries / regions - now also submitted for discussion by the "Internationale Politik" - illustrates the "remarkable range of factors that can cause instability." According to the author, these include, "organized crime," "political competition around elections," "the threat of insurgency," as well as "regional spill over" (without further elucidation). "Center/periphery tensions" or "authoritarian rule" could also lead to conflicts. The author acknowledges that conflicts could have "long roots," for example, underdevelopment and inequality. But, she disregards the deeper causes of underdevelopment and inequality, as well as western interventions. This is all the more surprising, when she mentions four countries / regions, which have been plunged into war or civil war by western interference and two others, where Western activities - including those of Germany - have led to serious internal tensions. All "Top 10" conflict regions have experienced noxious Western interference. The West's Innocence Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya and the Sahel Zone are among the ten countries or regions listed by Arbour. The war in Syria has largely been fuelled by the fact that foreign countries began early to support armed opponents of the government and have continued furnishing them arms, either directly or by way of allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Turkey.[2] There was no lack of warnings that this conflict could suffer irreversible escalation and that because of the regional social-religious relations, it could be expected that the war will spillover, at least into Lebanon.[3] In her analysis of the Iraqi situation, Arbour does not mention the 2003 Western invasion; instead she exclusively attributes the current combat to - undeniable - domestic shortcomings. The same applies to Libya: The article makes it clear that the author obviously considers the fact of the Libyan state having been destroyed by NATO's war on the Gadhafi government, to be completely insignificant. It is general knowledge that the Northern Mali conflicts were ignited by the destruction of the Libyan state making possible alliances of ethnic cliques and Salafists, to plunder arsenals and become active as militias in the Sahel Zone. In Arbour's analysis, this is not even mentioned as the trigger for combat in Mali. Not Worth Mentioning In Arbour's interpretation of the tensions in Honduras and Sudan, Western states appear absolutely innocent. Both countries are also among the "Top 10" in her list of conflicts. Arbour admits that in Honduras - one of the world's top ten countries with the greatest inequality - poverty and a lack of rule of law are leading to tensions and violence. "Violence in Honduras spiked upward in 2009, when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup," she writes. Zelaya wanted to bring Honduras into an alliance with ALBA member countries, led by Venezuela and Bolivia, where the struggle against poverty is of great importance. Because western foreign policy considers ALBA undependable, there were no objections from Washington or Berlin to the putsch that withdrew Honduras from ALBA. On the contrary, German foreign policy front organizations pleaded in favor of complacency with the putsch, with whose protagonists they had been closely cooperating. (german-foreign-policy.com <http://german-foreign-policy.com> reported.[4]) Arbour evidently did not mention, for example, the role played by the FDP-affiliated Friedrich Naumann Foundation during the putsch in Honduras. Poor Governance Also in the case of Sudan, if one were to believe the text published by "Internationale Politik," the secession of South Sudan, so resolutely pushed by the West, had led to no mentionable consequences. Arbour, for example, classifies Khartoum's suspending fuel subsidies - a measure, often enough demanded by Western finance institutions, such as the IMF - as a case of "poor governance." This measure, however, was in fact made necessary by the government's loss of revenue from oil exports. Three-fourths of Sudan's oil reserves are on South Sudanese territory. South Sudan's secession, also imposed with Berlin's help, has dramatically reduced Khartoum's state revenues.[5] It is noteworthy that Arbour's "Top 10" list does not include South Sudan, whose secession was a top priority project among Berlin's policies toward Africa. The author's attempt to pass over the escalating South Sudanese conflict in silence, suffered a dramatic setback just prior to publication of her article. The bloody combat, sparked in mid-December, has already accounted for up to 10,000 casualties. (german-foreign-policy.com <http://german-foreign-policy.com> reported.[6]) Implosion On her "Top 10" list, alongside the Central African Republic and Bangladesh, Arbour includes also Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. According to the article published by DGAP, Central Asia is, at the moment, tottering "ever closer to a political and security implosion." The five Central Asian nations are ascribed to Russia's immediate sphere of influence. The Northern Caucasus - including Sochi - which Arbour has included in her list, is Russian territory. The author admits that "there were at least 30 terrorist attacks in southern Russia" in 2013. Whereas her "Top Ten" list of conflicts does not include the US drone warfare - supported by intelligence information from Germany's BND - against presumed or real terrorists in Pakistan, and does not even consider Western drone operations worth mentioning, she accuses Russia - which is not using drones - of "reverting to heavy-handed methods" which will escalate the conflict in the Northern Caucasus. Arbour's hypocrisy particularly demonstrates that the Western political establishment, the DGAP included, concocts inconsistent tactical arguments, to apply them against Russia. This, in fact, nurtures apprehensions that a new major conflict - possibly in the Northern Caucasus - could erupt. [1] Zitate hier und im Folgenden aus: Louise Arbour: Die Kriege des kommenden Jahres. Von Sotchi bis Sudan: 10 Konflikte, die 2014 die globale Stabilität bedrohen werden. zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org <http://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org> 10.01.2014. [2] See also German War Assistance <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58543>. [3] See also Nach vierzig ruhigen Jahren <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58381> and Religion und Interesse <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58649>. [4] See also The Naumann Caucus <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56260> and Ein Amtsenthebungsverfahren <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/57571>. [5] See also Nächstes Jahr ein neuer Staat <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/57752>. [6] See also The Impact of Geostrategists <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58709>. -- G. Jure Ellero glry at ngi.it -- web adviser -- www.sibialiria.org -Geopolitica www.diecifebbraio.info -Resistenza http://boinc.berkeley.edu/ -Scienza --
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