Re: The Pakistani Crisis

["Fulvio Grimaldi" <bassottovic at libero.it>]

Non credo siano da accreditare i motivi principali vantati dall'intervento
USA in Afghanistan. I motivi veri non hanno molto da fare con la cattura del
tuttora agente CIA, Bin Laden (semmai con il ritrovamento di altre
megapatacche video), nè con la distruzione di Al Qaeda e del regime Taleban.
Conta che si faccia guerra quando e dove pare, che il "terrorismo" è
diventato il passamontagna sull'orrendo volto della fascistizzazione
globale, e che si sia ripreso il controllo della produzione e
commercializzazione dell'oppio e dell'utilizzo dei suoi proventi
nell'economia di rapina degli USA (e un obiettivo imminente, nello stesso
quadro, sarà il Laos, paese comunista e, perlopiù, ostacolo alla ripresa
della valorizzazione USA del "Triangolo d'oro" dell'oppio. Si sono già viste
da quelle partri le mosche cocchiere radicali). Conta il rafforzamento dello
stato-nazione nordamericano - e di quelli subalterni - nella perfetta
integrazione tra Stato e elementi trainanti privilegiati della produzione.
Conta di aver impiegato impunemente la punizione collettiva di popoli per
ricomporre sul cadavere sfilacciato della globalizzazione (cui credono ormai
solo Casarini e Negri) la più pura strategia imperialista. Conta di aver
potuto lanciare la grande controffensiva WASP-israeliana dopo la sconfitta
del colonialismo 50 anni fa. Conta che il ricatto terroristico fatto da
Israele agli USA ha definitivamente imposto il ruolo-guida di Israele nella
crociata occidentale contro i paesi delle risorse. Conta che si sono
sperimentate alcune nuove armi para-nucleari. Conta che si sia sfoltito un
altro po' di umanità eccedente. Conta che si sia infilato un cuneo nel
disegno di una grande triangolo di potenza alternativa nel l'Eurasia
(Russia, Cina, India e, forse, UE) e nella temutissima prospettiva di un
nuovo equilibrio di forze che possa inibire il passo alle aggressioni e
devastazioni USA, come al tempo dell'URSS e dei Non allineati.
Fulvio Grimaldi
----- Original Message -----
From: "Nello Margiotta" <animarg at tin.it>
To: <pck-pace at peacelink.it>
Sent: Saturday, December 22, 2001 10:42 AM
Subject: Fw: The Pakistani Crisis


>
>
>
>
>  The Pakistani Crisis
>  2245 GMT, 011220
>
>  Summary
>
>  With the Taliban withdrawal, the focus is shifting to countries that
could
>  next face U.S. military attention, such as Somalia or Iraq. However, if
>  Washington really wants to break the al Qaeda network, it must deal with
>  Pakistan first. It will become increasingly difficult for the United
States
>  to avoid taking some action in at least parts of that country.
>
>  Analysis
>
>  The mood in Washington is one of subdued satisfaction. The war in
>  Afghanistan has been concluded, with the primary strategic objective
>  achieved: the country can no longer be used as a base of operations for
al
>  Qaeda.
>
>  Secondary strategic objectives, though, have not been attained. The bulk
of
>  Taliban fighters have not been killed or captured, and it will not be
clear
> until after winter whether their cohesion has been permanently shattered.
>  The senior commanders of the Taliban have also not been liquidated. Above
>  all, al Qaeda's leadership, particularly Osama bin Laden, still appears
to
>  be on the loose.
>
>  However, in any war in which the primary objective is achieved with
little
>  cost in lives, there is ample reason for satisfaction. However, there is
>  another sense in Washington that events in Afghanistan have clearly given
>  the United States strategic initiative, and that therefore the next move
is
> up to the Bush administration.
>
>  There is a spirited debate underway among policymakers at all levels as
to
>  what such a move ought to be. Some argue that the United States should
now
> attack Iraq, while others want to deal with Somalia or Yemen.
>
>  The debate itself is rooted in a perception of the world that is dubious.
>  The Bush administration did not choose the war in Afghanistan. It was
> forced
> on the United States by the actions of others and by geopolitical reality.
>  Al Qaeda's decision to attack, its relationship to the Taliban and the
>  geography and politics of Afghanistan scripted the American response.
>
> Washington's perception of the current situation is that it now has the
>  freedom to choose its next step. But what that will be just isn't clear,
as
>  new issues will force themselves on the United States. The most important
>  issue, one that the United States has been assiduously avoiding, is that
of
>  the current role and future condition Pakistan.
>
>  Pakistan historically has been an ally of the United States, and it was a
>  base of operations for U.S. and allied efforts to support the mujahideen
>  during the Afghan-Soviet war.
>
>  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.-Pakistani relations underwent
a
>  transformation. Pakistan evolved politically from a secular, pro-Western
>  orientation until it became a bulwark of Islamic fundamentalism. To a
very
>  great extent, the Taliban is as much a Pakistani creature as it is an
> Afghan
>  one.
>
>  On the other side, with the United States no longer driven by the need to
>  contain the Soviet Union, the U.S. government downgraded Pakistan's
>  strategic importance. Before Sept. 11, the United States was already
>  exploring two new relationships: with the Khatami regime in Iran and with
>  India.
>
>  However, after Sept. 11, the United States was forced back into a
difficult
>  and complex relationship with Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistani interests in
>  Afghanistan were fundamentally at odds because Islamabad had close ties
> with
>  the Taliban and did not want them to lose power, especially to the
Northern
>  Alliance.
>
>  At the same time, the United States badly needed Pakistan. Washington was
>  incapable of containing either the Taliban or al Qaeda inside of
>  Afghanistan. The quantity of forces deployed simply would not achieve
that
>  goal.
>
>  Therefore, Pakistan's willingness to use its armed forces to seal its
> border
>  with Afghanistan became a matter of critical importance. Even more
>  important, the willingness of Pakistan to use its intelligence and
security
>  forces to uproot al Qaeda cells, disrupt Taliban control in regions where
>  these cells might find refuge and provide intelligence on al Qaeda
>  operations in the region became strategically critical. So long as
Pakistan
>  served as active or passive sanctuary, the Afghan operation could not be
>  conclusive.
>
>  The Pakistani government was caught in a serious dilemma. It could not
> afford to enrage the United States. An outright refusal to cooperate with
>  Washington, or continued active support of the Taliban and al Qaeda,
would
>  have made Pakistan an enemy of the United States. Given the evolution of
>  Washington's relationship with New Delhi, and to a lesser extent, with
>  Taliban enemy Iran, a direct challenge to Washington could have
> crystallized
>  a strategic alliance that would have doomed Pakistan.
>
> India recognized Sept. 11 as a historic opportunity, and put two policies
>  into motion. The first was to be absolutely forthcoming with Washington,
>  offering it a host of military and intelligence accommodations including
> the
>  right to use Indian air bases for operations. Second, it proceeded to
>  increase its forces in the Kashmir region in anticipation of evolving
>  strategic opportunities. Iran, with a much more complex internal
situation,
>  was of course less forthcoming and less relevant to the equation.
>
>  Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was caught between the strategic
> threat
>  and domestic reality. He understood he had to cooperate with the United
>  States, but also understood there were severe limitations on that
>  cooperation. Orders to act against Taliban supporters could be given, but
>  whether Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or other security
>  organs would obey those orders was questionable.
>
>  Musharraf faced two problems. First, if he pressed too hard, he could
>  destabilize his government and perhaps lose power. If he did nothing at
> all,
>  he could get trapped in a geopolitical minefield.
>
>  The president's solution was to act against the Taliban while asking that
>  the United States appreciate the limits of his power. Washington, knowing
>  that if Musharraf fell, it would leave America in a disastrous situation
in
>  Afghanistan, permitted the president to tread a careful, middle road.
>
>  He acted on behalf of the United States, but not so vigorously as to lose
>  his power base. This meant the U.S. military was able to base only
limited
>  forces in Pakistan, receive some cooperation from Pakistani intelligence
> and
>  have some control placed on pro-Taliban elements in the country.
>
>  However, the United States would still have to operate in a nation in
which
>  Taliban support was strong and the government was intimately bound up
with
>  the Taliban. The ultimate understanding was that the United States would
>  turn a blind eye to Pakistani collaboration with the Taliban, so long as
>  Pakistan cooperated with and never impeded the U.S. war against al Qaeda.
>
>  On paper this arrangement seemed fine. Washington cared much more about
al
>  Qaeda than the Taliban. The Pakistanis seemed to care mostly about the
>  Taliban and little about al Qaeda. Washington recognized that support for
>  the Taliban and support for al Qaeda came from the same quarters and
>  entities in Pakistan.
>
>  Those who were willing to strike at Musharraf were equally unwilling to
> cooperate in liquidating the Taliban. And since the ISI was a center of
>  pro-Taliban sentiment, the probability of actual cooperation was slim.
>
>  Much of this was academic prior to the recent Tora Bora operation, when
it
>  suddenly became a burning issue. It is far from clear that bin Laden was
at
>  Tora Bora. Why would he choose to go there from Kandahar as the Taliban
was
>  withdrawing from the cities?
>
>  But it seems extremely likely that he would have tried to make his way
into
>  Pakistan, and if he personally didn't go there, it seems certain that
other
>  members of the command cell, as well as less senior al Qaeda operatives,
> did
>  make their way into the country.
>
>  There has been a great deal of speculation as to where they will go from
>  Pakistan, although it is not even clear they would wish to leave the
> country
>  at all. There are important sectors of the government, especially in the
>  ISI, who are prepared to actively protect them and provide them with
>  infrastructure for movement, communications and even training.
>
>  Whatever Musharraf might want -- and he probably wishes that al Qaeda
>  members would disappear from his country so he can get on with his
life --
>  it is not certain that the president will or can act decisively.
>
>  One indication of the true status of Pakistan policymaking occurred last
>  week when Islamic operatives attacked India's Parliament. It is
difficult,
>  from Musharraf's point of view, to imagine a worse development right now.
>  The last thing he wants is to give the Indians an excuse to attack in
>  Kashmir. He does not want to create a crisis in which the United States
is
>  forced to make choices at a time when Pakistan cannot fulfill American
> demands.
>
>  Unfortunately, the attack on the Parliament was likely supported by
>  organizations that depend on Pakistani patronage and which clearly want
to
>  intensify the crisis between India and Pakistan. They may see their
>  situation inside of Pakistan deteriorating under U.S. pressure, and a
>  conflict with India might increase their power.
>
>  First, the United States would be revealed as a useless ally. Second,
those
>  Pakistanis who see some accommodation with the United States as necessary
>  would be discredited. Finally, an attack by India would create an
> atmosphere
>  in which Islamic forces could flourish.
>
>  Thus, the attack on India indicates two things. One, Islamic
> fundamentalists
>  inside Pakistan feel pressure from Musharraf. Two, they have the ability
to
>  act in a way that would reveal the president as incapable of controlling
> his
>  internal forces. And that would drive a wedge between Islamabad and
>  Washington in exactly the way they want.
>
>  The core of the problem is this: The next country the United States has
to
> deal with if it wants to break al Qaeda is not Iraq or Somalia. It is
>  Pakistan. The United States cannot begin the process of shutting down al
>  Qaeda globally until their organization inside Pakistan is broken. Al
Qaeda
>  was always present in Pakistan, and following the Taliban collapse, its
>  numbers there have undoubtedly surged. Many or even all may stay because
>  Pakistan is a good place from which to operate.
>
> This means that unless the Pakistani government acts directly against al
>  Qaeda, the United States must either begin to treat Pakistan as a hostile
>  power or must abandon its strategic goals. The latter is impossible. It
is
>  also impossible to imagine a circumstance under which Musharraf will be
> able
>  to act effectively to destroy al Qaeda's presence in Pakistan. There are
> too
>  many in Pakistan who would have to cooperate with this process who are
>  unwilling and incapable of doing so.
>
> Therefore, the United States is on a collision course with Pakistan, made
>  all the more complex by the fact that the government there is not capable
> of
>  giving the United States what it must have. If Washington is not going to
>  abandon its goals, it must create a plan of operation in Pakistan. It is
>  difficult to imagine any circumstance under which this will not compel
the
>  United States to take some actions against at least parts of Pakistan.
>
>  The United States will need regional strategic support. India is ready
and
>  waiting. China, on the other hand, is unpredictable. It is wary of U.S.
>  actions, hostile to increased Indian power and has longstanding relations
>  with Pakistan. China does have an Islamic problem, but Beijing's
>  geopolitical interests do not include the collapse of Pakistan.
>
>  As the Bush administration has said, things now get harder. The hardest
> part
>  is recognizing that the United States has not yet achieved true freedom
of
>  action. The menu is still being drawn up by others, and from where we
sit,
>  the next item on the menu is Pakistan.
>
>  That is the country of refuge for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. That is
> the
>  country where support for them is the highest and where supporters deeply
>  influence major institutions. Pakistan must either change or be changed,
or
> the United States must abandon its ambitions relative to al Qaeda. The
>  United States will not abandon its fight, nor can it unilaterally act in
>  Pakistan, although it can manipulate internal affairs as it did in
>  Afghanistan. However, Pakistan is not Afghanistan, and such manipulation
>  could have explosive results. And for India, this is the historical
>  opportunity it has waited for since its founding.
>
>
>
> >
> >
> > The Revolution will not be televised: News at 11...
> >
> > grok
> > Independent canadian marxist
> >
> > The U.S. ruling class: A godzilla monster
> > that stalks the world, devouring everything.
> > (apologies to Godzilla and friends)
> >
> >
>
>