Bolivia: Cocaleros annunciano blocchi il 6 gennaio

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Coca Growers Announce Blockades for January 6 -- Will Continue Dialogue 
Prepared by the Andean Information Network
December 17, 2002

Following an open meeting of the Six Coca Growing Federations in the Chapare
on December 5, coca growers announced that they will begin blockades on the
6th of January, but will continue to dialogue with Bolivian government
officials. During the three hour meeting, coca grower leaders decided to
reject the government’s “new coca policy.” They agreed to continue dialogue
if the government agrees to discuss the modification of article 10 of Law
1008 to allow each Chapare family to grow half a hectare of coca (La Razón,
12/6/02). Chapare coca growers have stated that the blockades will include a
wide spectrum of other groups, such as the Landless Movement, ex-political
prisoners and debtors (La Razón, 12/6/02).  However, these sectors, as well
as coca growers in the La Paz Yungas region and the campesino Federation led
by Felipe Quispe Huanca (Mallku) have declared that they will not
participate in the blockades (La Razón 12/12/02).  At this time, a portion
of the COB (Bolivian Workers’ Union) is the only group that has declared it
will participate in the blockades.

Perhaps in response to the lack of commitment to participate by other
sectors, coca grower leader Evo Morales has created a new agenda for the
dialogue that prioritizes the demands of these other sectors as well. While
the government is pushing for the dialogue to address solely the demands of
coca growers, Morales has created a 10-point agenda that incorporates other
themes of national interest, including capitalization, the international
sale of natural gas, and laws that affect diverse social sectors (Los
Tiempos 12/12/02).

While Chapare coca growers have agreed to continue dialogue, many are
doubtful that negotiations will lead to an agreement.  Julio Salazar of the
Isinuta union stated, “We don’t believe in the government. There is no hope
for the dialogue because the government is following the United States’
orders, defending the interests of that country . . .” (Opinion 12/6/02).
Similarly, Elsa Flores of the Mamoré Federation stated, “I believe that
there should not be continued dialogue . . . the government has been trying
to trick us the whole time; they will not give us answers.  So now, the
women with our children are going to blockade” (Opinion 12/6/02).

The Government has maintained that it remains open to dialogue, but is
prepared to deal with blockades. Minister of Defense, Freddy Teodovic,
affirmed that the Ninth Division of the Army, located in the Chapare, has
adequate forces to maintain order and control in the region, as well as
forces of the Joint Task Force and UMOPAR (the rural antinarcotics police)
(Opinion 12/6/02).  He stated, “the number of forces that we have in the
Chapare is a predetermined . . . The Ninth Division has between 1,200 and
1,500 men. We don’t see the need to increase this number in order to
guarantee order in the region” (Opinion 12/6/02).  During times of conflict,
though, the government sends in military reinforcements from other areas.

Coca Growers and Political Opposition Declare Alternative Development a
Failure (Again)

A continued source of desperation for coca growers is a lack of other viable
economic options. As one producer of palm heart, stated, “I have decided to
continue to plant coca, there is no other alternative. We have dedicated so
much time and energy to growing palm heart but no one wants to buy it. We
are suffering from hunger, we have no future for our children”(El Diario
12/9/02). Costs for starting alternative development crops can be
prohibitively high. In the case of palm heart, the producer must initially
invest 1000 dollars per hectare out of their own pocket, in spite of
alternative development assistance.
MAS party leader Evo Morales affirmed that corruption has hindered
alternative development, “as only bureaucrats have benefited from resources
allocated for alternative development projects” (El Diario 12/9/02).  He
stated, “the failure of alternative development is due to corruption, lack
of markets, elevated costs of transportation and technical assistance that
is more expensive than the income generated by tropical products”(El Diario
12/9/02). Senator of the MIR party, Morgan López, has assured that the
government is taking seriously the possibility of reevaluating alternative
development in order to correct what’s not working. He recognized that the
government has not yet found an economically, ecologically and socially
viable alternative to diminish economic dependency on the coca leaf (El
Diario 12/9/02).  NFR party member Johnny Antezana stated that the
government “needs to create internal markets in order to assure the sale of
alternative products” (El Diario 12/9/02). He admitted that tropical fruits
that have been cultivated in the Chapare as an alternative to coca have had
no success in a supersaturated market unable to compete globally.

In response to the criticism that alternative development in the Chapare has
been a failure, Presidential Spokesman Mauricio Antezana announced that the
government is looking for ways to support economic development in the
region. He stated that, “We want to incorporate the consumption of the
banana into a school breakfast program for all children in the country.
Other products will be added to the diet of police officers and military
officers.  This strategy will guarantee a secure market for alternative
development.”(El Diario 12/9/02).  After over twelve years of alternative
development efforts, no strategy or plan has been able to guarantee market
for these crops.

Violence and Human Rights Violations Despite Dialogue

Although negotiations have not broken down during the last three months,
tensions in the Chapare remain high. Coca growers continued vigils around
eradication camps and intermittent violence continued.  The Chapare Human
Rights Ombudsman’s office has documented 53 coca growers and three security
officers injured and one coca grower and one navy conscript killed since
Sanchez de Lozada’s August 6 inauguration. Press accounts sustain that
another four soldiers have been injured.

 Dorado Chico Confrontation--August 27

 In mid-July, the Joint Task Force (JTF) set up three eradication camps in
the Dorado Chico, Dorado Grande and Ibuelo communities.  According to
eyewitnesses, at approximately 8:30 a.m. on August 27 in Dorado Chico, a
large group of coca growers surrounded 100 members of the Joint Task Force
(JTF), creating an incredibly tense situation.   At the same time, members
of the Ibuelo community denounced that JTF had fired tear gas into their
homes and beat and detained several coca growers.  The Human Rights
Ombudsman’s office verified the beating of 12 people during the incident.
The forensic specialist at the Justice and Human Rights Center certified
that seven people suffered multiple contusions, one with a possible
fractured rib, and one had an open head wound. Four of these men were
detained. The Joint Task Force left the region several hours later.  JTF
Commander, Hernan Caprirolo agreed to remove the camp from the region.

San Andres Conflict-- September 3

On August 30, the JTF transferred three camps from Ibuelo to San Andres,
between the Chimore and Carrasco Tropical Federations. Several hundred coca
growers immediately surrounded the camps, impeding eradication.    On
September 3, JTF troops tear-gassed coca growers around the Guadalupe camp.
Ecological Police officer Silvestre Chinche Apaza suffered machete cuts to
the ear and shoulder.   Security forces detained coca grower, Fructuoso
Apaza Arteaga and his wife, Antonia Rocha Perez, as a result. Rocha was
released the same day.  Fructuoso Apaza suffered three fractured ribs during
his detention and has been transferred to Cochabamba for further legal
investigation.

Soldier Killed By Booby Trap October 4

On October 4, navy conscript Robin Huanacoma  Huanama (18 years old) was
fatally injured when he set off a booby trap bomb while eradicating coca in
the San Marcos community near Chimore.

Clash In Ichoa October 6

On Sunday October 6, approximately 200 members of the Joint Task Force (JTF)
entered the Volcan community, near Entre Ríos. According to eyewitness
accounts, when some members of the community attempted to block their
access, a member of the force shot a coca grower. After this incident the
JTF began to leave the region. When they reached the intersection of the
road to Ichoa at approximately 10:15 members of the force began to fire tear
gas and live ammunition at a small group of coca growers gathered in a
vigil.  Union leader Sabino Toledo (40 years old) received a bullet wound in
the left pectoral muscle and died.  The Ministry of Justice autopsy report
documents the death.  According to eyewitness accounts and reports from
human rights monitors, although there was a great deal of tension, coca
growers were unarmed and no confrontation took place.

Four Soldiers Reportedly Injured by Booby Traps  November 16

On the morning of November 16, four soldiers of the la Fuerza de Tarea
Conjunta (FTC) were injured by a booby trap explosion in the Alto San Pablo
region, according to the Vice-minister of Social Defense, Ernesto Justiniano
(El Diario 12/17/02).  According to authorities, the explosive consisted of
dynamite attached to a bottle containing nails, bolts and rocks, and it was
activated electrically. The names of the victims have not been released.

Impunity Update: The Ramón Pérez Case

On September 27, 2001 a member of the Joint task force shot and killed Ramón
Pérez, who was leading a group of journalists toward the Loma Alta military
camp in the Chapare. Almost a year later, the Ivirgarzama civilian judge has
granted a suspended sentence to one Ecological Police officer on duty during
the incident.  On the 26th of September, 2002, the judge found Macario
Beltran Condori guilty of negligent homicide and gave him a three year
suspended prison sentence. The judge gave Beltran two years of probation in
which he is prohibited from changing residences without the permission of
the judge and consuming alcoholic beverages, and during which he must check
in with the judge every 45 days. As a result Beltran will serve no jail
time.

The ruling claims that a ballistic report that matches bullet shells found
at the scene of the murder with bullets fired by this officer proves that
the officer shot his weapon, making Beltran responsible for the death.
However, the bullets that killed Ramon Pérez were not identified or
examined, and Beltran was among several security officers to shoot at the
group of journalists.  Therefore, matching the bullet shell with the officer
is not conclusive evidence. Initial reports written by police officers
participating in the incident did not include this particular soldier.  The
judge’s ruling also claims that the officers could not hear the yells of the
journalists, which identified them as journalists and not aggressors, due to
background motor noise.  The reenactment of events held approximately a
month before the decision established that the camp’s guards had a clear
view of the small, unarmed group of journalists and Perez approaching.

The Pérez case represents the first time in the Chapare that a judge has
completed a case against a security officer for a human rights violation.
This process appears to represent a new strategy to avoid concrete legal
consequences for human rights violators, as criticism for these trials in
military courts continues. The abbreviated trial process with multiple
irregularities in terms of evidence and legal argumentation was called by
one embassy official, “kind of a slap on the wrist.”  Yet embassy officers
remain reticent to evaluate whether the Bolivian government is “taking
effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces
unit to justice,” a key requirement for Leahy Amendment implementation.

Renewed Focus on Interdiction  Government Dissemination of Misleading
Information

The United States Embassy has announced that the War on Drugs will begin to
focus more on interdiction as a means of halting drug production. Since the
implementation of Plan Dignidad in 1998, the great bulk of antidrug efforts
focused on forced eradication.  While interdiction, carried out with respect
for human rights and legal norms, is a more viable means of stopping drug
production than eradicating the coca leaf, misinformation about the
effectiveness of interdiction operations continues to be a problem.  An
example of this new focus on interdiction is “Operation Falcon” which took
place in November 2002.  Bolivian government officials announced that in
this operation, the anti-drug police (UMOPAR) confiscated 152 kilos of
cocaine base paste, destroyed 267 maceration pits and 204 factories, and
detained 37 people involved in cocaine production in the Chapare region (El
Diario 12/20/02). However, records at the Chimore antidrug holding cell
demonstrated that there was no substantial increase in detentions during
Operation Falcon, and that there continued to be an average of 2-3 detainees
a week.
 In addition to misleading information regarding interdiction, Bolivian
government officials consistently misrepresent the realities of the Drug War
in the region, exacerbating coca growers’ frustrations.  According to
experts in the Chapare, the official figure of 11,000 hectares eradicated in
2002 is exaggerated.  Coca growers consistently denounce that DIRECO (the
government agency responsible for overseeing eradication) counts eradicated
hectares that had very few coca plants the same as full hectares of coca in
an effort to inflate eradication numbers and promote their efficiency.
DIRECO officials counter that they estimate the density of coca planted in
each hectare.  However, a recent DIRECO document reported 50 percent density
almost across the board, provoking speculation about the accuracy of these
calculations. In addition, although a U.S. embassy presentation, based on
satellite images, stated that there had been an increase of approximately 29
percent in Chapare coca cultivation between June 2001-2002 (La Razón
10/2/02, Unofficial translation of the presentation on estimated coca
cultivation in Bolivia), a DIRECO official admitted that satellite data was
not reliable, and that they “didn’t really know” how much coca remained in
the region. Chapare residents continue to complain that the Joint Task Force
destroys alternative crops and seedlings during eradication missions.

Within the Chapare, government agencies continue to be engaged in an
aggressive public relations campaign to promote the continued presence of
security forces there.  Until mid-November, local television and radio
stations frequently broadcasted spots highlighting the civic action programs
carried out by the Joint and Expeditionary Task Forces, even after the ETF
had been disbanded.  This propaganda provokes the outrage of local
communities.

 Confirmation of David Greenlee as US Ambassador Sparks Controversy

 David Greenlee was confirmed as US Ambassador to Bolivia on November 14,
2002, and should arrive in the country in mid-January. According to his
official biography, David N. Greenlee has been United States Ambassador to
the Republic of Paraguay since July 2000. Greenlee has served at the U.S.
embassy in La Paz before, as political officer and Deputy Chief of Mission
from 1987-89. Prior to his confirmation, members of the MAS party staged a
campaign against the new Ambassador, and MAS president Evo Morales was one
of the most outspoken critics of this nomination. Morales stated, “The
presence of David Greenlee in Bolivia is a clear demonstration of what the
United States is trying to achieve in our country.  We must bring the people
together to defend our dignity and the few resources that we have left in
our country” (El Diario, 10/2/02).

The naming of David Greenlee as U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia brought on a
review of his presence as an embassy official in Bolivia during times of
conflict.  One alternative press account accused Greenlee of “undiplomatic
activities” during the Huanchaca incident in 1986 and the Villa Tunari
massacre in 1988, as well participation in the creation of antidrug Law
1008.  The article stated that “aggressive violations of human rights have
been the dominant method in the antidrug policy led by Greenlee…..  His has
been a strategy clearly oriented to provoke reactions from the coca growers
which the U.S. has then used as evidence of ‘narcoterrorism.’” (El Juguete
Rabioso, 9/27/02). Other sources have not confirmed these accusations.

Greenlee’s term as ambassador will most likely not mark a dramatic change in
U.S. drug policy in Bolivia. During his October 9 confirmation hearing,
Greenlee stated, “We have a [drug] policy that has worked. It has eliminated
70 percent of Bolivian coca; that policy should continue…we should see what
we can do to make the policy better.”   Greenlee stated that the policy has
“spawned opposition” and “that there will probably continue to be excessive
use of force due to the nature of confrontations.  In those cases there must
be investigations.”  The new ambassador should present a slightly more
diplomatic stance than his predecessor, Manuel Rocha. It remains to be seen
how his arrival, about a week after blockades announced for January 6, will
affect the negotiations and brewing conflict.