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United States nuclear forces, 2020
Hans M. Kristensen &Matt Korda
Pages 46-60 | Published online: 13 Jan 2020

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701286?utm_source=FAS+General&utm_campaign=a89d35a2d5-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_12_12_02_16_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_56a7496199-a89d35a2d5-199326173&

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In this articleClose

ABSTRACT
Implementing New START
The Nuclear Posture Review and nuclear strategy
Nuclear planning, nuclear exercises
Land-based ballistic missiles
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
Strategic bombers
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons
References

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ABSTRACT

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen,
director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of
American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a research associate with the
project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the
status of the US nuclear arsenal. The US nuclear arsenal remained
roughly unchanged in the last year, with the Defense Department
maintaining an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,800 warheads. Of
these, only 1,750 warheads are deployed, while approximately 2,050 are
held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 2,000 retired warheads
are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately
5,800 nuclear warheads. Of the approximately 1,750 warheads that are
deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles,
roughly 900 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at
bomber bases in the United States, and 150 tactical bombs are at
European bases.

KEYWORDS: Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, Nuclear Posture Review,
nuclear weapons, nuclear arsenal, United States, Nuclear-Notebook

At the beginning of 2019, the US Department of Defense maintained an
estimated stockpile of 3,800 nuclear warheads for delivery by 800
ballistic missiles and aircraft. Most of the warheads in the stockpile
are not deployed, but rather stored for potential upload onto missiles
and aircraft as necessary. Many are destined for retirement. We
estimate that approximately 1,750 warheads are currently deployed, of
which roughly 1,300 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic
missiles and another 300 at strategic bomber bases in the United
States. An additional 150 tactical bombs are deployed at air bases in
Europe. The remaining warheads – approximately 2,050 – are in storage
as a so-called hedge against technical or geopolitical surprises.
Several hundred of those warheads are scheduled to be retired before
2030. (See Table 1.)

Table 1. US nuclear forces, 2020.

CSVDisplay Table

In addition to the warheads in the Defense Department stockpile,
approximately 2,000 retired – but still intact – warheads are stored
under custody of the Department of Energy and are awaiting
dismantlement, giving a total US inventory of an estimated 5,800
warheads. Between 2010 and 2018, the US government publicly disclosed
the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. But in 2019, the Trump
administration rejected a request from the Federation of American
Scientists to declassify the latest stockpile number (Aftergood 2019;
Kristensen 2019a).

The nuclear weapons are thought to be stored at an estimated 24
geographical locations in 11 US states and five European countries.
The location with the most nuclear weapons by far is the large
Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex south
of Albuquerque, NM. Most of the weapons in this location are retired
weapons awaiting shipment for dismantlement at the Pantex Plant in
Texas. The state with the second-largest inventory is Washington,
which is home to the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific and the
ballistic missile submarines at Naval Submarine Base Kitsap
(Washington is the state with most nuclear weapons if counting only
stockpiled weapons). Of the five nuclear weapons storage locations in
Europe, Incirlik Air Base in Turkey stores the most – about one-third
of the weapons in Europe. However, given the recent upswing in
tensions with Turkey, US officials have reportedly reviewed plans to
potentially quietly withdraw the nuclear weapons from Incirlik (Sanger
2019). If the United States decided to do so, it would require the use
of C-17 transport aircraft from the 4th Airlift Squadron based at
Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington—the only unit in the Air Force
that is qualified to airlift nuclear weapons.

Implementing New START

The United States appears to be in compliance with the New START
treaty limits, with 668 deployed strategic launchers with 1,376
attributed warheads counted as of September 1, 2019, well below the
limits of 700 deployed strategic launchers with 1,550 warheads.
Another 132 launchers were not deployed, for a total inventory of 800
deployed and non-deployed launchers (State Department 2019a). This
represents a slight increase from last March’s declaration of 656
deployed strategic launchers with 1,365 attributed warheads (State
Department 2019b), fluctuations that reflect normal maintenance of
launchers. These numbers differ from the estimates presented in this
Nuclear Notebook because the New START counting rules artificially
attribute one warhead to each deployed bomber, even though US bombers
do not carry nuclear weapons under normal circumstances, and because
this Nuclear Notebook counts weapons stored at bomber bases that can
quickly be loaded onto the aircraft.

Since the treaty entered into force in February 2011, the bi-annual
aggregate data show the United States has cut a total of 214 deployed
launchers and 424 deployed strategic warheads. The Department of
Defense has also completed the destruction of non-deployed launchers
and conversion of 97 launchers to non-nuclear status.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that the United States “will
continue to implement the New START Treaty” while it remains in effect
(Department of Defense 2018, 73). The treaty will remain in effect
until February 2021, at which point it may be extended for up to five
years with mutual agreement. The Trump Administration has not yet
indicated whether it will seek to extend the treaty; however,
prospects for extension appear to be somewhat grim, given the Trump
administration’s demonstrated disdain for arms control agreements.

The United States is currently 32 launchers and 174 warheads below the
treaty limit for deployed strategic weapons, but has 155 deployed
launchers more than Russia.

If New START were allowed to expire, both Russia and the United States
could upload several hundreds of extra warheads onto their launchers,
which means that the treaty has proven useful thus far in keeping a
lid on both countries’ nuclear modernization plans. Additionally, if
New START expired, then both countries would lose a critical node of
transparency into each other’s nuclear forces: as of December 11,
2019, the United States and Russia have completed a combined 321
on-site inspections and exchanged 19,261 notifications (State
Department 2019c).

The Nuclear Posture Review and nuclear strategy

Although the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
followed the broad outlines of the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR to
modernize the entire nuclear weapons arsenal, it includes several
important changes.

The most significant change is a recommendation to increase the types
and role of US nuclear weapons. The Trump NPR takes a confrontational
tone, presenting an assertive posture that embraces “Great Power
competition,” and includes plans to develop new nuclear weapons and
modify others. The report backs away from the goal of seeking to limit
the role of nuclear weapons to the sole purpose of deterring nuclear
attacks, and instead emphasizes “expanding” US nuclear options to
deter, and, if deterrence fails, to prevail against both nuclear and
“non-nuclear strategic attacks.” To be clear, any use of a nuclear
weapon to respond to a non-nuclear strategic attack would constitute
nuclear first use.

The NPR explains that “non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are
not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian
population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear
forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment
capabilities” (Department of Defense 2018, 21). US nuclear
capabilities will be postured to “hedge against the potential rapid
growth or emergence of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats,
including chemical, biological, cyber, and large-scale conventional
aggression” (Department of Defense 2018, 38). To achieve these goals,
the NPR states that “the United States will enhance the flexibility
and range of its tailored deterrence options. … Expanding flexible US
nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for
the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression,”
the report claims (Department of Defense 2018, 34).

The new tailored capabilities include modifying “a small number” of
the existing W76-1 90-kiloton two-stage thermonuclear warheads to
single-stage warheads by “turning off” the secondary to limit the
yield to what the primary can produce (an estimated 5–7 kilotons).
This new warhead (W76-2), the NPR claims, is necessary to “help
counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable ‘gap’ in US regional
deterrence capabilities.” Undersecretary of defense for policy John
Rood told reporters in December 2019 that the low-yield Trident
warhead was “very stabilizing” and in no way supporting the concept of
early use of low-yield nuclear weapons (Kreisher 2019), even though
the NPR explicitly states the weapon is being acquired to provide ”a
prompt response option" (Department of Defense 2018).

In the longer term, the NPR declares that the United States will also
“pursue a nuclear-armed” submarine-launched cruise missile to “provide
a needed nonstrategic regional presence, an assured response
capability, and [in view of] Russia’s continuing … violation” of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), a response that
itself is compliant with the treaty. In pursuit of this new missile,
the review states “we will immediately begin efforts to restore this
capability by initiating a requirements study leading to an Analysis
of Alternatives … for the rapid development of a modern
[submarine-launched cruise missile].” The report’s authors believe
that “US pursuit of a submarine-launched cruise missile may provide
the necessary incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction
of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, just as the prior Western
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe led to the
1987 INF Treaty” (Department of Defense 2018, 55). Despite these
efforts to respond to Russia’s INF treaty violation in a
treaty-compliant manner, the Trump Administration in February 2019
announced its decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, which it did
on August 2, 2019. So far, though, all of the land-based weapons
proposed to counter Russia are conventional (Sonne 2019).

The new nuclear “supplements” proposed by the NPR are needed, the
authors say, to “provide a more diverse set of characteristics greatly
enhancing our ability to tailor deterrence and assurance; expand the
range of credible US options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear
strategic attack; and, enhance deterrence by signaling to potential
adversaries that their concepts of coercive, limited nuclear
escalation offer no exploitable advantage” (Department of Defense
2018, 55).

Yet the US arsenal already includes around 1,000 gravity bombs and
air-launched cruise missiles with low-yield warhead options
(Kristensen 2017a). The NPR provides no evidence that existing
capabilities are insufficient or document that the yield of US nuclear
weapons is a factor in whether Russia would decide to use nuclear
weapons. The NPR authors simply claim that the new capabilities are
needed. The US Navy used to have a nuclear submarine-launched cruise
missile (the TLAM/N) but retired it in 2011 because it was redundant
and no longer needed. All other nonstrategic nuclear weapons – with
the exception of gravity bombs for fighter-bombers – have also been
retired because there was no longer any military need for them,
despite Russia’s larger nonstrategic nuclear weapons arsenal.

The suggestion that a US submarine-launched cruise missile could
motivate Russia to return to compliance with the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is flawed because Russia embarked upon its
current violation of the treaty at a time when the TLAM/N was still in
the US arsenal, and because the Trump administration has since
withdrawn the United States from the INF treaty. Moreover, US
Strategic Command has already strengthened strategic bombers’ support
of NATO in response to Russia’s more provocative and aggressive
behavior (see above); 46 B-52 bombers currently are equipped with the
air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and both the B-52 and the new B-21
bomber will receive the new long-range standoff (LRSO) weapon, which
will have essentially the same capabilities as the SLCM proposed in
the NPR.

Russia’s decisions about the size and composition of its nonstrategic
arsenal appear to be driven by the US military’s superiority in
conventional forces, not by the US nonstrategic nuclear arsenal or by
the yield of a particular weapon. Instead, pursuit of a new nuclear
SLCM to “provide a needed nonstrategic regional presence” in Europe
and Asia could – especially when combined with the parallel expansion
of US long-range conventional strike capabilities including
development of new conventional INF-range missiles – increase Russia’s
reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons and could potentially even
trigger Chinese interest in such a capability as well.

Nuclear-capable vessels triggered frequent and serious political
disputes during the Cold War when they visited foreign ports in
countries that did not allow nuclear weapons on their territory; in
the case of New Zealand, diplomatic relations have only recently – 30
years later – recovered from those disputes. Reconstitution of a
nuclear SLCM would reintroduce this foreign relations irritant and
needlessly complicate relations with key allied countries in Europe
and Northeast Asia.

According to an estimate published in January 2019 by the US
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), modernizing and operating the US
nuclear arsenal and the facilities that support it will cost around
$494 billion for the period 2019–2028 (Congressional Budget Office
2019, 1). This is $94 billion more than CBO’s 2017 estimate for the
2017–2026 period, in part because modernization programs continue to
ramp up, cost estimates are increasing, and because of the NPR’s call
for new nuclear weapons. The nuclear modernization (and maintenance)
program will continue well beyond 2028 and, based on the CBO’s
estimate, will cost $1.2 trillion over the next three decades.
Notably, although the CBO estimate accounts for inflation
(Congressional Budget Office 2017), other estimates forecast that the
total cost will be closer to $1.7 trillion (Arms Control Association
2017). Whatever the actual price tag will be, it is likely to increase
over time, resulting in increased competition with conventional
modernization programs planned for the same period. The NPR belittles
concerns about affordability issues in the nuclear modernization
program and instead labels it “an affordable priority,” pointing out
that the total cost is only a small portion of the overall defense
budget (Department of Defense 2018, XI). There is little doubt,
however, that limited resources, competing nuclear and conventional
modernization programs, tax cuts, and the rapidly growing deficit will
present significant challenges for the nuclear modernization program.

Nuclear planning, nuclear exercises

The changes in the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review so
far do not appear to have required new guidance from the White House
on nuclear weapons strategy. The previous guidance, issued in 2013,
also reaffirmed the importance of nuclear weapons and modernization
and emphasized a strong counterforce strategy – planning principles
that have already been incorporated into a host of highly flexible
strategic and regional nuclear strike plans (Kristensen 2013a).

This includes a “family” of plans organized under the strategic
“Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8010–12,” and also into various regional
plans. The OPLAN, which is named Strategic Deterrence and Force
Employment and first entered into effect in July 2012 in response to
Operations Order (OPORD) Global Citadel signed by the secretary of
defense, is flexible enough to absorb normal changes to the posture as
they emerge, including those flowing from the NPR. Several updates
have been published since 2012. OPLAN 8010–12 is part of a broader
plan that also includes conventional weapons such as the Tactical
Tomahawk submarine-launched cruise missile and the extended-range
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, as well as missile defense and
cyber. OPLAN 8010–12 includes strike options against Russia, China,
North Korea, and Iran. Although the Trump administration’s NPR
criticizes Russia for an alleged willingness to use nuclear weapons
first as part of a so-called escalate-to-deescalate strategy, OPLAN
8010–12 also “emphasizes escalation control designed to end
hostilities and resolve the conflict at the lowest practicable level”
by developing “readily executable and adaptively planned response
options to de-escalate, defend against, or defeat hostile adversary
actions” (US Strategic Command 2012). This objective is not just
directed at nuclear attacks, as the 2018 NPR calls for “expanding” US
nuclear options against “non-nuclear strategic attacks.”

The strategic war plan is a whole-of-government plan that includes the
full spectrum of national power to affect potential adversaries. This
integration of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic
strategic capabilities into one overall plan is a significant change
from the strategic war plan of the Cold War, which was almost entirely
nuclear. Former STRATCOM commander Gen. John Hyten, now the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2017 explained the scope of modern
strategic planning:

I’ll just say that the plans that we have right now, one of the things
that surprised me most when I took command on November 3 was the
flexible options that are in all the plans today. So we actually have
very flexible options in our plans. So if something bad happens in the
world and there’s a response and I’m on the phone with the secretary
of defense and the president and the entire staff, which is the
attorney general, secretary of state, and everybody, I actually have a
series of very flexible options from conventional all the way up to
large-scale nuke that I can advise the president on to give him
options on what he would want to do.

So I’m very comfortable today with the flexibility of our response
options. Whether the president of the United States and his team
believes that that gives him enough flexibility is his call. So we’ll
look at that in the Nuclear Posture Review. But I’ve said publicly in
the past that our plans now are very flexible.

And the reason I was surprised when I got to [Strategic Command] about
the flexibility, is because the last time I executed or was involved
in the execution of the nuclear plan was about 20 years ago, and there
was no flexibility in the plan. It was big, it was huge, it was
massively destructive, and that’s all there. We now have conventional
responses all the way up to the nuclear responses, and I think that’s
a very healthy thing (Hyten 2017).

To practice and fine-tune these plans, the armed forces conducted
several nuclear-related exercises in 2019. These included STRATCOM’s
Global Lightning exercise in March, a command and control and battle
staff exercise that focused on supporting US European Command
(USEUCOM). Global Lightning was part of a Globally-Integrated Exercise
that linked to several other exercises: USEUCOM’s Exercise Austere
Challenge, US Cyber Command’s Exercise Cyber Lightning, North American
Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command’s Exercise Vigilant
Shield, US Transportation Command’s Exercise Turbo Challenge, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Positive Response, and the United
Kingdom’s Exercise Joint Venture (US Strategic Command 2019a). At the
start of Global Lightning, four B-52s deployed to RAF Fairford in
England (two more joined later) for month-long operations over Europe,
which included unprecedented four-bomber strike formations over the
eastern Baltic Sea (US Air Forces In Europe 2019a) and north along the
Norwegian coast (US Air Forces In Europe 2019b).

Strategic bombers returned to Europe over the summer, and in September
participated in the first-ever operations of B-2 bombers above the
Arctic Circle (US Air Forces In Europe 2019c) as well as a landing in
Iceland (US Strategic Command 2019c).

STRATCOM’s Global Thunder exercise in October brought bombers to
Europe once more. The large-scale exercise had a focus on nuclear
operations and was designed “to test readiness and ensure a safe,
secure, ready and reliable strategic deterrent force” (US Strategic
Command 2019b). Noticeable bomber operations during the exercise
included an unprecedented three-aircraft B-52 formation flying north
of Norway deep into the Barents Sea only about 300 kilometers (200
miles) from Russia’s naval base on the Kola Peninsula. Another mission
involved two B-52s escorted by Polish F-16s over Poland in what
appeared to be a simulated strike mission against Russian forces in
Kaliningrad. In addition to the bombers deployed in Europe, Global
Thunder also included bombers taking off from their bases back in the
United States to simulate long-range strikes against Russia. Moreover,
STRATCOM said Global Thunder also exercised ICBM and SSBN forces “in
new and challenging ways” (US Strategic Command 2019d). Overall,
Global Thunder involved operations that “have not been done since the
Cold War ended” and – in some cases – offer more capability than the
military had at that time, according to Air Force Global Strike
Command. The exercise also incorporated newer aspects like space,
cyber, and electronic warfare (Cohen 2019).

These operations mark a peak in steadily increasing US bomber
operations in Europe since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014.
Before that, one or two bombers would deploy for an exercise or
airshow. But since then, the number of deployments and bombers has
increased, and the mission changed. Very quickly after the Russian
annexation of Crimea, STRATCOM increased the role of nuclear bombers
in support of EUCOM (Breedlove 2015), which in 2016 put into effect a
new standing war plan for the first time since the Cold War
(Scapparotti 2017). Before 2018, the bomber mission was called the
Bomber Assurance and Deterrence missions to show the flag, but now the
bombers deploy as a Bomber Task Force that brings the full offensive
capability to the forward base. Whereas the mission of Bomber
Assurance and Deterrence was to train with allies and have a visible
presence to deter Russia, the mission of the Bomber Task Force is to
move a fully combat ready bomber force into the European theater.
“It’s no longer just to go partner with our NATO allies, or to go over
and have a visible presence of American air power,” according to the
commander of the 2nd Bomb Wing. “That’s part of it, but we are also
there to drop weapons if called to do so” (Wrightsman 2019).

These changes are important indications of how US strategy has changed
in response to deteriorating East-West relations and the new “Great
Power competition” strategy promoted by the Trump administration. They
also illustrate a growing integration of nuclear and conventional
capabilities that is frequently overlooked. The deployment of four
B-52s to RAF Fairford in March 2019, for example, included two
nuclear-capable aircraft and two that have been converted to
conventional-only missions. NATO’s official announcement of the
exercise did not notice this feature but said the deployment “shows
that the US nuclear umbrella protects Europe … ” (NATO 2019). The
statement also said that the B-52 bombers “can carry both conventional
and nuclear weapons” when, in fact, nearly half of them – 41 of 87 –
cannot because they have been denuclearized under the New START
treaty. The close integration of nuclear and conventional bombers into
the same task force can have significant implications for crisis
stability, misunderstandings, and the risk of nuclear escalation.

Land-based ballistic missiles

The US Air Force operates a force of 400 silo-based Minuteman III
ICBMs split across three wings: the 90th Missile Wing at F. E. Warren
Air Force Base in Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming; the 91st Missile
Wing at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota; and the 341st Missile
Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. In addition to the 400
silos with missiles, another 50 silos are kept “warm” to load stored
missiles if necessary. Each wing has three squadrons, each with 50
Minuteman III silos. They are collectively controlled by five launch
control centers.

The 400 ICBMs as deployed carry one warhead each – either a
300-kiloton W87/Mk21 or a 335-kiloton W78/Mk12A. ICBMs equipped with
the W78/Mk12A, however, could theoretically be uploaded to carry two
or three independently targetable warheads each, for a total of 800
warheads available for the ICBM force. The ICBMs completed a
multibillion-dollar, decade-long modernization program in 2015 to
extend the service life of the Minuteman III to 2030. Although the
United States did not officially deploy a new ICBM, the upgraded
Minuteman IIIs “are basically new missiles except for the shell,”
according to Air Force personnel (Pampe 2012).

An ongoing Air Force modernization program involves upgrades to the
arming, fuzing, and firing component of the Mk21 reentry vehicle, at a
cost of slightly over a billion dollars in total. The publicly stated
purpose of this refurbishment is to extend the vehicles’ service life,
but the effort appears to also involve adding a “burst height
compensation” to enhance the targeting effectiveness of the warheads
(Postol 2014). Priority is on replacement of the Mk21 fuze. A total of
693 fuze replacements were initially planned; however, the new fuzes
will also reportedly be deployed on the Minuteman replacement missile,
which means that the fuze modernization program is likely to expand
significantly to accommodate those new missiles (Woolf 2018, 17). The
effort complements a similar fuze upgrade underway to the Navy’s
W76-1/Mk4A warhead. The enhanced targeting capability might also allow
for lowering the yield on future warhead designs.

It is possible to do a second life-extension of the Minuteman III. In
March 2019, the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear Integration noted in his testimony to the House
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that there was one more opportunity
to life-extend the missiles before the Minuteman III would have to be
replaced (Clark 2019). However, the Air Force has decided against
life-extension, instead opting to purchase a whole new generation of
ICBMs.

In August 2017, the Air Force awarded $678 million worth of contracts
to Boeing and Northrop Grumman to develop trade studies for the
next-generation ICBM that is currently known as the Ground-Based
Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) (Erwin 2018). In October 2019, the Program
Manager for GBSD noted that the official name for the missile would be
selected within 12 months (Bartolomei 2019). On July 16, 2019, the Air
Force issued a formal “request for proposals” for the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the GBSD program, which
includes five production lot options to produce and deploy the system
(Bryant 2019).

As the two companies currently under contract for technology
maturation and risk reduction, Boeing and Northrop Grumman were both
expected to bid for the EMD contract. However, only a week after the
request for proposals was issued, Boeing surprisingly walked away from
the competition, stating that “the current acquisition approach does
not provide a level playing field for fair competition” (Weisgerber
2019). The dispute appears to center over Northrop Grumman’s 2018
acquisition of Orbital ATK, which is one of only two US-based
companies that produces solid rocket motors and launch vehicles. Under
the terms of the acquisition, Northrop Grumman is required to provide
“for solid rocket motors to be available on a non-discriminatory basis
under certain conditions and processes.” However, Boeing has expressed
concern that Northrop Grumman would not comply with that order, thus
putting Northrup Grumman at a favorable position in the bidding
process over Boeing, which does not produce those systems in-house. As
of October 2019, the Federal Trade Commission has opened in inquiry
into Northrop Grumman’s compliance with that order (Pawlyk 2019). The
EMD contract was originally scheduled to be awarded in the fourth
quarter of fiscal 2020; however, it is unclear whether the Air Force
intends to reconsider the competition, given the near certainty that
the contract would come at a much higher cost if Northrop Grumman
remained the sole bidder.

The new missile is scheduled to begin replacing Minuteman IIIs in 2029
or 2030. The plan is to buy 666 missiles – of which 400 would be
deployed, with the remainder used for test launches and as spares – at
an estimated cost of $100 billion (Reif 2017). The Air Force says the
GBSD will meet existing user requirements but have the adaptability
and flexibility to be upgraded through 2075 (US Air Force 2016). The
new missile is expected to have a greater range than the Minuteman
III, making it possible to target not just Russia from the continental
United States but also potentially China, North Korea, and Iran.

The GBSD will be capable of single or multiple warheads. The Air Force
initially planned to equip the GBSD with life-extended versions of the
existing W78 and W87 warheads. The modified W78 was known as
Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW-1). But in 2018, the Air Force and
National Nuclear Security Administration canceled the W78 upgrade and
instead proposed a W78 Replacement Program using a W87-1 warhead. The
new warhead will use a W87-like plutonium pit, “using a well-tested
IHE [Insensitive High Explosive] primary design” (Energy Department
2018b). The new warhead will be incorporated into a modified version
of the Mk21 reentry vehicle and be designated as the W87-1/Mk4A. In
October 2019, Lockheed Martin was awarded at $138 million contract to
integrate the Mk21 reentry vehicle into the GBSD, beating out rivals
Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Orbital ATK (which Northrop
Grumman now owns) (Lockheed Martin 2019). Because the W87-1/Mk21A will
be bulkier than the current W78/Mk12A, the GBSD payload section would
have to be wider to accommodate multiple warheads, and Northrup
Grumman’s GBSD illustration shows a missile that is different than the
existing Minuteman III, with a wider upper body and payload section
(Kristensen 2019b).

The Air Force conducted four Minuteman III flight-tests in 2019. The
first test took place on February 5th, when a Minuteman III picked
from Minot Air Force Base was launched remotely from the Airborne
Launch Control System aboard a Navy E6-B Mercury from Vandenberg Air
Force Base to the Reagan Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Western
Pacific (Scully 2019a).

The second test launch took place on May 1st, when a Minuteman III
picked from F. E. Warren Air Force Base was launched from Vandenberg
to the Reagan Test Site (Associated Press 2019a).

The third test launch took place on May 9th, when a Minuteman III
picked from F. E. Warren Air Force Base was launched from Vandenberg
to the Reagan Test Site (Scully 2019b). It is rare for the United
States to conduct two ICBM tests within the same month; however, the
Air Force maintains that these test launches are typically scheduled
months—or even years—in advance and therefore have no correlation with
geopolitical events. That being said, this launch directly coincided
with North Korea significantly ramping up its missile testing program
since talks with President Trump broke down in February 2019, with
North Korea even test launching two missiles of its own on the same
day as the Minutemen III launch (Denyer 2019).

The fourth test launch took place on October 2nd, when a Minuteman III
picked from Malmstrom Air Force Base was launched from Vandenberg to
the Reagan Test Site (Associated Press 2019b).

Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines

The US Navy operates a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarines, of which eight operate in the Pacific from their base near
Bangor, Washington, and six operate in the Atlantic from their base at
Kings Bay, Georgia. Normally, 12 of the 14 submarines are considered
operational, with the remaining two boats in a refueling overhaul at
any given time. But because operational submarines undergo minor
repairs at times, the actual number at sea at any given time is closer
to eight or 10. Four or five of those are thought to be on “hard
alert” in their designated patrol areas, while another four or five
boats could be brought to alert status in hours or days.

Each submarine can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles, a
number reduced from 24 to meet the limits of the New START treaty.
Since 2017, the Navy has been replacing the original Trident II D5
with a life-extended and upgraded version known as Trident II D5LE (LE
stands for “life-extended”). The D5LE, which has a range of more than
12,000 km (7,456 miles), is equipped with the new Mk6 guidance system
designed to “provide flexibility to support new missions” and make the
missile “more accurate,” according to the Navy and Draper Laboratory
(Naval Surface Warfare Center 2008; Draper Laboratory 2006). The D5LE
upgrade will continue until all boats have been upgraded and will also
replace existing Trident SLBMs on British ballistic missile
submarines. The D5LE will also arm the new US Columbia-class and
British Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines when they enter
service. Instead of building a new ballistic missile, the Navy plans
to do a second life-extension of the Trident II D5 to ensure it can
operate through 2084 (Eckstein 2019).

Each Trident SLBM can carry up to eight nuclear warheads, but normally
carry an average of four or five warheads, for an average load-out of
approximately 90 warheads per submarine. The payload of the different
missiles on a submarine are thought to vary significantly to provide
maximum targeting flexibility, but all deployed submarines are thought
carry the same combination. Normally, 900 to 950 warheads are deployed
on the operational ballistic missile submarines, although the number
can be lower due to maintenance of individual submarines. The New
START data from March 2019 indicated there were 918 SLBM warheads
deployed.

Two warhead types are deployed on SLBMs: the 90-kiloton enhanced
W76-1, and the 455-kiloton W88. The W76-1 is a refurbished version of
the W76-0, which is being retired, apparently with slightly lower
yield but with enhanced safety features added. The National Nuclear
Security Administration announced in January 2019 that it has
completed production of the W76-1 (Energy Department 2019a), a massive
decade-long production of an estimated 1,600 warheads. The Mk4A
reentry body that carries the W76-1 is equipped with a new arming,
fuzing, and firing unit with better targeting efficiency than the old
Mk4/W76 system (Kristensen, McKinzie, and Postol 2017). The Mk4A/W76-1
combination reportedly is also being supplied to the United Kingdom
for use on its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(Kristensen 2011b), although the warhead on the British subs is
thought to be a slightly modified version of the W76 that the British
government calls the Trident Holbrook (UK Ministry of Defence 2015).

Production has begun of a low-yield version of the W76-1 known as
W76-2, which only uses the warhead fission primary to produce a yield
of 5–7 kilotons. The First Production Unit of the W76-2 was completed
at the Pantex Plant on February 22, 2019, and the full complement of
warheads is scheduled for delivery to the Navy by the end of fiscal
2019 (NNSA 2019). It is unknown how many W76-2 will be produced, but
the NPR says it’s a “small number” (Department of Defense 2018, 54),
probably no more than 50.

Since the first deterrent patrol in 1960, US ballistic missile
submarines have conducted approximately 4,150 deterrent patrols at
sea. During the past 15 years, operations have changed significantly,
with the annual number of deterrent patrols having declined by more
than half, from 64 patrols in 1999 to 36 patrols in 2018. Most
submarines now conduct what are called “modified alerts,” which mix
deterrent patrol with exercises and occasional port visits (Kristensen
2013b). While most ballistic missile submarine patrols last around 77
days, they can be shorter – or, occasionally, can last significantly
longer. In June 2014, for example, the Pennsylvania (SSBN-735)
returned to its Kitsap Naval Submarine Base in Washington after a
140-day deterrent patrol – the longest patrol ever by an Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarine. In contrast to the Cold War years, when
the overwhelming majority of deterrent patrols took place in the
Atlantic Ocean, today more than 60 percent of deterrent patrols
normally take place in the Pacific, reflecting increased nuclear war
planning against China and North Korea (Kristensen 2018).

SSBNs normally do not visit foreign ports during patrols, but there
are exceptions. Over a four-year period in the late 1970s and early
1980s, US SSBNs routinely conducted port visits to South Korea
(Kristensen 2011a). Occasional visits to Europe, the Caribbean, and
Pacific ports continued during the 1980s and 1990s. After Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Navy has started to conduct one or
two foreign port visits per year. A visit to Scotland in 2015 appeared
to be a warning to Russia and was described as a US Navy plan to make
ballistic missile submarines more visible (Melia 2015). A highly
publicized visit to Guam in 2016 – the first visit to the island by a
ballistic missile submarine since 1988 – was a clear warning to North
Korea. Visits continued in 2017, 2018, and 2019 to Scotland, Alaska,
and Guam.

Design of the next generation of ballistic missile submarines, known
as the Columbia class, is well under way. This new class is scheduled
to begin replacing the current Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines
in the late 2020s. The Columbia class will be 2,000 tons heavier than
the Ohio class and will be equipped with 16 missile tubes rather than
20. The Columbia program, which is expected to account for
approximately one-fifth of the Navy’s entire shipbuilding program
during the mid-2020s to mid-2030s, is projected to cost $103 billion
(Congressional Research Service 2018) – or an average of $8.1 billion
to $8.6 billion per submarine. Navy officials said in late 2017 that
they had managed to bring the average boat cost down to $7.21 billion
(Eckstein 2017), although it remains to be seen if the projection will
hold. A $5.1 billion development contract was awarded to General
Dynamics Electric Boat in September 2017, with construction of the
first boat scheduled for 2021 (US Navy 2017). General Dynamics expects
to receive $75 billion in revenue over the life span of the
Columbia-class project (Medici 2017).

In October 2019, the Columbia program manager noted in a presentation
that final ship arrangements for the new class of SSBNs had been
completed on September 6th, apparently a year ahead of schedule. The
Navy’s revised schedule now indicates that the Ohio-class boats will
begin going offline in 2027, around the same time that the first
Columbia-class boat will be delivered in October 2027. Sea trials are
expected to last approximately three years, and the first Columbia
deterrence patrol is scheduled for June 2030. Given that the Columbia
deliveries will coincide with the Ohio-class boats being taken out of
service, there will be a decade-long period in the 2030s where the US
will only have ten operational SSBNs; however, the number will
eventually go back to 12 in the early 2040s (Rucker 2019).

Five Trident II D5LEs were test-launched in 2019. The most recent
tests occurred in September 2019, when the USS Nebraska (SSBN-739)
launched four missiles off the coast of southern California. These
launches, which were part of a Commander Evaluation Test to evaluate
performance expectations of the life-extended Trident II D5, marked
the 173rd to 176th successful test flights of the missile since its
introduction into the US arsenal in 1989 (US Navy 2019a). The previous
test took place on May 9th—the same day as a test launch of a
Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg Air Force Base—during which the USS
Rhode Island (SSBN-740) launched a single missile as part of a
Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO-29) after completing its
refueling overhaul. The USS Rhode Island completed its engineered
refueling overhaul in August 2018, which is estimated to have extended
the boat’s life by 20 years (US Navy 2019b).

Strategic bombers

The US Air Force currently operates a fleet of 20 B-2A bombers (all of
which are nuclear-capable) and 87 B-52H bombers (46 of which are
nuclear-capable). A third strategic bomber, the B-1, is not
nuclear-capable. Of these bombers, we estimate that approximately 60
(18 B-2As and 42 B-52Hs) are assigned nuclear missions under US
nuclear war plans, although the number of operational bombers is
lower. The New START data from March 2019 counted 49 deployed nuclear
bombers (12 B-2As and 37 B-52Hs) (State Department 2019b). The bombers
are organized into nine bomb squadrons in five bomb wings at three
bases: Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, Barksdale Air Force Base
in Louisiana, and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

Each B-2 can carry up to 16 nuclear bombs (the B61-7, B61-11, and
B83-1 gravity bombs), and each B-52H can carry up to 20 air-launched
cruise missiles (the AGM-86B). B-52H bombers are no longer assigned
gravity bombs (Kristensen 2017b). An estimated 850 nuclear weapons,
including 528 air-launched cruise missiles, are assigned to the
bombers, but only about 300 weapons are thought to be deployed at
bomber bases. The remaining 550 bomber weapons are thought to be in
central storage at the large Kirtland Underground Munitions
Maintenance and Storage Complex outside Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The United States is modernizing its nuclear bomber force by upgrading
nuclear command and control capabilities on existing bombers;
developing improved nuclear weapons (the B61-12 and the long-range
standoff missile); and designing a new heavy bomber, the B-21 Raider.

Upgrades to the nuclear command and control systems that the bombers
use to plan and conduct nuclear strikes include the Global Aircrew
Strategic Network Terminal (Global ASNT) – a new high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse–hardened network of fixed and mobile nuclear
command and control terminals that provides wing command posts, task
forces, munitions support squadrons, and mobile support teams with
survivable ground-based communications to receive launch orders and
disseminate them to bomber, tanker, and reconnaissance air crews.
First delivery of the Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminals is
expected in May 2020 (US Air Force 2018).

Another command and control upgrade involves a program known as Family
of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T), which replaces
existing terminals designed to communicate with the MILSTAR satellite
constellation. These new, extremely high frequency terminals are
designed to communicate with several satellite constellations,
including Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites. FAB-T will
provide protected high–data rate communication for nuclear and
conventional forces, to include what is officially called Presidential
National Voice Conferencing. According to the Air Force (US Air Force
2019b), “FAB-T will provide this new, highly secure, state-of-the-art
capability for [Department of Defense] platforms to include strategic
platforms and airborne/ground command posts via MILSTAR, [Advanced
Extremely High Frequency], and Enhanced Polar System (EPS) satellites.
FAB-T terminals will also support the critical command and control …
of the MILSTAR, [Advanced Extremely High Frequency], and EPS satellite
constellations.”

The heavy bombers are also being upgraded with improved nuclear
weapons. This effort includes development of the first guided,
standoff nuclear gravity bomb – known as the B61-12 – which is
intended to replace all existing gravity bombs. The bomb will use a
modified version of the warhead used in the current B61-4 gravity
bomb. B61-12 integration drop tests have already been conducted from
the B-2 bomber (and several tactical fighter jets). Approximately 480
B61-12 bombs, which appear to have earth-penetration capability
(Kristensen and McKinzie 2016), are expected to cost a total of
roughly $10 billion. The first production unit was initially scheduled
for March 2020; however, in September 2019 a National Nuclear Security
Administration official confirmed that both the B61-12 and the
upgraded W88 warhead for the Trident II SLBM will likely face 18-month
delays during production due to concerns over the longevity of its
commercial off-the-shelf subcomponents, and will therefore be ready
“roughly around the same time.” (Gould and Mehta 2019).

The Air Force is also developing a new nuclear air-launched cruise
missile known as the long-range standoff (LRSO) missile. It will
replace the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile in 2030 and carry the
W80-4 warhead, a modified version of the W80-1 used in the current
air-launched cruise missile. In February 2019, the Nuclear Weapons
Council authorized Development Engineering (Phase 6.3) for the W80-4
(Energy Department 2019b). A solicitation invitation to defense
contractors in 2015 listed three potential options for the LRSO
engine: First, a derivative subsonic engine that improves on current
engine technology by up to 5 percent; second, an advanced subsonic
engine that improves on current technology by 15 percent to 20
percent; and third, a supersonic engine (US Air Force 2015). In August
2017, the Air Force awarded 5-year contracts of $900 million each to
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to develop design options for the
missile. After reviewing the designs, the Air Force in December 2019
cleared the two companies to continue development of the missile
(Sirota 2019). In March 2019, the Air Force awarded Boeing a $250
million contract to integrate the future LRSO capability onto the
B-52Hs, which is expected to be completed by the beginning of 2025
(Hughes 2019). Development and production are projected to reach at
least $4.6 billion for the missile (US Air Force 2019a) with another
$10 billion for the warhead (Energy Department 2018a).

The missile itself is expected to be entirely new, with significantly
improved military capabilities compared with the air-launched cruise
missile, including longer range, greater accuracy, and enhanced
stealth (Young 2016). This violates the White House pledge from 2010
(White House 2010) that the “United States will not … pursue … new
capabilities for nuclear weapons” – but the Trump NPR from 2018 did
away with such constraints.

Supporters of the LRSO argue that a nuclear cruise missile is needed
to enable bombers to strike targets from well outside the range of the
modern and future air-defense systems of potential adversaries, and to
provide US leaders with flexible strike options in limited regional
scenarios. However, critics argue that conventional cruise missiles,
such as the extended-range version of the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile, can currently provide standoff strike capability,
and that other nuclear weapons would be sufficient to hold the targets
at risk. In fact, the conventional extended-range Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) is now an integral part of STRATCOM’s
annual strategic exercises.

Unlike the current air-launched cruise missile, which is only carried
by the B-52H bomber, the long-range standoff missile will be
integrated on both the B-52H and new B-21 bombers (Kristensen 2013c).
Warhead production is scheduled from 2025 through 2031. The Air Force
plans to buy 1,000 missiles (Reif 2015), but there will only be enough
warheads for about half of those. The excess missiles are intended to
be used as spares and for test flights over the course of the weapon’s
30-year service life. Moreover, several hundred of the existing
air-launched cruise missiles were converted to conventional missiles
(AGM-86C/D) and the US Air Force Global Strike Command has previously
indicated that it intends to develop a conventional version of the
LRSO (Wilson 2015).

But given the deployment of several new long-range conventional cruise
missiles and the development of even more advanced versions, it
remains to be seen if the Air Force can persuade Congress to also pay
for a conventional version of the LRSO. Indeed, the Air Force has
replaced the AGM-86C/D conventional air-launched cruise missile with
the extended-range conventional Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.
If Congress will not pay for conventional LRSOs, it can probably be
assumed that the plan to buy 1,000 missiles can be reduced by several
hundred.

Development of the new B-21 Raider next-generation heavy bomber
continues at Northrop Grumman, with the preliminary design review
receiving approval in early 2017 and the first test vehicle currently
in production. The B-21 is scheduled to make its first flight in
December 2021 from its production facility in Palmdale, California, to
Edwards Air Force Base (US Air Force 2019c). However, the director of
the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office suggested in October 2019 that
this date would likely be pushed back (Hitchens 2019). The B-21 is
expected to enter service in the mid-2020s to gradually replace the
B-1B and B-2 bombers during the 2030s and 2040s.

In early 2018, the Air Force chief of staff reportedly assessed that
175 B-21s would be necessary (Seligman 2018), and it was announced in
May that the bombers would be hosted at Dyess Air Force Base (Texas),
Ellsworth Air Force Base (South Dakota), and Whiteman Air Force Base
(Missouri) (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs 2018). At an
estimated $550 million per plane, 175 B-21s would cost a total of
$96.25 billion; however, details about the B-21 program, including the
cost estimate, are still shrouded in secrecy. Like all previous bomber
programs, the cost estimate will most likely increase.

The B-21 is very similar in design to the B-2 but is expected to be
slightly smaller and have a reduced weapons capability. Nuclear
weapons will include the B61-12 guided nuclear bomb and the LRSO. The
B-21 will also be capable of delivering a wide range of non-nuclear
weapons, including the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff cruise missile.

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons

The United States has one type of nonstrategic nuclear weapon in its
stockpile – the B61 gravity bomb. The weapon exists in two
modifications: the B61-3 and the B61-4. A third version, the B61-10,
was retired in September 2016. Approximately 230 tactical B61 bombs of
all versions remain in the stockpile. About 150 of these (versions −3
and −4) are thought to be deployed at six bases in five European
countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in
Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. This
number has declined since 2009 partly due to reduction of operational
storage capacity at Aviano and Incirlik (Kristensen 2015, 2019c).

The Belgian and Dutch air forces (with F-16 aircraft), as well as the
German and Italian air forces (with PA-200 Tornado aircraft), are
assigned nuclear strike missions with US nuclear weapons. At least
until 2010, Turkey was still using F-16s for the nuclear mission,
although it is possible that the mission has since been mothballed.
NATO states that do not host nuclear weapons can still participate in
the nuclear mission as part of conventional supporting operations,
known as SNOWCAT (Support Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air
Tactics). Under normal circumstances, the nuclear weapons are kept
under the control of US Air Force personnel; their use in war must be
authorized by the US president. Concerns were raised about the
security of the nuclear weapons at the Incirlik base during the failed
coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, and reports emerged in late 2017
suggesting that the weapons might have been “quietly removed” (Hammond
2017). These reports have not been confirmed, however, and Incirlik is
still included in scheduled nuclear storage base upgrades. The
remaining 80 B61s stored in the United States are for potential use by
US fighter-bombers in support of allies outside Europe, including
northeast Asia.

NATO is working on a broad modernization of the nuclear posture in
Europe that involves upgrading bombs, aircraft, and the weapons
storage system. The B61-12 will be deployed to Europe beginning in
2022–2024, at which point the older B61-3 and B61-4 bombs will be
returned to the United States. The B61-12 will use the nuclear
explosive package of the B61-4, which has a maximum yield of
approximately 50 kilotons, but it will be equipped with a guided tail
kit to increase accuracy and standoff capability, which will allow
strike planners to select lower yields for existing targets to reduce
collateral damage. The increased accuracy will give the tactical bombs
in Europe the same military capability as strategic bombs in the
United States. Although the B61-12 has not been designed as a
designated earth-penetrator, it does appear to have some limited
earth-penetration capability, which increases its ability to hold at
risk underground targets (Kristensen and Matthew 2016).

Work intended to integrate the B61-12 on F-15E, F-16, and PA-200
aircraft is well under way and the F-35A – with its incoming Block 4
software patch – is expected to become nuclear-certified with the
B61-12 in 2024–2026. The Block 4 software will be patched into
existing F-35As in six-month increments, starting in 2023 (Roblin
2019).

Several of the NATO allies that currently have a nuclear strike
mission plan to upgrade their fighter-bombers to the more capable and
stealthy US-built F-35A. The Netherlands has already received its
first F-35A training aircraft, and the first Italian F-35A flew for
the first time in September 2015. Belgium is also acquiring the F-35A,
but the Trump administration has now halted delivery of F-35As to
Turkey because of its plans to acquire the Russian S-400 air-defense
system. Germany officially rejected the F-35A in early 2019, in favor
of purchasing either an upgraded Eurofighter Typhoon or the Boeing
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (Sprenger 2019).

NATO is also preparing a life extension of the Weapons Storage
Security System over the next several years. The work will upgrade
command and control and security at six active bases (Aviano, Büchel,
Ghedi, Kleine Brogel, Incirlik, and Volkel) and one training base
(Ramstein).

The Trump Nuclear Posture Review has recommended rapid development of
a nuclear nonstrategic submarine-launched cruise missile to recreate a
capability to deploy such a weapon in support of NATO (and Pacific)
allies. A previous cruise missile was retired in 2011. The new weapon
would likely be intended for deployment on attack submarines. It
remains to be seen if Congress will agree to fund the project.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This research was carried out with grants from the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the
Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation.

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--

Diceva Gandhi:

Vivi come se dovessi morire domani. Impara come se dovessi vivere per sempre.

Non ho nulla di nuovo da insegnare al mondo. La verità e la nonviolenza sono antiche come le montagne. 

Non c'è strada che porti alla pace che non sia la pace, l'intelligenza e la verità.

Io e te siamo una sola cosa: non posso farti male senza ferirmi.

Occhio per occhio... e il mondo diventa cieco.

Ci sono cose per cui sono disposto a morire, ma non ce ne è nessuna per cui sarei disposto ad uccidere.

Per praticare la nonviolenza, bisogna essere intrepidi e avere un coraggio a tutta prova.

Nessun uomo può essere attivamente non-violento e non ribellarsi contro l'ingiustizia dovunque essa si verifichi.

--

Diceva Gandhi:

Vivi come se dovessi morire domani. Impara come se dovessi vivere per sempre.

Non ho nulla di nuovo da insegnare al mondo. La verità e la nonviolenza sono antiche come le montagne. 

Non c'è strada che porti alla pace che non sia la pace, l'intelligenza e la verità.

Io e te siamo una sola cosa: non posso farti male senza ferirmi.

Occhio per occhio... e il mondo diventa cieco.

Ci sono cose per cui sono disposto a morire, ma non ce ne è nessuna per cui sarei disposto ad uccidere.

Per praticare la nonviolenza, bisogna essere intrepidi e avere un coraggio a tutta prova.

Nessun uomo può essere attivamente non-violento e non ribellarsi contro l'ingiustizia dovunque essa si verifichi.