cosa ha detto Blix al Consiglio di Sicurezza ONU (inglese)

["Nello Margiotta" <animarg@tin.it>]

Transcript of weapons inspector's U.N. presentation
Friday, February 14, 2003 Posted: 11:44 AM EST (1644 GMT)


 Following is a transcript of chief weapons inspector Hans Blix's February
14 presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the progress of the
inspection effort in Iraq.

(CNN) -- Mr. President, since I reported to the Security Council on 27th of
January, UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical
work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total
period of inspections so far to 11 weeks.

Since then, we have also listened on the 5th of February to the presentation
to the Council by the U.S. secretary of state and the discussion that
followed.

Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with
our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on the 8th and 9th of
February.

Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being
performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.

We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in Mosul
is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for a regional
office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft continues
to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight
helicopters are fully operational.

With the resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of
minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has improved. We
expect to increase utilization of the helicopters.

The number of Iraqi minders during inspections has often reached a ratio --
had often reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks in
January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about 1:1.
The situation has improved.

Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections
covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice,
and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen
convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors
were coming.

The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq, at industrial sites,
ammunition depots, research centers, universities, presidential sites,
mobile laboratories, private houses, missile-production facilities, military
camps and agricultural sites.

At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, rebase lining activities
were performed. This included the identification of the function and
contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included
verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags,
taking samples, and discussions with the site's personnel regarding past and
present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to
look for underground structures or buried equipment.

Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good knowledge
of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its
missile capability. But as before, we do not know every cave and corner.
Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that
arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November
2002.

More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been
collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been screened,
using our own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad center. The
results to date have been consistent with Iraqi declarations.

We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 liters of
mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under UNMOVIC seal at the
Muthanna site; one-third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The
laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found
at another site, has also been destroyed.

The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This
includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 50 IAEA inspectors, 15 air crew and
65 support staff.

Mr. President, in my 27th of January update to the Council, I said that it
seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide
cooperation on process -- most importantly, prompt access to all sites and
assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure.

This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been
without problems, including those that have never been declared or
inspected, as well as to presidential sites and private residences.

In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on substance
was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the disarmament
task to completion and to set the monitoring system on the firm course.

Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors.
In the words of Resolution 1441, it requires immediate, unconditional and
active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of disarmament, either
by presenting remaining proscribed items and programs for elimination or by
presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated.

In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply.

While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the government of South
Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of
the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons program by a
wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have just
learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of
experts for further talks.

How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related
proscribed items and programs? So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such
weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions which should have
been declared and destroyed.

Another matter, and one of great significance, is that many proscribed
weapons and items are not accounted for.

To take an example, a document which Iraq provided suggested to us that some
1,000 tons of chemical agent were unaccounted for. I must not jump to the
conclusion that they exist; however, that possibility is also not excluded.
If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not
exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.

We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are
convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programs continue to
exist. The U.S. secretary of state presented material in support of this
conclusion.

Governments have many sources of information that are not available to
inspectors. The inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only on
the evidence which they can themselves examine and present publicly. Without
evidence, confidence cannot arise.

Mr. President, in my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant
outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security Council
documents from early 1999 and should be well known to Iraq.

I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX, and
long-range missiles, and said that such issues -- and I quote myself --
"deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside,"
unquote.

The declaration submitted by Iraq on the 7th of December last year, despite
its large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and
evidence needed to respond to the open questions.

This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can
understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the
evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq
itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.

In my January update to the Council I referred to the al-Samud II and the Al
Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of a missile
engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared
to UNMOVIC by Iraq.

I noted that the al-Samud II and the Al Fatah could very well represent
prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to
ranges exceeding the 150 kilometers limit set by the Security Council.

I also noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these
missiles until UNMOVIC completed a technical review.

Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts
from a number of member states to discuss these items. The experts concluded
unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared
variants of the al-Samud II missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometers
in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to
Resolution 687 and the monitoring plan adopted by Resolution 715.

As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile
data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile
system could be fully assessed.

With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM ordered
and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers, which had been
intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr 2000 missile
system. Iraq has declared that it has reconstituted these chambers. The
experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still
be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly
greater than 150 kilometers. Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.

The expert also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is
nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of testing missile
engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far the test
stand has not been associated with the proscribed activity.

On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the
export-import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of Resolution
687, UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing
that these engines were intended for use in the al-Samud II missile system,
which has now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured
for use in this missile system would also be proscribed. I intend to
communicate these findings to the government of Iraq.

At the meeting in Baghdad on the 8th and the 9th, February, the Iraqi side
addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and gave us a
number of papers -- for instance, regarding anthrax and growth material, the
nerve agent VX and missile production.

Experts who were present from our side studied the papers during the evening
of 8th of February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February
for further clarifications.

Although no new evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues were
closed through them or the expert discussions, the presentation of the
papers could be indicative of a more active attitude focusing on the
important open issues.

The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of
anthrax and two VX precursors, which had been declared unilaterally
destroyed, might be tackled through certain technical and analytical
methods. Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions, they are
not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of
material poured into the grounds years ago. Documentary evidence and
testimony by staff that dealt with the items still appears to be needed.

Not least against this background, a letter of the 12th of February from
Iraq's National and Monitoring Directorate may be irrelevant. It presents a
list of 83 names of participants, I quote, "in the unilateral destruction in
the chemical field which took place in the summer of 1991," unquote.

As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains
an important reason why quantities of chemicals had been deemed unaccounted
for, the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the
actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance.

**************************************************
Nello

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