USAF Report: “Most” Nuclear Weapon Sites In Europe Do Not Meet US Security Requirements

[rossana <rossana at comodinoposta.org>]

Problemi di sicurezza (grandi problemi di sicurezza) nelle basi europee 
dove sono stoccate armi nucleari statunitensi.
Attenzione qui si legge che a Ghedi vi sono problemi di sicurezza.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/usaf/BRR-2008.pdf

By Hans M. Kristensen

An internal U.S. Air Force investigation has determined that “most 
sites” currently used for deploying nuclear weapons in Europe do not 
meet Department of Defense security requirements.

A summary of the investigation report was released by the Pentagon in 
February 2008 but omitted the details. Now a partially declassified 
version of the full report, recently obtained by the Federation of 
American Scientists, reveals a much bigger nuclear security problem in 
Europe that previously known.

As a result of these security problems, according to other sources, the 
U.S. plans to withdraw its nuclear custodial unit from at least one base 
and consolidate the remaining nuclear mission in Europe at fewer bases.

European Nuclear Safety Deficiencies Detailed

The national nuclear bases in Europe, those where nuclear weapons are 
stored for use by the host nation’s own aircraft, are at the center of 
the findings of the Blue Ribbon Review (BRR), the investigation that was 
triggered by the notorious incident in August 2007 when the U.S. Air 
Force lost track of six nuclear warheads for 36 hours as they were flow 
across the United States without the knowledge of the military personnel 
in charge of safeguarding and operating the nuclear weapons.

“Most” nuclear sites in Europe don’t meet DOD security standards, 
according to the Blue Ribbon Review report.

The final report of the investigation – Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of 
Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures – found that “host nation 
security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from country to 
country in terms of personnel, facilities, and equipment.” The report 
describes that “inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment 
provided to the security mission by the host nation were evident as the 
team traveled from site to site….Examples of areas noted in need of 
repair at several of the sites include support buildings, fencing, 
lighting, and security systems.”

The situation is significant: “A consistently noted theme throughout the 
visits,” the BRR concluded, “was that most sites require significant 
additional resources to meet DOD security requirements.” Despite overall 
safety standards and close cooperation and teamwork between U.S. Air 
Force personnel and their host nation counterparts, the inspectors found 
that “each site presents unique security challenges.”

Specific examples of security issues discovered include conscripts with 
as little as nine months active duty experience being used protect 
nuclear weapons against theft.

Inspections can hypothetically detect deficiencies and inconsistencies, 
but the BRR team found that U.S. Air Force inspectors are hampered in 
performing “no notice inspections” because the host nations and NATO 
require advance notice before they can visit the bases. If crews know 
when the inspection will occur, their performance might not reflect the 
normal situation at the base.

Many of the safety issues discovered are precipitated by the fact that 
the primary mission of the squadrons and wings is not nuclear deterrence 
but real-world conventional operations in support of the war on 
terrorism and other campaigns. This dual-mission has created a situation 
where many nuclear positions are “one deep,” and where rotations, 
deployments, and illnesses can cause shortfalls.

The review recommended consolidating the bases to “minimize variances 
and reduce vulnerabilities at overseas locations.”

USAFE Commander Visits Nuclear Bases

In light of the findings about Air Force nuclear security, General Roger 
Brady, the USAFE Commander, on June 11 visited Kleine Brogel Air Base in 
Belgium and Volkel Air Base in Holland. Both bases store U.S. nuclear 
weapons for delivery by their national F-16 fighters.

A news story on a USAF web site notes that the weapons security issues 
found by the BRR investigation were “at other bases,” suggesting that 
Büchel Air Base in Germany or Ghedi Torre Air Base in Italy were the 
problem. Even so, the BRR found problems at “most sites,” visits to 
Kleine Brogel and Volkel were described in the context of these 
findings. Two commanders of the 52 Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, 
which controls the 701st and 703rd Munitions Support Squadrons at the 
national bases, were also present “to witness both units for the first 
time.”

Withdrawal and Consolidation

The deficiencies at host nation bases apparently have triggered a U.S. 
decision to withdraw the Munition Support Squadron (MUNSS) from one of 
the national bases.

Four MUNSS are currently deployed a four national bases in Europe: the 
701st MUNSS at Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium, the 702nd MUNSS at 
Büchel Air Base in Germany, the 703rd MUNSS at Volkel Air Base in 
Holland, and the 704th MUNSS at Ghedi Torre in Italy (see top image).

It is not yet known which base it is, but sources indicate that it might 
involve the 704th MUNSS at Ghedi Torre in Northern Italy.

Status of Nuclear Weapons Deployment

The number and location of nuclear weapons in Europe are secret. 
However, based in previous reports, official statements, declassified 
documents and leaks, a best estimate can be made that the current 
deployment consists of approximately 200-350 B61 nuclear bombs (see 
Table 1). The most recent public official statement was made by NATO 
Vice Secretary General Guy Roberts in an interview with the Italian 
RAINEWS in April 2007: “We do say that we’re down to a few hundred 
nuclear weapons.”

Derived from more extensive table. Click table or here to download the 
full table.

The U.S. weapons are stored in underground vaults, known as WS3 (Weapon 
Storage and Security System), at bases in Belgium, Germany, Holland, 
Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Most of the weapons are at U.S. 
Air Force bases, but Belgium, Germany, Holland and Italy each have 
nuclear weapons at one of their national air bases.

The weapons at each of the national bases are under control of a U.S. 
Air Force MUNSS in peacetime but would, upon receipt of proper authority 
from the U.S. National Command Authority, be handed over to the national 
Air Force at the base in a war for delivery by the host nation’s own 
aircraft. This highly controversial arrangement contradicts both the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and NATO’s international nonproliferation policy.

Implications and Observations

The main implication of the BRR report is that the nuclear weapons 
deployment in Europe is, and has been for the past decade, a security 
risk. But why it took an investigation triggered by the embarrassing 
Minot incident to discover the security problems in Europe is a puzzle.

Since the terrorist attacks in September 2001, billions of dollars have 
been poured into the Homeland Security chest to increase security at 
U.S. nuclear weapons sites, and a sudden urge to improve safety and use 
control of nuclear weapons has become a principle justification in the 
administration’s proposal to build a whole new generation of Reliable 
Replacement Warheads.

But, apparently, the nuclear deployment in Europe has been allowed to 
follow a less stringent requirement.

This contradicts NATO’s frequent public assurances about the safe 
conditions of the widespread deployment in Europe. Coinciding with the 
dramatic reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe after the Cold War 15 
years ago, “a new, more survivable and secure weapon storage system has 
been installed,” a NATO fact sheet from January 2008 states. “Today, the 
remaining gravity bombs associated with DCA [Dual-Capable Aircraft] are 
stored safely in very few storage sites under highly secure conditions.”

Apparently they are not. Yet despite the BRR findings, the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group meeting in Brussels last week did not issue a statement. 
But at the previous meeting in June 2007 the group reaffirmed the “great 
value” of continuing the deployment in Europe, “which provide an 
essential political and military link between the European and North 
American members of the Alliance.”

That NATO - nearly two decades after the Cold War ended - believes it 
needs U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to keep the alliance 
together is a troubling sign. NATO air forces are stretched thin to meet 
real-world operations in the war against terrorism and other campaigns, 
and tactical nuclear weapons are not a priority, no matter what nuclear 
bureaucrats might claim.

Even Republican presidential candidate John McCain apparently does not 
believe tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are essential for NATO. On 
May 27 he stated that, if elected, he would, “in close consultation with 
our allies…like to explore ways we and Russia can reduce – and hopefully 
eliminate – deployments of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.”

Many European governments would support such a plan - even though some 
of the new eastern European NATO members see Russian resurgence as a 
reason to continue the deployment. But their security concerns can be 
met by other means, and Germany and Norway have already been pushing a 
proposal inside NATO for a review of the alliance’s nuclear policy, the 
Belgium parliament has called for a withdrawal, and there is 
overwhelming cross-political public support in Germany to end the 
deployment in Europe.

Perhaps the BRR findings will help empower these countries and convince 
NATO and the next U.S. administration that the time has come to finally 
complete the withdrawal if tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/usaf-report-%e2%80%9cmost%e2%80%9d-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-us-security-requirements.php