Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis/Georgia and the Push for Cold War

[rossana <rossana at comodinoposta.org>]

Due articoli: Georgia and the Push for Cold War/'Georgia and Kosovo: A 
Single Intertwined Crisis/
Il secondo è del direttore di Stratfor, George Friedman. Alla fine si 
leggerà che la guerra nel Kosovo è stata un punto di svolta. Gli USA e 
l'Europa non hanno preso sul serio la Russia, i suoi avvertimenti.

Georgia and the Push for Cold War

John McCain ha detto per primo:"Nel 21 ° secolo le nazioni non invadono 
altre nazioni."
Bush ha detto: Il modo di fare della Russia non è il "modo di condurre 
la politica estera nel 21 ° secolo".
Condoleezza Rice 19 agosto ha detto: "La Russia è uno Stato che, 
purtroppo, sta utilizzando quel mezzo che ha sempre utilizzato ogni 
volta che desidera lanciare un messaggio e che è la sua potenza 
militare. Non è questo il modo per affrontare i problemi nel 21 ° secolo. "

Vice President Cheney, Vilnius, Lithuania. 4 maggio 2006

Cheney a Vilnius minaccia la Russia. Il contesto merita di essere 
ricordato: indipendenza del Kosovo, ammissione della Georgia nella NATO, 
scudo antimissile nella repubblica Ceca e in Polonia.
Anche le sue parole: "L'America e tutta l'Europa volevano vedere la 
Russia nella categoria delle democrazie più vibranti, sane....Non è 
legittimo usare il gas e il petrolio come strumenti di 
intimidazione...........
La Russia può fare una scelta....

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/georgia-and-the-push-for_b_120478.html

Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis

By George Friedman

The Russo-Georgian war was rooted in broad geopolitical processes. In 
large part it was simply the result of the cyclical reassertion of 
Russian power. The Russian empire — czarist and Soviet — expanded to its 
borders in the 17th and 19th centuries. It collapsed in 1992. The 
Western powers wanted to make the disintegration permanent. It was 
inevitable that Russia would, in due course, want to reassert its 
claims. That it happened in Georgia was simply the result of circumstance.

There is, however, another context within which to view this, the 
context of Russian perceptions of U.S. and European intentions and of 
U.S. and European perceptions of Russian capabilities. This context 
shaped the policies that led to the Russo-Georgian war. And those 
attitudes can only be understood if we trace the question of Kosovo, 
because the Russo-Georgian war was forged over the last decade over the 
Kosovo question.

Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics in the early 1990s. The 
borders of the republics did not cohere to the distribution of 
nationalities. Many — Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and so on — found 
themselves citizens of republics where the majorities were not of their 
ethnicities and disliked the minorities intensely for historical 
reasons. Wars were fought between Croatia and Serbia (still calling 
itself Yugoslavia because Montenegro was part of it), Bosnia and Serbia 
and Bosnia and Croatia. Other countries in the region became involved as 
well.

One conflict became particularly brutal. Bosnia had a large area 
dominated by Serbs. This region wanted to secede from Bosnia and rejoin 
Serbia. The Bosnians objected and an internal war in Bosnia took place, 
with the Serbian government involved. This war involved the single 
greatest bloodletting of the bloody Balkan wars, the mass murder by 
Serbs of Bosnians.

Here we must pause and define some terms that are very casually thrown 
around. Genocide is the crime of trying to annihilate an entire people. 
War crimes are actions that violate the rules of war. If a soldier 
shoots a prisoner, he has committed a war crime. Then there is a class 
called “crimes against humanity.” It is intended to denote those crimes 
that are too vast to be included in normal charges of murder or rape. 
They may not involve genocide, in that the annihilation of a race or 
nation is not at stake, but they may also go well beyond war crimes, 
which are much lesser offenses. The events in Bosnia were reasonably 
deemed crimes against humanity. They did not constitute genocide and 
they were more than war crimes.

At the time, the Americans and Europeans did nothing about these crimes, 
which became an internal political issue as the magnitude of the Serbian 
crimes became clear. In this context, the Clinton administration helped 
negotiate the Dayton Accords, which were intended to end the Balkan wars 
and indeed managed to go quite far in achieving this. The Dayton Accords 
were built around the principle that there could be no adjustment in the 
borders of the former Yugoslav republics. Ethnic Serbs would live under 
Bosnian rule. The principle that existing borders were sacrosanct was 
embedded in the Dayton Accords.

In the late 1990s, a crisis began to develop in the Serbian province of 
Kosovo. Over the years, Albanians had moved into the province in a broad 
migration. By 1997, the province was overwhelmingly Albanian, although 
it had not only been historically part of Serbia but also its historical 
foundation. Nevertheless, the Albanians showed significant intentions of 
moving toward either a separate state or unification with Albania. 
Serbia moved to resist this, increasing its military forces and 
indicating an intention to crush the Albanian resistance.

There were many claims that the Serbians were repeating the crimes 
against humanity that were committed in Bosnia. The Americans and 
Europeans, burned by Bosnia, were eager to demonstrate their will. 
Arguing that something between crimes against humanity and genocide was 
under way — and citing reports that between 10,000 and 100,000 Kosovo 
Albanians were missing or had been killed — NATO launched a campaign 
designed to stop the killings. In fact, while some killings had taken 
place, the claims by NATO of the number already killed were false. NATO 
might have prevented mass murder in Kosovo. That is not provable. They 
did not, however, find that mass murder on the order of the numbers 
claimed had taken place. The war could be defended as a preventive 
measure, but the atmosphere under which the war was carried out 
overstated what had happened.

The campaign was carried out without U.N. sanction because of Russian 
and Chinese opposition. The Russians were particularly opposed, arguing 
that major crimes were not being committed and that Serbia was an ally 
of Russia and that the air assault was not warranted by the evidence. 
The United States and other European powers disregarded the Russian 
position. Far more important, they established the precedent that U.N. 
sanction was not needed to launch a war (a precedent used by George W. 
Bush in Iraq). Rather — and this is the vital point — they argued that 
NATO support legitimized the war.

This transformed NATO from a military alliance into a quasi-United 
Nations. What happened in Kosovo was that NATO took on the role of 
peacemaker, empowered to determine if intervention was necessary, 
allowed to make the military intervention, and empowered to determine 
the outcome. Conceptually, NATO was transformed from a military force 
into a regional multinational grouping with responsibility for 
maintenance of regional order, even within the borders of states that 
are not members. If the United Nations wouldn’t support the action, the 
NATO Council was sufficient.

Since Russia was not a member of NATO, and since Russia denied the 
urgency of war, and since Russia was overruled, the bombing campaign 
against Kosovo created a crisis in relations with Russia. The Russians 
saw the attack as a unilateral attack by an anti-Russian alliance on a 
Russian ally, without sound justification. Then-Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin was not prepared to make this into a major confrontation, nor 
was he in a position to. The Russians did not so much acquiesce as 
concede they had no options.

The war did not go as well as history records. The bombing campaign did 
not force capitulation and NATO was not prepared to invade Kosovo. The 
air campaign continued inconclusively as the West turned to the Russians 
to negotiate an end. The Russians sent an envoy who negotiated an 
agreement consisting of three parts. First, the West would halt the 
bombing campaign. Second, Serbian army forces would withdraw and be 
replaced by a multinational force including Russian troops. Third, 
implicit in the agreement, the Russian troops would be there to 
guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty.

As soon as the agreement was signed, the Russians rushed troops to the 
Pristina airport to take up their duties in the multinational force — as 
they had in the Bosnian peacekeeping force. In part because of 
deliberate maneuvers and in part because no one took the Russians 
seriously, the Russians never played the role they believed had been 
negotiated. They were never seen as part of the peacekeeping operation 
or as part of the decision-making system over Kosovo. The Russians felt 
doubly betrayed, first by the war itself, then by the peace arrangements.

The Kosovo war directly effected the fall of Yeltsin and the rise of 
Vladimir Putin. The faction around Putin saw Yeltsin as an incompetent 
bungler who allowed Russia to be doubly betrayed. The Russian perception 
of the war directly led to the massive reversal in Russian policy we see 
today. The installation of Putin and Russian nationalists from the 
former KGB had a number of roots. But fundamentally it was rooted in the 
events in Kosovo. Most of all it was driven by the perception that NATO 
had now shifted from being a military alliance to seeing itself as a 
substitute for the United Nations, arbitrating regional politics. Russia 
had no vote or say in NATO decisions, so NATO’s new role was seen as a 
direct challenge to Russian interests.

Thus, the ongoing expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union and the 
promise to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO were seen in terms of 
the Kosovo war. From the Russian point of view, NATO expansion meant a 
further exclusion of Russia from decision-making, and implied that NATO 
reserved the right to repeat Kosovo if it felt that human rights or 
political issues required it. The United Nations was no longer the prime 
multinational peacekeeping entity. NATO assumed that role in the region 
and now it was going to expand all around Russia.

Then came Kosovo’s independence. Yugoslavia broke apart into its 
constituent entities, but the borders of its nations didn’t change. 
Then, for the first time since World War II, the decision was made to 
change Serbia’s borders, in opposition to Serbian and Russian wishes, 
with the authorizing body, in effect, being NATO. It was a decision 
avidly supported by the Americans.

The initial attempt to resolve Kosovo’s status was the round of 
negotiations led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari that 
officially began in February 2006 but had been in the works since 2005. 
This round of negotiations was actually started under U.S. urging and 
closely supervised from Washington. In charge of keeping Ahtisaari’s 
negotiations running smoothly was Frank G. Wisner, a diplomat during the 
Clinton administration. Also very important to the U.S. effort was 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel 
Fried, another leftover from the Clinton administration and a specialist 
in Soviet and Polish affairs.

In the summer of 2007, when it was obvious that the negotiations were 
going nowhere, the Bush administration decided the talks were over and 
that it was time for independence. On June 10, 2007, Bush said that the 
end result of negotiations must be “certain independence.” In July 2007, 
Daniel Fried said that independence was “inevitable” even if the talks 
failed. Finally, in September 2007, Condoleezza Rice put it succinctly: 
“There’s going to be an independent Kosovo. We’re dedicated to that.” 
Europeans took cues from this line.

How and when independence was brought about was really a European 
problem. The Americans set the debate and the Europeans implemented it. 
Among Europeans, the most enthusiastic about Kosovo independence were 
the British and the French. The British followed the American line while 
the French were led by their foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had 
also served as the U.N. Kosovo administrator. The Germans were more 
cautiously supportive.

On Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized 
rapidly by a small number of European states and countries allied with 
the United States. Even before the declaration, the Europeans had 
created an administrative body to administer Kosovo. The Europeans, 
through the European Union, micromanaged the date of the declaration.

On May 15, during a conference in Ekaterinburg, the foreign ministers of 
India, Russia and China made a joint statement regarding Kosovo. It was 
read by the Russian host minister, Sergei Lavrov, and it said: “In our 
statement, we recorded our fundamental position that the unilateral 
declaration of independence by Kosovo contradicts Resolution 1244. 
Russia, India and China encourage Belgrade and Pristina to resume talks 
within the framework of international law and hope they reach an 
agreement on all problems of that Serbian territory.”

The Europeans and Americans rejected this request as they had rejected 
all Russian arguments on Kosovo. The argument here was that the Kosovo 
situation was one of a kind because of atrocities that had been 
committed. The Russians argued that the level of atrocity was unclear 
and that, in any case, the government that committed them was long gone 
from Belgrade. More to the point, the Russians let it be clearly known 
that they would not accept the idea that Kosovo independence was a 
one-of-a-kind situation and that they would regard it, instead, as a new 
precedent for all to follow.

The problem was not that the Europeans and the Americans didn’t hear the 
Russians. The problem was that they simply didn’t believe them — they 
didn’t take the Russians seriously. They had heard the Russians say 
things for many years. They did not understand three things. First, that 
the Russians had reached the end of their rope. Second, that Russian 
military capability was not what it had been in 1999. Third, and most 
important, NATO, the Americans and the Europeans did not recognize that 
they were making political decisions that they could not support militarily.

For the Russians, the transformation of NATO from a military alliance 
into a regional United Nations was the problem. The West argued that 
NATO was no longer just a military alliance but a political arbitrator 
for the region. If NATO does not like Serbian policies in Kosovo, it can 
— at its option and in opposition to U.N. rulings — intervene. It could 
intervene in Serbia and it intended to expand deep into the former 
Soviet Union. NATO thought that because it was now a political arbiter 
encouraging regimes to reform and not just a war-fighting system, 
Russian fears would actually be assuaged. To the contrary, it was 
Russia’s worst nightmare. Compensating for all this was the fact that 
NATO had neglected its own military power. Now, Russia could do 
something about it.

At the beginning of this discourse, we explained that the underlying 
issues behind the Russo-Georgian war went deep into geopolitics and that 
it could not be understood without understanding Kosovo. It wasn’t 
everything, but it was the single most significant event behind all of 
this. The war of 1999 was the framework that created the war of 2008.

The problem for NATO was that it was expanding its political reach and 
claims while contracting its military muscle. The Russians were 
expanding their military capability (after 1999 they had no place to go 
but up) and the West didn’t notice. In 1999, the Americans and Europeans 
made political decisions backed by military force. In 2008, in Kosovo, 
they made political decisions without sufficient military force to stop 
a Russian response. Either they underestimated their adversary or — even 
more amazingly — they did not see the Russians as adversaries despite 
absolutely clear statements the Russians had made. No matter what 
warning the Russians gave, or what the history of the situation was, the 
West couldn’t take the Russians seriously.

It began in 1999 with war in Kosovo and it ended in 2008 with the 
independence of Kosovo. When we study the history of the coming period, 
the war in Kosovo will stand out as a turning point. Whatever the 
humanitarian justification and the apparent ease of victory, it set the 
stage for the rise of Putin and the current and future crises.