Fw: The Pakistani Crisis

["Nello Margiotta" <animarg@tin.it>]

 The Pakistani Crisis
 2245 GMT, 011220

 Summary

 With the Taliban withdrawal, the focus is shifting to countries that could
 next face U.S. military attention, such as Somalia or Iraq. However, if
 Washington really wants to break the al Qaeda network, it must deal with
 Pakistan first. It will become increasingly difficult for the United States
 to avoid taking some action in at least parts of that country.

 Analysis

 The mood in Washington is one of subdued satisfaction. The war in
 Afghanistan has been concluded, with the primary strategic objective
 achieved: the country can no longer be used as a base of operations for al
 Qaeda.

 Secondary strategic objectives, though, have not been attained. The bulk of
 Taliban fighters have not been killed or captured, and it will not be clear
until after winter whether their cohesion has been permanently shattered.
 The senior commanders of the Taliban have also not been liquidated. Above
 all, al Qaeda's leadership, particularly Osama bin Laden, still appears to
 be on the loose.

 However, in any war in which the primary objective is achieved with little
 cost in lives, there is ample reason for satisfaction. However, there is
 another sense in Washington that events in Afghanistan have clearly given
 the United States strategic initiative, and that therefore the next move is
up to the Bush administration.

 There is a spirited debate underway among policymakers at all levels as to
 what such a move ought to be. Some argue that the United States should now
attack Iraq, while others want to deal with Somalia or Yemen.

 The debate itself is rooted in a perception of the world that is dubious.
 The Bush administration did not choose the war in Afghanistan. It was
forced
on the United States by the actions of others and by geopolitical reality.
 Al Qaeda's decision to attack, its relationship to the Taliban and the
 geography and politics of Afghanistan scripted the American response.

Washington's perception of the current situation is that it now has the
 freedom to choose its next step. But what that will be just isn't clear, as
 new issues will force themselves on the United States. The most important
 issue, one that the United States has been assiduously avoiding, is that of
 the current role and future condition Pakistan.

 Pakistan historically has been an ally of the United States, and it was a
 base of operations for U.S. and allied efforts to support the mujahideen
 during the Afghan-Soviet war.

 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.-Pakistani relations underwent a
 transformation. Pakistan evolved politically from a secular, pro-Western
 orientation until it became a bulwark of Islamic fundamentalism. To a very
 great extent, the Taliban is as much a Pakistani creature as it is an
Afghan
 one.

 On the other side, with the United States no longer driven by the need to
 contain the Soviet Union, the U.S. government downgraded Pakistan's
 strategic importance. Before Sept. 11, the United States was already
 exploring two new relationships: with the Khatami regime in Iran and with
 India.

 However, after Sept. 11, the United States was forced back into a difficult
 and complex relationship with Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistani interests in
 Afghanistan were fundamentally at odds because Islamabad had close ties
with
 the Taliban and did not want them to lose power, especially to the Northern
 Alliance.

 At the same time, the United States badly needed Pakistan. Washington was
 incapable of containing either the Taliban or al Qaeda inside of
 Afghanistan. The quantity of forces deployed simply would not achieve that
 goal.

 Therefore, Pakistan's willingness to use its armed forces to seal its
border
 with Afghanistan became a matter of critical importance. Even more
 important, the willingness of Pakistan to use its intelligence and security
 forces to uproot al Qaeda cells, disrupt Taliban control in regions where
 these cells might find refuge and provide intelligence on al Qaeda
 operations in the region became strategically critical. So long as Pakistan
 served as active or passive sanctuary, the Afghan operation could not be
 conclusive.

 The Pakistani government was caught in a serious dilemma. It could not
afford to enrage the United States. An outright refusal to cooperate with
 Washington, or continued active support of the Taliban and al Qaeda, would
 have made Pakistan an enemy of the United States. Given the evolution of
 Washington's relationship with New Delhi, and to a lesser extent, with
 Taliban enemy Iran, a direct challenge to Washington could have
crystallized
 a strategic alliance that would have doomed Pakistan.

India recognized Sept. 11 as a historic opportunity, and put two policies
 into motion. The first was to be absolutely forthcoming with Washington,
 offering it a host of military and intelligence accommodations including
the
 right to use Indian air bases for operations. Second, it proceeded to
 increase its forces in the Kashmir region in anticipation of evolving
 strategic opportunities. Iran, with a much more complex internal situation,
 was of course less forthcoming and less relevant to the equation.

 Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was caught between the strategic
threat
 and domestic reality. He understood he had to cooperate with the United
 States, but also understood there were severe limitations on that
 cooperation. Orders to act against Taliban supporters could be given, but
 whether Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or other security
 organs would obey those orders was questionable.

 Musharraf faced two problems. First, if he pressed too hard, he could
 destabilize his government and perhaps lose power. If he did nothing at
all,
 he could get trapped in a geopolitical minefield.

 The president's solution was to act against the Taliban while asking that
 the United States appreciate the limits of his power. Washington, knowing
 that if Musharraf fell, it would leave America in a disastrous situation in
 Afghanistan, permitted the president to tread a careful, middle road.

 He acted on behalf of the United States, but not so vigorously as to lose
 his power base. This meant the U.S. military was able to base only limited
 forces in Pakistan, receive some cooperation from Pakistani intelligence
and
 have some control placed on pro-Taliban elements in the country.

 However, the United States would still have to operate in a nation in which
 Taliban support was strong and the government was intimately bound up with
 the Taliban. The ultimate understanding was that the United States would
 turn a blind eye to Pakistani collaboration with the Taliban, so long as
 Pakistan cooperated with and never impeded the U.S. war against al Qaeda.

 On paper this arrangement seemed fine. Washington cared much more about al
 Qaeda than the Taliban. The Pakistanis seemed to care mostly about the
 Taliban and little about al Qaeda. Washington recognized that support for
 the Taliban and support for al Qaeda came from the same quarters and
 entities in Pakistan.

 Those who were willing to strike at Musharraf were equally unwilling to
cooperate in liquidating the Taliban. And since the ISI was a center of
 pro-Taliban sentiment, the probability of actual cooperation was slim.

 Much of this was academic prior to the recent Tora Bora operation, when it
 suddenly became a burning issue. It is far from clear that bin Laden was at
 Tora Bora. Why would he choose to go there from Kandahar as the Taliban was
 withdrawing from the cities?

 But it seems extremely likely that he would have tried to make his way into
 Pakistan, and if he personally didn't go there, it seems certain that other
 members of the command cell, as well as less senior al Qaeda operatives,
did
 make their way into the country.

 There has been a great deal of speculation as to where they will go from
 Pakistan, although it is not even clear they would wish to leave the
country
 at all. There are important sectors of the government, especially in the
 ISI, who are prepared to actively protect them and provide them with
 infrastructure for movement, communications and even training.

 Whatever Musharraf might want -- and he probably wishes that al Qaeda
 members would disappear from his country so he can get on with his life --
 it is not certain that the president will or can act decisively.

 One indication of the true status of Pakistan policymaking occurred last
 week when Islamic operatives attacked India's Parliament. It is difficult,
 from Musharraf's point of view, to imagine a worse development right now.
 The last thing he wants is to give the Indians an excuse to attack in
 Kashmir. He does not want to create a crisis in which the United States is
 forced to make choices at a time when Pakistan cannot fulfill American
demands.

 Unfortunately, the attack on the Parliament was likely supported by
 organizations that depend on Pakistani patronage and which clearly want to
 intensify the crisis between India and Pakistan. They may see their
 situation inside of Pakistan deteriorating under U.S. pressure, and a
 conflict with India might increase their power.

 First, the United States would be revealed as a useless ally. Second, those
 Pakistanis who see some accommodation with the United States as necessary
 would be discredited. Finally, an attack by India would create an
atmosphere
 in which Islamic forces could flourish.

 Thus, the attack on India indicates two things. One, Islamic
fundamentalists
 inside Pakistan feel pressure from Musharraf. Two, they have the ability to
 act in a way that would reveal the president as incapable of controlling
his
 internal forces. And that would drive a wedge between Islamabad and
 Washington in exactly the way they want.

 The core of the problem is this: The next country the United States has to
deal with if it wants to break al Qaeda is not Iraq or Somalia. It is
 Pakistan. The United States cannot begin the process of shutting down al
 Qaeda globally until their organization inside Pakistan is broken. Al Qaeda
 was always present in Pakistan, and following the Taliban collapse, its
 numbers there have undoubtedly surged. Many or even all may stay because
 Pakistan is a good place from which to operate.

This means that unless the Pakistani government acts directly against al
 Qaeda, the United States must either begin to treat Pakistan as a hostile
 power or must abandon its strategic goals. The latter is impossible. It is
 also impossible to imagine a circumstance under which Musharraf will be
able
 to act effectively to destroy al Qaeda's presence in Pakistan. There are
too
 many in Pakistan who would have to cooperate with this process who are
 unwilling and incapable of doing so.

Therefore, the United States is on a collision course with Pakistan, made
 all the more complex by the fact that the government there is not capable
of
 giving the United States what it must have. If Washington is not going to
 abandon its goals, it must create a plan of operation in Pakistan. It is
 difficult to imagine any circumstance under which this will not compel the
 United States to take some actions against at least parts of Pakistan.

 The United States will need regional strategic support. India is ready and
 waiting. China, on the other hand, is unpredictable. It is wary of U.S.
 actions, hostile to increased Indian power and has longstanding relations
 with Pakistan. China does have an Islamic problem, but Beijing's
 geopolitical interests do not include the collapse of Pakistan.

 As the Bush administration has said, things now get harder. The hardest
part
 is recognizing that the United States has not yet achieved true freedom of
 action. The menu is still being drawn up by others, and from where we sit,
 the next item on the menu is Pakistan.

 That is the country of refuge for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. That is
the
 country where support for them is the highest and where supporters deeply
 influence major institutions. Pakistan must either change or be changed, or
the United States must abandon its ambitions relative to al Qaeda. The
 United States will not abandon its fight, nor can it unilaterally act in
 Pakistan, although it can manipulate internal affairs as it did in
 Afghanistan. However, Pakistan is not Afghanistan, and such manipulation
 could have explosive results. And for India, this is the historical
 opportunity it has waited for since its founding.



>
>
> The Revolution will not be televised: News at 11...
>
> grok
> Independent canadian marxist
>
> The U.S. ruling class: A godzilla monster
> that stalks the world, devouring everything.
> (apologies to Godzilla and friends)
>
>