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ritratto di un' industria in crisi
Dal sito dell World Watch Institute
Ritratto di un' industria in crisi
(Notate che, ora che il recente Protocollo di Cartagena sugli OGM riconosce
il principio di precauzione, e impone il dovere di mettere a punto una
normativa sulla responsabilita' civile per i danni, la crisi si fa, almeno
potenzialmente, piu' seria)
Spero interessi
Alessandro Gimona
Portrait Of An Industry In Trouble
by Brian Halweil
After four years of stupendous growth, farmers are expected
to reduce their planting of genetically
engineered seeds by as much as 25 percent in 2000, as
spreading public resistance staggers the once
high-flying biotech industry. (See Figure 1.) Stock prices
for agricultural biotech companies are
falling, exports of transgenic crops are tumbling, and
questions are mounting about the liability for
what is turning into a major debacle for farmers. At the
same time, some 130 nations just signed an
international biosafety agreement prescribing caution.
Worldwide, the area planted to transgenic crops jumped more
than twenty-fold in the last four
seasons, from 2 million hectares in 1996 to nearly 40
million hectares in 1999. In the United States,
Argentina, and Canada, over half the acreage for major
commodities like soybeans, corn, and canola
are planted in transgenics. (These three nations account for
99 percent of the global transgenic
acreage, pointing to the limited global acceptance.)
But with a growing number of food manufacturers and grocery
chains in Europe taking products
containing transgenics off the shelves, the market for these
crops has been shrinking. American
exports of soybeans to the European Union plummeted from 11
million tons in 1998 to 6 million tons
last year, while American corn shipped to Europe dropped
from 2 million tons in 1998 to 137,000
tons last year: a combined loss of nearly one billion
dollars in sales for American agriculture.
Investors have reacted harshly to the growing consumer
rejection of transgenics and the resulting
reduced sales of engineered seed and complementary
agrochemicals. In May of 1999, Europe’s
largest bank, Deutsche Bank, recommended that investors sell
all holdings in companies involved in
genetic engineering, declaring that “GMO’s [Genetically
Modified Organisms] Are Dead.” The
bank’s report envisioned the development of a two-tiered
commodity market in which
non-transgenic crops would command price premiums over
transgenic crops—a prospect that
threatens the farmers planting engineered seeds and the
companies that sell these seeds.
In fact, top commodity handlers, such as Archer Daniels
Midland and A.E. Staley, have already
begun to discount transgenic crops because of this greater
financial risk. Commodity traders have
followed suit fearing the loss of export markets as Japan,
South Korea, Australia, Mexico, the
members of the European Union, and other nations draft laws
requiring mandatory labeling of food
products containing transgenic ingredients.
Most major food companies have already announced that they
will avoid transgenic ingredients in
their products for the European market. But now recent
surveys indicate that consumer tastes are
souring on the other side of the Atlantic as well. Several
food manufacturers, including Gerber,
Frito-Lay, and natural food retailers Wild Oats and Whole
Foods, have said that they will avoid
transgenic ingredients in their products sold in the United
States—the largest consumer market for
transgenic crops. If more American manufacturers hop on the
bandwagon, the drop in demand
would be devastating for transgenic growers and seed
producers.
Share prices for biotech seed companies that were Wall
Street’s darlings a few years ago are sinking
towards all-time lows. Investors in Monsanto Company, the
industry leader which has born the brunt
of public criticism, have watched the corporation’s share
price lose nearly one-third of its value in the
last year, falling from a high of $50 in February of 1999 to
a recent low of just $35. (See Figure 2.)
Brokerage houses have been advising major players in the
biotech industry to spin off their ailing
agricultural divisions. Novartis and AstraZeneca both
followed this advice in December of 1999.
Dupont had been considering issuing a new stock that would
track its much-celebrated and nascent
ag biotech division, but decided in early 2000 to
indefinitely postpone the stock’s release. And
struggling to recoup nearly $8 billion in seed company and
agricultural biotechnology investments,
Monsanto merged with pharmaceutical and chemical giant
Pharmacia Upjohn at the end of 1999.
The new firm quickly decided to turn Monsanto’s agricultural
unit into a separate company
Further complicating the financial picture are concerns
about uninsured liabilities for farmers and
agribusiness companies. In November 1999, 30 farm groups,
including the National Family Farm
Coalition and the American Corn Growers Association, warned
American farmers that "inadequate
testing of gene-altered seeds could make farmers vulnerable
to ‘massive liability’from damage caused
by genetic drift—the spreading of biologically modified
pollens–and other environmental effects." In
December, a group of high-profile lawyers filed a
class-action lawsuit against Monsanto, on behalf of
American soy farmers, charging that the company has not
conducted adequate safety testing of
engineered crops prior to release and that the company has
tried to monopolize the American seed
industry.
To many observers, the rapid release of transgenic crops and
the ensuing financial disarray is
disturbingly reminiscent of the earlier uncritical
bandwagons for nuclear energy and chemical
pollutants like DDT. A combination of public opposition and
financial liability eventually forced
retrenchment of these earlier technologies, after their
effects on the environment and human health
proved to be far more complex, diffuse, and lingering than
the promises that accompanied their rapid
commercialization.
In an effort to avoid this same dismal cycle with the
introduction of each new “revolutionary”
technology, public policy advocates have called for the
adoption of the precautionary principle.
Under current policy, a technology is all too often judged
safe until it is definitively proven harmful.
The precautionary principle holds that when a new technology
carries suspected harm, scientific
uncertainty of the scope and scale of the harm should not
necessarily prevent precautionary action.
Instead of requiring critics to prove that the technology
poses potential dangers, the producers of a
technology shoulder the burden of presenting evidence that
the technology is safe.
Industry has long labeled the precautionary approach as
reactionary, arguing that it stifles research
and prevents economic progress. On the contrary, advocates
realize that all stakeholders—including
consumers, government, and industry—benefit from an open and
democratic attempt to anticipate
any undesirable social and financial surprises. The goal is
to apply wisdom and judgement about the
potential effects of a new technology before flooding the
marketplace with the products of that
technology.
The rapid rollout of genetically engineered crops over the
last four years stands the precautionary
principle on its head. Widespread commercialization of
transgenic crops has come before—not
after—any thorough examination of the benefits and risks
associated with these crops. The regulatory
framework devoted to transgenics is inadequate,
nontransparent, or completely absent. And there
has been essentially no public discussion about the many
potential consequences of large-scale
planting of transgenic crops. For example, U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture Dan Glickman only recently
called for studies assessing the long-term ecological
effects of these crops. But more than half of the
U.S. soybean crop and nearly as much of the corn crop are
already genetically engineered.
Another recent illustration of our lack of precaution was
presented in a December 1999 article in
Nature reporting that the insecticide produced by a widely
planted variety of transgenic corn can
accumulate—in its active form—in the soil for extended
periods of time. The authors note that the
effects on soil organisms and soil fertility are largely
unknown, but potentially enormous. But, like
earlier laboratory studies showing that pollen from this
same corn could be lethal to certain beneficial
insects, the fact that such effects had not been considered
prior to planting tens of millions of hectares
in this crop raises concerns about the adequacy of existing
safeguards for ecological and human
health risks.
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