The Drone War Doctrine We Still Know Nothing About

[glry at ngi.it]

The Drone War Doctrine We Still Know Nothing About
by Cora Currier and Justin Elliott

http://www.uruknet.info/?s1=2&p=95559&s2=28 
(on web link you find all reference - here plain text only)


February 26, 2013

The nomination of John Brennan to be CIA director has prompted intense debate [1] on 
Capitol Hill and in the media about U.S. drone killings abroad. But the focus has been on 
the targeting of American citizens - a narrow issue that accounts for a miniscule proportion 
of the hundreds of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen in recent years.

Consider: while four [2] American citizens are known to have been killed by drones in the 
past decade, the strikes have killed an estimated [3] total [4] of 2,600 to 4,700 people over 
the same period.

The focus on American citizens overshadows a far more common, and less understood, 
type of strike: those that do not target American citizens, Al Qaeda leaders, or, in fact, any 
other specific individual.

In these attacks, known as "signature strikes [5]," drone operators fire on people whose 
identities they do not know based on evidence of suspicious behavior or other "signatures." 
According to anonymously sourced media reports, such attacks on unidentified targets 
account for many, or even [6] most [7], drone strikes.

Despite that, the administration has never publicly spoken about signature strikes. Basic 
questions remain unanswered.

What is the legal justification for signature strikes? What qualifies as a "signature" that 
would prompt a deadly strike? Do those being targeted have to pose a threat to the United 
States? And how many civilians have been killed in such strikes?

The administration has rebuffed repeated [8] requests from Congress to provide answers - 
even in secret.

"How, for example, does the Administration ensure that the targets are legitimate terrorist 
targets and not insurgents who have no dispute with the United States?" asked three senior 
Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee in a letter [9] to Attorney General Holder last 
May.

The legislators sent a second letter [10] in December. Republicans on the committee joined 
in sending another letter [11] this month. All have gone unanswered, according to 
committee staff.

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., recently sent his own letter [12] to Brennan asking several 
pointed questions on signature strikes.

"How do 'signature strikes´ square with your statement that targeted killing operations are 
only approved when a targeted individual poses a 'significant threat to U.S. interests?´" 
McCain asked, quoting a speech [13] Brennan gave on drone strikes last April.

"How can the Administration be certain it is not killing civilians in areas, like many parts of 
Yemen and Pakistan, where virtually all men, including civilians, carry weapons?" the letter 
continued.

A McCain spokesman said the senator had not received a response. The White House 
declined to comment for this story.

When Obama administration officials publicly address [14] drone strikes, they focus on 
thwarting imminent threats and targeting Al Qaeda leaders, including U.S. citizens.

Brennan, for example, said [15] at his confirmation hearing that a lethal strike only occurs 
when "the intelligence base is so strong and the nature of the threat is so grave and serious, 
as well as imminent, that we have no recourse." He was talking only about strikes targeting 
U.S. citizens, not signature strikes.

Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., is now threatening [16] to filibuster Brennan´s nomination until he 
answers questions on the U.S. citizen issue. And the Justice Department "white paper" 
leaked to [17] NBC this month outlines the legal rationale for drone strikes, but only in cases 
when they target U.S. citizens who are also Al Qaeda leaders.

"What about the people who aren´t U.S. citizens and who aren´t on a list?" asks Naureen 
Shah [18], a human rights and counterterrorism expert at Columbia Law School. Of the few 
thousand people killed, Shah notes, "it´s hard to believe all of these people are senior 
operational leaders of Al Qaeda."

The hazy history of 'signature strikes´

The first [19] public reference to a signature strike appears to have been in February 2008, 
when the New York Times reported [20]a change in drone strike policy, negotiated between 
the U.S. and Pakistan.

"Instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant leader before attacking, this 
shift allowed American operators to strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics 
of Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, for instance, so long as the risk of civilian casualties 
is judged to be low," the Times reported.

Over the next few years, they became the majority [21] of strikes conducted in Pakistan, 
according to media [6]reports [21] citing unnamed officials [22].

The new policy contributed to an increase in strikes in Pakistan - up to a high of about 120 
[3] in 2010 - and also to an increase [23] in the number of low-level militants or foot soldiers 
killed, according to a New America Foundation analysis.

It´s not clear how much evidence is needed to justify a strike. In media reports, U.S. officials 
have offered scenarios of signature strikes hitting training camps [24] or fighters who might 
cross the border [25] from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The CIA reportedly uses drone 
surveillance and other intelligence [26] to try to ensure those targeted are in fact militants.

Other officials, however, have described the policy more loosely - one calling it a 
"'reasonable man´ standard [27]."

Asked what the standard is for who could be hit, former Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron 
Munter recently told [28] an interviewer: "The definition is a male between the ages of 20 
and 40. My feeling is one man´s combatant is another man´s - well, a chump who went to a 
meeting."

It is also next to impossible to say which attacks are signature strikes.

The names of militant leaders killed in strikes are often confirmed by officials in news 
reports. But that doesn´t necessarily mean the U.S. knew who was there ahead of the strike. 
One unnamed former military official claimed [26] last year that the CIA "killed most of their 
'list people´ when they didn´t know they were there."

Conversely, strikes in which little information emerges on who was killed could be failed 
attempts to hit specific individuals. (According to the New Yorker [29], it took as many as 16 
strikes to kill Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in 2009.)

The outcomes of strikes are often disputed. In one apparent signature strike two years ago, 
unnamed U.S. officials told the Associated Press [30] that they had targeted a group that 
"was heavily armed, some of its members were connected to Al Qaeda, and all 'acted in a 
manner consistent with AQ (Al Qaeda)-linked militants.´" The U.S. said [6] about 20 militants 
were killed. But Pakistani officials said [31] it had been a meeting of tribesmen and villagers 
provided evidence to the AP that 38 civilians were killed.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the attack prompted [6] a debate in the White House 
about whether signature strikes and strikes on low-level fighters were worth the diplomatic 
risks.

The pace of strikes in Pakistan has tapered off since 2010, in large part because of 
deteriorating diplomatic relations with Pakistan, according to Bill Roggio [32], who tracks 
strikes for the Long War Journal.

Last spring the U.S. reportedly expanded signature strikes to Yemen [33], though 
administration officials said there were stricter standards than in Pakistan and evidence of a 
threat to the U.S. or U.S. interests was required [25]. Officials referred to [34] the attacks 
with a new phrase, "Terror Attack Disruption Strikes."

That tighter standard is reportedly [35]also part of the Obama administration´s new 
guidelines for the targeted killing program. (The CIA´s strikes in Pakistan will be exempt 
from any new rules [35] for at least another year, according to the Washington Post.)

The legal debate

Brennan was asked [36] about signature strikes last April but sidestepped the question. He 
replied: "You make reference to signature strikes that are frequently reported in the press. I 
was speaking here specifically about targeted strikes against individuals who are involved."

He continued that "everything we do, though, that is carried out against Al Qaeda is carried 
out consistent with the rule of law, the authorization on the use of military force, and 
domestic law... that´s the whole purpose of whatever action we use, the tool we use, it´s to 
prevent attack [sic] and to save lives."

The idea of killing members of an enemy force without knowing their identities isn´t itself 
controversial.

"In a traditional conflict, there is no requirement that you know every single person´s identity 
before you strike, so long as there are reasonable grounds for determining that the target is 
part of the enemy force," said Jennifer Daskal, a professor at Georgetown Law School and a 
former attorney in the Justice Department during the first Obama administration.

But legal observers hotly debate [37] the bounds of the drone war, and who qualifies as a 
member of the enemy force. "In the conflict with a clandestine enemy like Al Qaeda, that 
determination is much harder," said Daskal.

While President Obama pledged in his State of the Union address [38] to be more 
transparent about drone policy, the administration appears to maneuvering to avoid sharing 
additional information with Congress.

According to the New York Times [39], the administration may opt to share information on 
last year´s Benghazi attack with Republican senators to avoid revealing any more legal 
memos on the drone war to Democratic senators.

Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Sen. Diane Feinstein, D-Calif., has said [40] that her 
committee reviews videos of strikes.But she also recently said [41] that the committee has 
long sought all of the legal opinions on drone strikes - and that the administration has 
withheld most of the opinions. 


Source


:: Article nr. 95559 sent on 28-feb-2013 00:54 ECT

:: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of this website.


Fonte: URUKNET - www.uruknet.info?p=95559