Info 21 - from Jonatan Peled

["Jonatan Peled" <peled_j at maabarot.org.il>]

Info 21

From the burning Middle - East


Dear Friends !

The real face of Ariel Sharon and his policy are becoming every day more
and more clear.
There is no "new Sharon": unfortunately our Prime Minister is the same
brutal nationalist person that we knew all but too well for the last  50
years. He still believes - like 20 years ago when he planned the Libanon
War - that he will be able to impose his will by power on our neighbours.
When the nationalist right refuses to accept any honest sharing of the land
between the Jordan river and the Sea with the Palestinian people -
including their rights for sovereign and viable state and honest
recompensation for the lost property and the suffering of the refugees -
they bring Israel to a dangerous situation of re-opening all the historic
account of 1948: the Israeli - Palestinian civil war, that we call our
Independence - War and the Palestinians call "Nakbah" - the Disaster.
In this situation that may bring uppon us a horrible disaster, every
non-Jewish sympathiser and every Jewish patriot have to oppose the policy
of the present government. We know but too well the false argument that "if
you oppose the Government's policy, you are anti - Israeli. If you are anti
- Israeli that means - you are anti- Zionist. If you are anti - Zionist,
that means you are anti - semitic ( for non - Jews) or self hating (for
Jews).
The bottom line of this logic is, that if you don't agree with the Israeli
Government's policy, you are either an anti-semitic "Goy", or a self hating
Jew...
Of course, this was - and still is - a way of the official Israel to stuff
the mouth of every opposition or critics. People who support Israel,
shouldn't have to be frightened: they have to do whatever they can, to
challange the disastrous policy of the Israeli Government - in favour of
the future of Israel.

In the internal argument  that opened the last weeks in Israel the argument
that says openly, that the present war is still a continuity of the
"Independence War" is heard more and more loudly: The dispute over the
"Land of Israel" has not yet finished and we have to fight until we will
take over totally all our home land. This way of mind justifies all means
that people use in an independence war.
This argument has been responded by a growing part of the Palestinian
people - beyond the "Green Line" and inside Israel by the same means: if
there is no honest compromise, then time to re-open all the account: the
continuous oppression, the mass land appropriations, the "right of return",
the Jewish character of Israel.
The opposition to this ideology that seemed until lately accepted by a
great majority in the Israeli public, charges that the State of Israel has
been already established, a sovereign state is not allowed to use means
that were used by National Liberation Movements, time to think politically,
that means - to integrate in the Middle-East, to compromise with our
neighbours, when the final goal is - to be accepted as an integral member
among the countries of this region.
The outcome of this ideology is: awarness of the limits of power, legal
equality between all the citizens, responsibility of the state to all the
people that live , permanently or temporarily, under its control.
Respecting international agreements and more.
People who believe in the first ideology are now in power in Israel. In the
present situation they may bring distruction upon our country and upon the
Middle-East.
Until not long time ago I believed that almost all the people in Israel and
our leadership honestly wanted peace - the argument was only about its
price. Now I'm no more sure about this. If the "Independence War" is not
yet over, than the goal is not peace - that always means a kind of
compromise - but rather total victory.    As one who doesn't believe in
"total victories" I'm frightened for what our present leadership is going
to bring upon us...

Two articles are presented in this "Info" :
1 - Why international intervention in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is
necessary.
2 - Excerpts from the " Mitchell Report": report of the International
Delegation that analised the sources of the present Palestinian uprising
and presents some recommendations of the ways, how to cope with the
situation.

The articles can be also found in the website:
http://friendshipvillage.homestead.com/ArticlesMay113Mitchell.html


                                             Jonatan Peled
                              Friendship Village



Saving the Israelis from themselves

By Gideon Levymailto:levy at haaretz.co.ilHaaretz 22 April 2001


To whom shall we give thanks, to whom give praise? To the great United
States of America. It was the U.S. administration, despite having affirmed
the principles of isolationism and non-intervention, which demonstrated,
last week, the crucial role it can play in the Middle East. It was
precisely a statement that was intended to condemn Israel that turned out
to be valuable for the country that was condemned and for the entire
region. And it was Secretary of State Colin Powell, of all people - who,
it's true, knows a few words of Yiddish but is far from being considered a
"friend of Israel" in the usual sense - who emerged, at least for a moment,
as a true friend of Israel and of peace.

It's been some time since a statement issued by one spokesman became such a
significant signpost as the one put out by the spokesman of the State
Department which termed the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip "excessive
and disproportionate." As though waving a magic wand, the statement
instantly defined the limits of Israel's power - a definition that Israel
should have long since formulated for itself, without the need for American
intervention.

It's a pity Israel did not take that necessary step, but in the absence of
a more restrained and balanced Israeli policy, it's a good thing the work
was done for Israel - and for Israel's sake - by Colin Powell. Henceforth
it will be clear even to the dangerous trinity - Ariel Sharon, Benjamin
Ben-Eliezer and Shaul Mofaz - that if they themselves do not restrain their
forceful, disproportionate reactions, then America will do it for them.

In the present situation, on the edge of the abyss, the importance of this
development cannot be overestimated. It turns out that even the America of
George W. Bush and Colin Powell will not let the region bleed without
intervention. Nor will it let the Israel of Sharon, Ben-Eliezer and Mofaz
react to a few potholes that were created next to the city of Sderot by
reconquering the Gaza Strip. Israel's road back to Gaza, which appeared to
be frighteningly well-paved, was blocked by Powell, and Israel should be
grateful to him. A regional power like Israel needs brakes; and when the
impression is created that it has lost its brakes - and that is the
impression that has been created in the past few months - the secretary of
state did well to assume that function himself.

Israel is now fighting against a violent and helpless Palestinian entity.
Clinging to its belief that only force will win, Israel in the past few
weeks has begun to make use of measures that go beyond the boundaries of
the reasonable, based on the mistaken assumption that it is necessary "to
react" to everything, and with all its force.

With American taking an isolationist stance, the thinking in Israel went,
the Israel Defense Forces would be able to make use of all the force at its
disposal to combat Palestinian violence that is limited in its capability.
It started with rubber-coated steel bullets and live bullets fired at stone
throwers, volleys of missiles launched at police stations, liquidations
that resembled contract killings, and it ended with ground operations in
Area A (under full Palestinian control) in reaction to the firing of
mortars. All this continued uninterruptedly and threatened to extend the
confrontation to dangerous dimensions, while also inducing the Palestinians
to respond as intensively as they could.

When Israel enters the city of Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip and demolishes
dozens of homes, the Palestinian Authority cannot, and perhaps should not,
sit idly by. It owes its people a reaction. And then, when the Palestinians
escalated the use of their wretched weapons, Israel drew on its Doomsday
weapon: the reconquest of Area A. With a defense minister like Ben-Eliezer
and a chief of staff like Mofaz, it was clear that a re-occupation was only
a matter of time.

Sharon, who from this point of view is apparently more sensitive to the
reaction of the United States, came across as the most restrained of the
triumvirate. But as in the case of Lebanon, here too the scenario could be
written in advance: first the penetration, then the takeover of a stretch
of territory "for a limited time," and finally renewed entrenchment in the
heart of darkness, with a "security zone" and all that it entails. It
wouldn't have taken many more mortar shells in order to return the IDF to
Gaza, in all its strength and weakness.

It was just at this juncture that Powell intervened, showing magnificent
timing. The success of his intervention, although it translates into the
failure of the operation in Gaza, has to serve as a portent for the future.
It is already clear that the Israelis and the Palestinians, under their
present leaders, will not be able to reach a viable settlement. It is
equally clear that in the absence of such a settlement the situation will
continue to deteriorate and the bloodshed will continue to intensify.

This is exactly the moment at which the world can and should save the
Israelis from themselves, and the entire region from another tragedy. After
the success of Powell's move - Israel will not invade again - the United
States, together with Europe, should mobilize to implement another rescue
operation: the dispatch of a multinational force before the next war
erupts, not afterward, should be the next move.

It's not clear why Israel is so opposed to this: What is so upsetting about
the idea of an international force that will reduce the violence on both
sides? True, a significant international presence in the region runs
contrary to all the myths of the past, according to which the
internationalization of the conflict will work to Israel's disadvantage,
but this is an assumption that deserves to be reassessed.

There is nothing wrong with Israel saying to the international community:
We have failed in our attempt to find a solution, we are too violent and
the Palestinians are too violent - so come and help us. American and
European troops stationed between Beit Jalla and Gilo, between Khan Yunis
and Kfar Yam, and between Ramallah and Psagot until a settlement is
achieved, can be good news for everyone concerned. Let's issue the
invitation. If we can't help ourselves, at least let the world help us.





What began as a series of confrontations...

Excerpts from the text of the Mitchell Commission's Report 6 May 2001


Introduction

On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, the President of the United States spoke on behalf
of the participants (the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the United
Nations, and the European Union). Among other things, the President stated
that:.The United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as
well as in consultation with the United Nations Secretary General, a
committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how
to prevent their recurrence....

On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants,
the President asked us to serve on what has come to be know as the Sharm
el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee.

Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and
Palestinians seem not to fully appreciate each other's concerns. Some
Israelis appear not to comprehend the humiliation and frustration that
Palestinians must endure every day as a result of living with the
continuing effects of occupation, sustained by the presence of Israeli
military forces and settlements in their midst, or the determination of the
Palestinians to achieve independence and genuine self-determination. Some
Palestinians appear not to comprehend the extent to which terrorism creates
fear among the Israeli people and undermines their belief in the
possibility of co-existence, or the determination of the government of
Israel to do whatever is necessary to protect its people.
Discussion
The violence has not ended (since the Sharm el-Sheikh summit). It has
worsened. Thus the overriding concern of those in the region with whom we
spoke is to end the violence and to return to the process of shaping a
sustainable peace....Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have
effect, it must deal with the situation that exists, which is different
from that envisaged by the summit participants. In this report, we will try
to answer the questions assigned to us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What
happened? Why did it happen?


What happened?
We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we do not
determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties....

In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received
reports that Member of the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was
planning a visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem.
Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to
prohibit the visit. Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was
intended to be an internal political act directed against him by a
political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.

Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli
police officers. Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal
political context, Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them. On
the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian
demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other.
According to the U.S. Department of State, "Palestinians held large
demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of the Western
Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition to
disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring about 200."
According to the Government of Israel [GOI], 14 policemen were injured.

Similar demonstrations took place over the following several days. Thus
began what has become known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a
mosque at the Haram al- Sharif/Temple Mount).

The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the
breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the
"widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian
responsibility for the impasse." In this view, Palestinian violence was
planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring
Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that
the intifada was planned. It claims, however, that "Camp David represented
nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it exercises on
the ground to negotiations..." From the perspective of the PLO, Israel
responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal use of deadly
force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO's view, reflected
Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For
Palestinians, the widely seen images of Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on
September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that
perception.

From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and
directed by the Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause
around the world by provoking Israeli security forces to fire upon
demonstrators, especially young people. For Israelis, the lynching of two
military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef
Avrahani, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian
hatred of Israel and Jews.

What began as a series on confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators
and Israeli security forces, which resulted in the GOI's initial
restrictions of the movement of people and goods in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions
and responses....

In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation
and degree of control exercised by the other. However, we were provided
with no persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than
an internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive
evidence that the PA planned the uprising.

Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a
deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first
opportunity; or to conclude that there was a delilberate plan by the GOI to
respond with lethal force.

However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a
consistent effort to contain the demonstrations and control the violence
once it began; or that the GOI made a consistent effort to use non-lethal
means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger,
fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted
accordingly.

The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly
timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed, it was
foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More significant
were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on
September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and
the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise
restraint.
Why did it happen?

Divergent Expectations: We are struck by the divergent expectations
expressed by the parties in relating to the implementation of the Oslo
process. Results achieved from this process were unthinkable less than 10
years ago. During the latest round of negotiations, the parties were closer
to a permanent settlement than ever before.

Nonetheless, Palestinians and Israeli alike told us that the premise on
which the Oslo process is based - that tackling the hard "permanent status"
issues be deferred to the end of the process - has gradually come under
serious pressure....

The GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in
a nonviolent atmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the
agreements between the parties....

The PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result of an
Israeli attempt to prolong and solidify the occupation.... "In sum,
Israel's proposals at Camp David provided for Israel's annexation of the
best Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East
Jerusalem, a continued military presence on Palestinian territory, Israeli
control over Palestinian natural resources, airspace and borders, and the
return of fewer than 1% of refugees to their homes."

Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since
the opening of the peace process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This
conclusion led to an erosion of trust even before the permanent status
negotiations began.

Divergent Perspectives: During the last seven months, these views have
hardened into divergent realities. Each side views the other as having
acted in bad faith; as having turned the optimism of Oslo into suffering
and grief of victims and their loved ones. In their statements and actions,
each side demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize any truth in
the perspective of the other.

The Palestinian Perspective: For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo"
heralded the prospect of a State, and guaranteed an end to the occupation
and a resolution of outstanding matters within an agreed time. Palestinians
are genuinely angry at the continued growth of settlements and at their
daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's
presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers and
settlements in their midst not only as violating the spirit of the Oslo
process, but also as application of force in the form of Israel's
overwhelming military superiority.....

The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other
commitments such as the further withdrawal from the West Bank and the
release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition, Palestinians expressed
frustration with the impasse over refugees and the deteriorating economic
circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Perspective: From the GOI perspective, the expansion of
settlement activity and the taking of measures to facilitate the
convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudice the outcome of
permanent status negotiations....

Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during
subsequent talks the GOI offered to make significant concessions with
respect to the settlements in the context of an overall agreement.

Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO
has breached its solemn commitments by continuing the use of violence in
the pursuit of political objectives....

According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes on several forms:
institutionalized anti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement; the release from
detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal weapons; and the
actual conduct of violent operations.... The GOI maintains that the PLO has
significantly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of
violence, thereby significantly eroding trust between the parties.
End the violence
For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past seven months
has been intensely personal.... We were touched by their stories....
Israeli and Palestinian families used virtually the same words to describe
their grief....

With widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals of each
other in hostile stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without
considerable determination and readiness to compromise, the rebuilding of
trust will be impossible.

Cessation of Violence: Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed
themselves, in all their agreements, to the path of nonviolence.... To stop
the violence now, the PA and GOI need not "reinvent the wheel." Rather they
should take immediate steps to end the violence, reaffirm their mutual
commitments, and resume negotiations.

Resumption of Security Cooperation: Palestinian security officials told us
that it would take some time .... for the PA to reassert full control over
armed elements nominally under its command and to exert decisive influence
over other armed elements operating in Palestinian area. Israeli security
officials have not disputed these assertions. What is important is that the
PA make an all-out effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence and
that it be clearly seen by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewise
exercise a 100 percent effort to ensure that potential friction points,
where Palestinians come into contact with armed Israelis, do not become
stages for renewed hostilities.

The collapse of the security cooperation in early October reflected the
belief by each party that the other had committed itself to a violent
course of action. If parties wish to attain the standard of 100 percent
effort to prevent violence, the immediate resumption of security
cooperation is mandatory.....


Rebuild confidence
The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister
Rabin at the White House in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of
both parties that the door to the peaceful resolution of differences had
been opened. Despite the current violence and mutual loss of trust, both
communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channeling this
desire into substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of
trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this
end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and
sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by
the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.

Terrorism: In the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties
pledged to take action against "any threat or act of terrorism, violence,
or incitement...."

Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected
noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome
by spreading terror and demoralization throughout a population....

In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of
supporting terrorism by releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA
security personnel to abet, and in some cases to conduct terrorist
operations, and by terminating security cooperation the with GOI. The PA
vigorously denies the accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA's
leadership has made no real effort to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. The
belief that is, in and of itself, a major obstacle to the rebuilding of
confidence.

We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by
making it clear to both communities that terrorism is reprehensible and
unacceptable, and by taking all measures to prevent terrorist operations
and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to
apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.

Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence.
A cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to
sustain unless the GOI freezes all settlement construction activity.....
Settlement activities must not be allowed to undermine the restoration of
calm and resumption of negotiations....

On each of our two visits to the region there were Israeli announcements
regarding expansion of settlements, and it was almost always the first
issue raised by Palestinians with whom we met. The GOI describes its policy
as prohibiting new settlements but permitting expansion of existing
settlements to accommodate "natural growth." Palestinians contend that
there is no distinction between "new" and "expanded" settlements; and that,
except for a brief freeze during the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, there has been a continuing, aggressive effort by Israel to increase
the number and size of settlements....

Reducing Tension: We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis that
emotions generated by the many recent deaths and funerals have fueled
additional confrontations, and, in effect, maintained the cycle of
violence. Both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations will not
be tolerated. We can and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater respect
for human life when demonstrators confront security personnel....

Actions and Responses: For the first three months of the current uprising,
most incidents did not involve Palestinian use of firearms and
explosives... Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000
injured over the past seven months; the overwhelming majority in both
categories were Palestinian....

Israel's characterization of the conflict, as "armed conflict short of
war," does not adequately describe the variety of incidents reported since
late September 200. Moreover, by thus defining the conflict, the IDF has
suspended its policy of mandating investigations by the Department of
Military Police Investigations whenever a Palestinian in the territories
dies at the hands of an IDF soldier in an incident not involving
terrorism....

Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls "the
targeting of individual enemy combatants." The PLO describes these actions
as "extra-judicial" executions" ...that is "in clear violation of Article
32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention...." The GOI states that, "whatever
action Israel has taken has been taken firmly within the bounds of the
relevant and accepted principles relating to the conduct of hostilities."
...

We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges
of fire between populated areas.... Palestinian gunmen have directed small
arms fire at Israeli settlements and at nearby IDF positions from within or
adjacent to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas, thus endangering
innocent Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn the
positioning of gunmen within or near civilian dwellings ....We urge that
such provocations cease and that the IDF exercise maximum restraint in its
responses if they do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of force often
lead to escalation....

On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas
of responsibility and accountability.... We urge the PA to take all
necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for
armed personnel operating under its authority....

Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to the Committee, both sides
expressed concerns about hateful language and images emanating from the
other....We call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster
mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from incitement and
hostile propaganda....

Economic and Social Impact of Violence: Further restrictions on the
movement of people and goods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. These closures take the three forms: those which
restrict movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those which
restrict movement within the Palestinian areas; and those which restrict
movement from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries. These measures
have disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians....

Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli
security forces and settlers of tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees
and other agricultural property. The closures have also had other adverse
effects. ...

We acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however, that the
GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit
Palestinians who have been employed in Israel to return to their jobs.
Closure policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to expand their
constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should resume
cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinian
workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to
terrorist organizations....

Holy Places: It is particularly regrettable that the places such as the
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, and
Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem have been the scenes of violence, death and
injury. These are places of peace, prayer and reflection which must be
accessible to all believers.

Places deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit respect,
protection and preservation.

International Force: One of the most controversial subjects raised during
our inquiry was the issue of deploying an international force to the
Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly in favor of having such a force to
protect Palestinians .... The GOI is just as adamantly opposed to an
"international protection force," believing it would prove unresponsive to
Israeli security concerns and interfere with bilateral negotiations to
settle the conflict.

We believe that to be effective such a force would need the support of both
parties...


Resume negotiations
Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding violence."
Palestinian leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding occupation."
We appreciate the political constraints on leaders of both sides.
Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the search for
peace resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral relationship incorporating
both security cooperation and negotiations.

We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political
objectives. Yet the construction of a new bilateral relationship
solidifying and transcending an agreed cessation of violence requires
intelligent risk-taking. It requires, in the first instance, that each
party again be willing to regard the other as a partner...


Recommendations of the Mitchell Commission's Report
The Government of Israel (GOI) and the PA must act swiftly and decisively
to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild
confidence and resume negotiations....


End the violence
- The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing
agreements and undertakings and should immediately implement an
unconditional cessation of violence.

- The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.

Effective bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence will encourage
the resumption of negotiations .... We believe that the security
cooperation cannot long be sustained if meaningful negotiations are
unreasonably deferred, if security measures "on the ground" are seen as
hostile, or if steps are taken that are perceived as provocative or as
prejudicing the outcome of negotiations.


Rebuild confidence
The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off
period" and implement additional confidence building measures....

- The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and
discourage incitement in all its forms.

- The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and
Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that
the PA will make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and
to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to
apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.

- The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural
growth" of existing settlements. The kind of security cooperation desired
by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlement activity....

- The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which
are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for
future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of
productive talks.

- The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would
pose no threat to the territorial contiguity of a Palestinian State to be
established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

- The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September
28, 2000 which will reduce the number of friction points and the potential
for violent confrontations.

- The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and
procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with
a view to minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities....

- The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed,
and permit Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their
jobs; and should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the
destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural
property in Palestinian areas....

- The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure,
to the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within
Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and
individuals engaged in terrorism.

- The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to
fire upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places
civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.

- The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed
to ensure that the response to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian
populated areas minimizes the danger to the lives and property of
Palestinian civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably the objective of
the gunmen to elicit an excessive IDF response.....


Resume negotiations
- We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence,
an immediate resumption of security cooperation and an exchange of
confidence building measures are all important for the resumption of
negotiations. Yet none of these steps will long be sustained absent a
return to serious negotiations.

It is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis or the
agenda of negotiations. However, in order to provide an effective political
context for practical cooperation between the parties, negotiations must
not be unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a spirit
of compromise, reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events
of the past seven months.

George J. Mitchell, Chairman - Former member and Majority Leader of the
United States Senate

Suleyman Demirel - 9th President of the Republic of Turkey

Thorbjoern Jagland - Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway

Warren B. Rudman - Former Member of the United States Senate

Javier Solana - High European Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, European Union