Imperialism for a Cash-Strapped Era: Storms Below the Surface

[glry at ngi.it]

 Imperialism For Cash-Strapped Era: Storms Below The Surface, U.S. Can Only Afford Half 
A Cold War

 http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2012/01/18/imperialism-for-cash-strapped-era-storms-
below-the-surface-u-s-can-only-afford-half-a-cold-war/

 Stop NATO
 January 13 and 18, 2012

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 http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/01/13/imperialism-cash-strapped-era-storms-
below-the-surface-i.html

 Strategic Culture Foundation
 January 13, 2012


 Imperialism for a Cash-Strapped Era: Storms Below the Surface 
 Part I

 Melkulangara (MK) Bhadrakumar
 Edited by Rick Rozoff

 ====

 Three core areas in the defence strategy document merit detailed analysis, since they have 
profound implications for regional and international security for the period ahead - the US´s 
drawdown in Europe, consolidation in the Middle East and "rebalancing" toward the Asia-
Pacific. The document repeatedly mentions that the trans-Atlantic alliance and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] will remain the anchor of the US´s global strategies in 
the 21st century. In fact, the criticality of the alliance is such that NATO´s role is no longer 
confined to Europe´s territorial limits but will be on a global scale at a time when the US 
gives primacy to future military interventions in foreign lands jointly with the alliance system 
rather than as unilateralist enterprises.

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 The United States´ defence strategy unveiled by President Barack Obama in Washington 
on January 5 has been occasioned by the need to slash the spending of the Pentagon by 
nearly half a trillion dollars over the next decade. There is undeniably some merit in the 
viewpoint that this is a strategy that has been driven by budget woes - although Obama and 
Pentagon chief Leon Panetta have insisted that it is indeed a pure strategy.

 In Obama´s own words, "The tide of war is receding but the question that this strategy 
answers is what kind of military will we [the US] need long after the wars of the last decade 
are over." But a harsh contrarian estimation has been attributed to the influential Republican 
chairman of the US House Armed Forces Committee Representative Buck McKeon who 
said, "This is a lead-from-behind strategy for a left-behind America. The president has 
packaged our [US´s] retreat from the world in the guise of a new strategy to mask his 
divestment of our military and national defense."

 The argument can be settled with some certainty only by next month when the US Defense 
Department spells out the allocations under its proposed 2013 budget and we get to know 
where the cuts are being made. Indeed, another $500 billion across-the-board 
"sequestration" cuts will also take effect in 2013 unless Congress repeals them. Panetta has 
already warned that such a fiscal hit would be a catastrophe for US defence.

 Last week, Panetta indicated that the Pentagon would be fielding a "smaller and meaner" 
military force, while other administration officials have been quoted as saying that Army and 
Marine Corps personnel levels might be reduced by 10 to 15 percent through the coming 
decade. On the whole, therefore, Gordon Adams, a professor who worked on budgets in the 
Bill Clinton White House, was spot on: "This is a classic resource-driven strategy document. 
That´s not a criticism, that´s just a reality. It´s inevitable. Strategy always wears a dollar 
sign."

 So, is this the end of history? Is US imperialism on the retreat in the world arena? Are the 
Marines packing bags and returning home for family reunions and for a life happily ever 
after? Actually, the defence strategy document is deceptive. The more things seemed to 
change, the more they will remain the same. The heart of the matter is that the United 
States is making adjustments by way of preparing for another Cold War, and unlike Cold 
War I against the Soviet Union, this will be primarily fought in the Asia-Pacific. But before 
getting into that, the salient of the national defence strategy needs to be understood.

 In a nutshell, the US would prefer not to get involved in any massive land invasions such as 
in Afghanistan in 2001 or Iraq in 2003 and the priority will be on cyberwarfare and 
unmanned drones. The US forces "will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged 
stability operations", the document says, and even small overseas incursions will be rarer, 
since "with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the 
location and frequency of these operations."

 The US will reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its inventory as well as review their 
role in the overall security strategy. It´s goodbye to the decades-old goal of a unilateral US 
force that can fight two major ground wars simultaneously, and instead the objective will be 
to "fight and deter" - to fight one-and-a-half wars. Also, the US will as far as possible 
operate with allied and coalition forces. In short, it´s boom times ahead for US military 
contractors, spies and drones and contractor-managed military logistics overseas - and for 
close allies like Britain and Australia (unlike France or Germany) who are unfailing partners 
for the Marines as they set out for foreign intervention as well as new partners like Qatar. 
The plan is indeed to shrink the military significantly and to rely much more on the capacity 
of air and naval forces to balance a competitor like China or face down an antagonist like 
Iran.

 Asymmetric challenges

 The shrinking necessitates downsizing Cold War-era military presence in Europe. At the 
same time, the US will "of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region" and maintain 
a big presence in the Middle East. Without doubt, the Asia-Pacific now becomes a top 
priority for the US for meeting the challenge posed by the rising regional power of China. 
Obama stressed to the media that "we´ll be strengthening our presence in the Asia-Pacific, 
and budget reductions will not come at the expense of this critical region." Clearly, to build 
capacity in the Asia-Pacific, the US will draw down deployments in Europe (but not from the 
Middle East) and find savings in benefit and retirement costs, Cold War weapon systems 
and the nuclear arsenal.

 The impact of the new defence strategy on regional conflicts and world politics can only be 
assessed once all answers about direct budget consequences are known in another month. 
But some preliminary estimates can be made of what the US military footprint will actually 
look like. First and foremost, it must be assumed that the US´ intention is indeed to move 
away from counter-insurgency doctrines, land invasions and ground operations. This 
shouldn´t come as a surprise since the former secretary of defense Robert Gates went 
public last year that any future leader who contemplated a war and occupation of a Middle 
Eastern country "should have his head examined." That is to say, Iraq-style military 
interventions by the US can be virtually ruled out in Syria, Iran or North Korea.

 The "Libya"-type intervention replaces classic military aggression. A fallback could be the 
"Iraq"-type operation to change the established territorial boundaries in a slow-motion 
enterprise. The success of the "Iraq"-type operation depends on tenacity but it is cost-
effective. To be sure, Iran is going to be a test case where short of an "implosion" (which is 
next-to-impossible), a regime change can only be effected through a massive ground 
operation of a sort that will involve committing far bigger resources than in the Iraq war in 
2003 over an extended period lasting at least a decade to subjugate a nation with a history 
of resistance and revolution and an ideology-driven power system which enjoys a 
substantial social base. On the other hand, Iran also presents an ethnic mosaic.

 Having said that, the strategy will be to face down Iran (and China) by projecting US 
military power in the Persian Gulf or South China Sea and deter Iran´s (or China´s) pursuit of 
asymmetric means - electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced 
air defences, mining, etc. - to counter the US´s power projection capabilities. The strategy 
insists that the US will "ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial 
environments...[The US] must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our 
access and freedom to operate are challenged." Looking beyond that, the US will continue 
to exercise its global reach as a superpower to "protect freedom of access throughout the 
global commons - those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital 
connective tissue of the international system."

 The new strategy estimates that al-Qaeda has been rendered "far less capable", but 
nonetheless it remains active and will continue to threaten US interests and for the 
"foreseeable future" an active approach is needed to counter them. The "primary loci of 
these threats" are perceived to be lying in South Asia and the Middle East. This becomes a 
justification for continued robust engagement by the US in the two regions. With regard to 
Afghanistan, a follow-up to the current drawdown of US troops, a "mix of direct action and 
security force assistance" is contemplated. By implication, a substantial presence of US 
combat troops and special forces will remain in Afghanistan for a long time to come and the 
al-Qaeda threat is expected to provide the alibi for the establishment of permanent US 
military bases.

 Quiet lies the steppes

 Three core areas in the defence strategy document merit detailed analysis, since they have 
profound implications for regional and international security for the period ahead - the US´s 
drawdown in Europe, consolidation in the Middle East and "rebalancing" toward the Asia-
Pacific. The document repeatedly mentions that the trans-Atlantic alliance and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] will remain the anchor of the US´s global strategies in 
the 21st century. In fact, the criticality of the alliance is such that NATO´s role is no longer 
confined to Europe´s territorial limits but will be on a global scale at a time when the US 
gives primacy to future military interventions in foreign lands jointly with the alliance system 
rather than as unilateralist enterprises.

 Second, the document makes it clear that the US is far from withdrawing from Europe. The 
drawdown of the Cold War-era military presence is advisable since a country like Germany 
would increasingly like to be on its own and it is also prudent since Russia by no stretch of 
the imagination poses any security threat to western Europe. So the emergent geopolitical 
reality is that the US will have "enduring interests" in the so-called frozen conflicts in parts of 
Europe and Eurasia as well as other security challenges, which can be adequately met with 
as and when contingencies arise. In short, Washington proposes to seize "a strategic 
opportunity to rebalance the US military investment in Europe" so that it can optimally focus 
on developing "future capabilities" that are suitable for a "resource-constrained era". The 
new mantra is "Smart Defence". Of course, the US´s commitments to Article 5 of the 
Atlantic Charter will remain unwavering and no one should cast an evil eye on the US´s 
NATO allies.

 Russia is mentioned in the document in the above context en passe as a country with which 
the US will continue to engage selectively. But no assurances have been held out on the 
deployment of the US´s missile defence system in its periphery or on the future expansion of 
NATO. The pointed reference to the US´s determination to become involved in "security 
challenges and unresolved conflicts" in Eurasia, on the other hand, puts Washington 
somewhat at odds with the Moscow-led accelerating integration processes under way in the 
region, especially between now and 2015.

 An interesting puzzle is what would happen if the Arab Spring were to arrive on the Central 
Asia steppes. All indications are that such a scenario is increasingly in the US´s 
consideration zone. Ambassador William Courtney, who used to be the US´s envoy to 
Astana wrote an article only last week - interestingly, in the leading Arab daily Khaleej 
Times - pondering deeply over the future of Kazakhstan. "Kazakhstan at a precipice", the 
title of the article, said it all. He underscored "important US interests" in Kazakhstan ranging 
from "energy production to the elimination of nuclear and biological weapons to the transit of 
vital NATO supplies to Afghanistan." (Some US commentators have lately begun to cite 
Kazakhstan as the real "hub" of the Northern Distribution Network, rather than Uzbekistan.)

 Courtney wrote:

 "People in Kazakhstan who seek greater freedom look to Washington and European 
capitals for support...Over two decades amid growing wealth and corruption, Kazakhstan´s 
soft autocracy has hardened...As I have seen in recent trips, much of Kazakhstan has been 
starved of public investment while Nazarbayev has turned the new capital, Astana, into a 
mini-Dubai. The privileged few are astoundingly rich. Economic inequality, authoritarian rule 
and a highly personalized style of government have bred wide resentment.

 "Western governments, while carefully balancing their interests, should lose no time in 
deepening engagement with promising leaders, including younger ones in government. 
Expanded professional and educational exchanges and democracy training could help 
prepare the way for a new and more open generation of leaders. Western defense 
establishments might step up training on military roles in a democracy. A new accord with 
the European Union ought to expand programs on the rule of law and the OSCE should 
increase its stabilizing field presence.

 "The West has an enormous stake in Kazakhstan. It can do more to help its people shape a 
democratic future."

 Of course, the bell is tolling not only for Kazakhstan but also for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, which the US consider to be rather "low-hanging fruits" in 
comparison with Kazakhstan that can be easily plucked at leisure or will anyway fall down 
on their own when the big tree shakes. Evidently, a game plan for regime change in the 
Central Asian region is being prepared and could be set in motion if only Kabul is brought 
under a "friendly" Islamist government and the US succeeds in establishing its military 
bases in Afghanistan. No doubt, the commotion in the western Kazakh city of Zhanaozen on 
December 16 has been magnified out of proportion by US commentators, including 
Courtney.

 Thus, it must be concluded that the new defence strategy unveiled in Washington draws a 
deceptively calm picture of Europe and Eurasia but behind the curtain storms are brewing. 
The storms will gather momentum in direct proportion to the current integration processes in 
Central Asia leading to the formation of a Eurasian Union by 2015. In short, the crunch time 
probably just lies ahead.


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 http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/01/18/imperialism-for-a- cash-strapped-era-us-
cold-war-ii.html

 Strategic Culture Foundation
 January 18, 2012


 Imperialism for a cash-strapped era: US can only afford only half a Cold War
 Part II

 Melkulangara (MK) Bhadrakumar
 Edited by Rick Rozoff


 "Color revolutions" will continue to be the preferred route for the United States in effecting 
regime change in Central Asia. But the limits to the United States´s capacity to intervene 
also cannot but be noted. As a perceptive observer recently noted, the US is a "renter rather 
than a bona fide landlord of Eurasian property" - and a renter can always be evicted by the 
landlord. Second, the Central Asian countries cannot but find odious the violent regime 
changes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya and wouldn´t want to go through a similar 
experience. Most important, both Russia and China are following active regional policies 
with regard to the Central Asian countries, which give the latter much space to withstand US 
pressures.

 The fact remains that the Central Asian countries are an integral part of the so-called 
Northern Distribution Network [NDN], which is increasingly gaining in strategic importance 
as the main supply route for the US´s Afghan war due to the rupture and distrust in US-
Pakistan relations leading to the closure of the transit routes through Pakistan. Effectively, 
this means that "Russian policymakers may now take comfort from the fact that NATO´s 
Afghan mission is hostage to Moscow´s goodwill", to quote Richard Weitz, director of the 
Center for Political-Military Analysis at the prominent Washington think tank the Hudson 
Institute.

 Weitz wrote:

 "The NDN cannot function without access to Russian territory or in the face of Russian 
opposition, given Moscow´s decisive influence in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. 
From the perspective of meeting NATO´s logistical needs in Eurasia, Moscow is in a pivotal 
position."

 In geopolitical terms, this would mean that the Central Asian states would continue to look 
to Moscow as the main provider of security for the region and so long as Moscow continues 
to enhance its political, economic and security interests in the region commensurate with its 
status as a great power, the US´s capacity to work itself into the "right of history" will remain 
severely restricted.

 Flashpoint

 This brings us back to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific as the two principal theatres 
where the new US defence strategy can be expected to play out in the near term. The 
document is quite transparent that the US intends to pursue robust policies in these two 
regions with the intent to maximize its influence and resource constraints in the Pentagon 
will not be allowed to come in the way.

 The document asserts the continuance of the US´s interventionist approach to the Middle 
East and its quest for regional hegemony. It sees the Arab Spring as posing challenges to 
the US strategy but also sees "opportunities" presenting themselves. In the short term, there 
might be uncertainties about the trajectory of developments in the region but the US can 
expect a "more stable and reliable partnership" with the new governments that have a 
representative character. Three directions of the US regional strategy have been singled out 
for emphasis: support of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] member states; containment 
of Iran; and "standing up for Israel´s security."

 The document underlines that the US´s big military presence in the region will remain as a 
priority. All in all, therefore, the document´s main thrust is that US will do whatever it takes 
to perpetuate its regional hegemony in the Middle East. The strong affirmation of support for 
the ruling oligarchies in the GCC territory translates as great determination to go to any 
length to keep control over the vast oil and gas resources of the region. The US´s 
differentiated approach to the Arab Spring - low-key approach to Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia and high-pitched revolutionary fervor with regard to Libya and Syria - drives home 
the point that geopolitics will be the ultimate determiment of the US approach. To that end, 
the US will not countenance any "regime change" in the GCC states. On the contrary, the 
US will persevere with efforts to force regime change in Syria.

 The approach to the Arab Spring is directly linked to the other two templates of the US´s 
regional strategy, namely, containment of Iran and safeguarding Israel´s regional pre-
eminence. The geopolitical reality is that Iran´s quest of regional power and influence puts it 
at odds with US and Israeli interests. Equally, Iran´s rise as a regional power stems from 
multiple factors, which which primarily lie in the domestic sphere and over which neither the 
US nor Israel has any capacity to influence - Iran´s indigenous capabilities in science and 
technology, its success in defeating US sanctions, its comprehensive military strength, its 
nuclear technology, its political system with an appreciable social base and its unifying 
ideology.

 The contradiction is, therefore, becoming very acute. For the US, the emergence of an 
authentic regional power in the Middle East is unthinkable. The US simply cannot allow any 
dilution of its dominance of the strategically important region. But Iran´s emergence as a 
regional power threatens to do precisely that by transforming the geopolitics of the Middle 
East. The US has employed all the tricks in its armory in the past three decades to destroy 
or weaken the Iranian regime. But Iran has remained defiant and is unwilling to give in. 
Thus, a flashpoint has arisen. What other option is the US left with other than launching a 
war on Iran?

 Have gun, will travel

 The US defence strategy document´s most sensational part is in regard to the US´s 
"rebalancing" toward the Asia-Pacific region. In a way, the document carries forward and 
expands on the US´s National Security Strategy of 2010 to renew America´s global 
leadership and advance its interests in the 21st century by "building upon the sources of [the 
US´s] strength at home, while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of 
our time."

 The approach principally involves increasing the US´s strategic investment in the Asia-
Pacific by exploiting the fears and complexities with regard to China´s rise in the region 
among the regional states in the Asia-Pacific, some of whom also happen to have 
unresolved territorial disputes with China (which are intractable) or have had military 
conflicts with China in modern history. In particular, the South China Sea has been an arena 
of regional unrest where the US has to an extent succeeded in stirring up regional 
sentiments concerning and resistance to an "assertive" China. Clearly, the US will continue 
to disregard China´s warnings against the involvement of "external forces" in the affairs of 
the region and the US strategy will be to instigate regional opinion to mobilize against China 
under its [the US's] leadership.

 The US has also been harping on China´s modernization of its military as lacking in 
transparency, thereby playing up the regional apprehensions of a "revanchist" China. The 
latest document suggests a substantial increase in the US´s military expenditure in the Asia-
Pacific so that its claim to be the provider of security to regional countries gains in 
credibility. An arms race in the region will suit US interests and the "China threat" lends itself 
to promoting the US´s arms exports to the region.

 The strong likelihood is that the US will do its utmost to accentuate contradictions in the 
relations between the regional states on the one hand - especially India and Japan - and 
China on the other hand. The US initiative to launch a trilateral dialogue with Japan and 
India (which held its first session in Washington in December) can be seen in this light. 
Equally, the US attempt to hustle India into an Asian bloc under its leadership is apparent 
from the defence strategy document´s pithy reference to India:

 "We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the 
Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. The 
United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its 
ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian 
Ocean region."

 Gatecrashing at interval time

 However, the success of the US policy is predicated on several> factors, the principal 
among them being the US´s ability to offer an economic partnership to the regional countries 
that provide with them with an alternative to moving into the Chinese economic orbit as is 
happening today.

 China is likely to maintain its high growth rate for at least another decade by inducing 
greater consumption by its 1.3 billion population, which is acquiring bigger disposable 
incomes. As China´s GDP increases, the countries in the region - not only those in its 
periphery but even outlying countries - cannot resist the attraction of the Chinese market 
and they are being drawn into China´s economic orbit. The countries of the region are 
mindful of the growing reality that their huge dependence on the Chinese market could give 
Beijing over time the leverage to "punish" those who work against its interests. In sum, they 
realize that the balance of power in the region has changed, while at the same time the 
paradox is that they also enjoy benefits in trade and investment and are tapping into China´s 
growth, including Australia, which is the US´s staunchest ally in the Asia-Pacific.

 An article co-authored by the minister mentor of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, over an year 
ago had suggested, "There is still time for the US to counter China´s attraction by instituting 
a free-trade agreement with other countries in the region. This would prevent these 
countries from having an excessive dependence on the Chinese market...[The] outlook for a 
balanced and equitable relationship between the American and Chinese markets is 
becoming increasingly difficult. Every year China attracts more imports and exports from its 
neighbors than the US does from the region. Without an FTA, Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the 
ASEAN countries will be integrated into China´s economy - an outcome to be avoided."

 But this is easier said than done. If anything, the prevailing mood in the US against any 
new FTA agreements is only hardening, and protectionist sentiments are in evidence all 
over. Besides, this is also a game that China can play. And so far, while the Americans and 
Lee may see China as an economic threat, the countries of the region - like the Europeans, 
too - continue to be lured by the promise of China as an economic opportunity. In sum, 
instead of being prescriptive, China so far has been about adaptation and creating "win-win" 
situations with its Asia-Pacific partners.

 The new defence strategy´s overt emphasis on a cold war with China aims at neutralizing 
the widespread perception in the Asia-Pacific that the US´s "unipolar moment" is ending. 
However, the US´s prolonged absence from the region while engaged in the "war on terror" 
for the past decade obviously created a new paradigm where the countries of the region 
began pondering over the stability, security and prosperity of the region without Uncle Sam´s 
leadership.

 New regional mechanisms of regional cooperation took shape, such as the "10+1" [10 
ASEAN member countries plus China] and new approaches to developing a matrix of 
political, economic and security ties made substantial headway. In essence, therefore, the 
US is virtually gatecrashing at interval time into an Asian drama that didn´t envisage it or 
think it necessary to cast it as a lead player.

 Besides, China is not standing idle, either. A powerful instrument in its hands is the 
unprecedented level of its economic interdependency with the US. The fact that President 
Barack Obama has begun the US´s diplomatic calendar for 2012 by deputing Treasure 
Secretary Timothy Geithner to Beijing as special envoy - so soon after the strident rhetoric 
on the sidelines of the APEC session in Honolulu and the East Asia Summit in Bali - 
underscores Washington´s keenness to set a positive tone for the US-China relationship. 
Beijing of course gleefully welcomed the opportunity to kiss and make up. Geithner´s talks 
with the Chinese leadership conveyed the message that the two countries have no 
alternative but to cooperate with each other.

 With the US economic recovery proving slower than expected, China´s market is of the 
highest importance for boosting the growth rate in America. Again, China´s continued 
purchase of US treasury bonds is vital for the US´s capacity to maintain financial 
sustainability. There is also a curious convergence of interests lately with regard to 
sequestering their respective economies from the adverse fallout of the Eurozone crisis. 
Against the backdrop of Geithner´s talks in Beijing, the government-owned China Daily took 
note:

 "Although some officials in the [Barack] Obama administration have joined the China-
bashing game, top China hands within and around the White House seem to be more clear-
minded, which is why the yuan-related currency bill was shelved in the House of 
Representatives and the Treasury Department has not labeled China a `currency 
manipulator´...

 "Prior to Geithner´s visit, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell visited Beijing and 
discussed recent developments on the Korean peninsula, and Vice-President Xi Jinping is 
expected to visit the US in February. Hopefully, such high-level visits from both sides will 
help make sure that Sino-US relations stay on the right track."

 In sum, the US´s "rebalancing" of its military capacities to the Asia-Pacific has complex 
motives of engaging China deeper while at the same time simultaneously, on a parallel 
track, tapping into the growing prosperity of the countries of the region by playing on their 
insecurities and shepherding them under US leadership. Both enterprises are needed for the 
recovery of the US economy. The net result is going to be that, contrary to the apparent 
intention of the US defence strategy to proclaim a new Cold War in the Asia-Pacific, the 
high probability is that Washington may end up getting at the most a mere half a Cold War. 
And a Cold War is worthless unless it is comprehensive and one hundred percent unitary.

 The harsh reality is that the US can no longer inspire confidence in the world community 
about its "unipolar moment". The latest figures as of last September show that the size of 
the US´s national debt has reached a new milestone - 15.23 trillion dollars - and it is now as 
big as the whole of the American economy. The long-term forecast is that the debt will grow 
faster than the economy, and the economy may need six percent annual growth merely to 
keep pace with galloping debts.


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FROM: 

KOMINFORM
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